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Outsiders and the Impact of Party Affiliation in Ecuadorian Presidential 
Elections 
 
Rachel Hammond 
ABSTRACT 
 
How has the party affiliation of presidential candidates impacted 
presidential elections in Ecuador? Historically, how have political party 
candidates and outsiders performed in elections and how has this changed over 
the last 20 years of democratic history? This case study attempts to answer 
fundamental questions about the connections between parties and electablility of 
presidential candidates. In a country with an inchoate party system and a history 
of populism, personalist candidates have always had relatively high levels of 
electoral success. Yet, it would seem that preference for unaligned candidates is 
increasing. After years of domination by political party candidates, the 
Ecuadorian people elected two political neophytes to compete in the final round 
of the 2002 elections. Both campaigned as outsiders, with strong opposition to 
the party system, and both created personal political parties that served as 
electoral vehicles.  
 iv
The dependent variable, the success of outsider candidates in the 2002 
elections, appears to come from three main independent variables: a history of 
weak and highly ineffective parties, voter alienation from institutions due to 
continuing political and economic crises, and a political culture that revolves 
around personalist and populist presidents. Because of these evident trends, 
outsiders in Ecuador have found favorable situations for messages of opposition 
to the political system. In addition, appeals to alienated citizens, based on a 
personal campaign, have proven successful in Ecuadorian elections. Parties 
appear to become increasingly irrelevant in the executive sphere. 
After a brief historical orientation, this thesis discusses the impact of the 
presidencies of Abdalá Bucaram (elected 1996, impeached 1997) and Jamil 
Mahuad (elected 1998, overthrown 2000) as important background for the 2002 
election. The hypothesis is that in 2002, alignment with traditional political parties 
diminished the support for candidates in the presidential elections. This thesis 
analyzes the presidential candidates that participated in the 2002 campaign, and 
concludes that affiliating with a traditional political party was a liability for a 
presidential candidate in the 2002 elections.   
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CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
The recent democratization of Latin America has spread across the 
continent over the last two decades. For various reasons, including economic 
problems and a loss of legitimacy of governing bodies, virtually the entire region 
abandoned decades of authoritarian, military and dictatorial rule and returned to 
a governmental system of representative democracy. In a climate of economic 
collapse and ineffective bureaucracy, democracy provided hope for fundamental 
changes in Latin American governments. These new democratic institutions were 
frequently accompanied by a new economic program, dubbed neoliberalism, 
which attempted to address deep economic problems, including bloated 
bureaucracies and inefficient economic practices in the region. The combination 
of democracy and neoliberalism was supposed to make drastic changes in Latin 
America, leading to more open, representative and responsive government, 
accompanied by a reinvigorated economy that provided prosperity similar to that 
enjoyed by the United States and other first world countries. It was to be Latin 
America’s time to shine. 
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The experiment did not go as planned. After widespread optimism and 
initial enthusiasm for governmental and economic reforms, both economic and 
political systems have fallen far short of the promised results for governmental 
and economic stability and prosperity. Neoliberal reforms failed to bring about 
significant changes in the quality of life for the majority of Latin Americans, and 
states lost important sources of revenue due to privatization. As governments 
struggled to keep up with debt payments, austerity measures continued to cut 
social services and increase inequalities in Latin America. Country after country 
experienced economic crises. These unending economic problems have deeply 
affected Latin America’s perception and opinion of democracy, as in 2004, 54.7% 
of Latin Americans interviewed reported that they would be willing to accept an 
authoritarian government if that government could solve deep economic 
problems. (UNDP, 2004:31)   
Latin America’s elected executives have also not fulfilled expectations. 
Marred by corruption scandals and lack of capacity to address economic 
problems, these leaders have lost much legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. 
In multiple countries, politicians have become viewed as corrupt, unresponsive, 
self-interested men and women, little concerned with the conditions of the 
majority representation of the populace. As international financial institutions 
obligated presidents to push through unpopular and widely rejected austerity 
measures, presidents have become vulnerable to unconstitutional departures 
from office. The promises of development have not come through. 
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It is important to highlight significant accomplishments in establishing a 
viable democratic system in Latin America. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) emphasizes the general perception that Latin America’s 
long history of authoritarianism seems to have finally come to an end. Nearly the 
entire region has converted its political system into a democratic one, and 
elections are the accepted way to choose leaders. Yet, United Nations secretary 
general Kofi Annan asserts that elections aren’t isolated events, but a part of a 
larger process of democracy. (UNDP, 2004:44)   
The evolving democracy in Latin America has had a huge impact on the 
political, economic, social and cultural life of the region. Never before in history 
has a region with such pronounced problems of poverty and inequality been 
completely organized under democratic regimes. (UNDP 2004:36) In contrast to 
armed opposition, Latin Americans have begun to log their protest against the 
status quo inside the democratic system. In recent years, particularly in the last 
decade, Latin America has experienced a new wave of political and social 
movements. These social movements have challenged traditional elite rule in 
Latin America. Fighting for the inclusion of alienated groups of people, such as 
indigenous citizens, women, and citizens of African descent, social movements 
have frequently moved into the political sphere. 1 The populace is generally 
becoming much less tolerant of general Latin American political characteristics, 
including corruption, ineffective rule, and unresponsive and inefficient 
                                                 
1 For a more extended on the development of social movements across Latin America, please see Vanden’s two works. 
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government bureaucracies and programs. (Vanden, 2004:1 New political 
movements) According to Latinobarómetro, a respected public opinion poll, most 
Latin Americans continue to favor democracy as a political model. (Shifter, 
2003:2) Yet dismal economic performance has impacted the credibility and 
legitimacy of traditional politicians. Elections continue to be seen as the most 
accepted way to select leaders. (Shifter, 2003:2)  
 Politically, the populace has rebelled against existing institutions, parties 
and politicians by rejecting their candidates in presidential and congressional 
elections. The United Nations Development Programme recently released a 
report on the state of democracy in Latin America, highlighting the crisis of 
political parties as an agent of representation. This has resulted in a loss of 
confidence in political parties by the electorate, and affected their electoral 
choices.  (UNDP, 2004:3) Using the power of the ballot, Latin Americans have 
often steered away from candidates aligned with established parties. A new 
group of leaders, dubbed outsiders or neopopulists by some, have worked to 
appeal to dissatisfied citizens, frustrated with the lack of economic development 
and opportunities in their countries. The plethora of new political and social 
movements has greatly changed the face of Latin American politics in recent 
years.    
In regards to presidential elections, the role of political parties has evolved 
in many unexpected ways. Though political parties have rarely formed the 
cornerstone of a Latin American political system, many Latin American 
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constitutions tried to legislate important functions for political parties when 
reconstructing the political system. These contemporary constitutions intended to 
create an essential role for political parties, by casting them as critical links 
between the state and civil society.  
Yet, the historical reality of Latin America’s personalism and populism 
impacted the construction of healthy and effective parties. Latin America’s 
leaders have historically arrived into office based on their personal capacity to 
obtain and hold power, not due to institutions that have supported and assisted in 
their quest for power. Caudillos ruled Latin America for decades in the 1800’s, 
and populists quickly adapted their political message to create an attachment to 
an individual politician as opposed to an organization or institution. In the context 
of historically weak party systems in many Latin American countries, the 
democratic era has given the power to elect leaders back to the public. As many 
parties have gradually lost legitimacy, the situation has arrived to a point where in 
some circumstances aligning with a traditional political party can be damaging for 
a presidential candidate. While political parties provide important legislative 
support and also critical constraints on executive candidates, voters have 
sometimes rejected traditional political party presidential candidates in a variety 
of party systems in Latin America. This trend has strengthened in recent times. 
Of late, several outsiders, unaligned with political parties, have been elected into 
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office on highly oppositional, personal campaigns. 2  The include Peruvian 
candidates Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo, Venezuelan Hugo Chávez, 
and Ecuadorian Lucio Gutiérrez. Many of these new leaders enter the executive 
office with no experience in politics whatsoever.  
Democratic Systems 
The UNDP emphasizes an important concept of a full democracy, which 
includes social, economic, and cultural rights. In addition, the UNDP asserts that 
politics is a critical component of democracy. While contemporary literature has 
focused on the characteristics of a democracy in the context of a political regime, 
this has negated important complementary parts of a democracy. For this study, 
inside the electoral arena, a political definition is necessary. Yet this study fully 
supports the broader concept emphasized by the UNDP report on democracy, 
which states that a strictly political definition of democracy hinders the 
development of a concept of democracy which actively limits the capacity of the 
state to respond to great inequalities in the region. As the government fails to 
provide social and civil rights, it loses credibility among large sectors of the 
population. (UNDP, 2004:47) 
Dahl (1989) and O’Donnell (1996) have constructed definitions of political 
democracy. Dahl establishes a formal definition of democracy, with the following 
attributes: elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to 
                                                 
2 This thesis defines outsiders as, “Candidates who have little or no political experience, campaign on opposition to 
established institutions, political parties and political elite, and highlight their absence of relationship to existing political 
system.” 
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run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational 
autonomy. O’Donnell adds the following attributes: elected officials (and some 
appointed persons, such as high court judges) should not be arbitrarily 
terminated before the end of their constitutionally mandated terms, elected 
officials should not be subject to severe constraints, vetoes, or exclusion from 
certain policy domains by other, nonelected actors, especially the armed forces, 
and there should be an uncontested territory that clearly defines the voting 
population. All of these characteristics of democracy highlight the importance of 
free and fair elections. 
Political Parties 
Political parties have formed an important base for most democratic 
political systems. In parliamentary systems, political parties play an essential role 
in the election of the prime minister, which must come from a party with strong 
support in the legislature. In presidential systems, the executive and legislative 
branches are more independent of one another, but political parties continue to 
form critical parts of the legislative system. Parties have the responsibility to 
propose or postulate candidates for the national executive post.  
General political party theory, especially in the past, comes from the 
United States and Europe. The characteristics of these countries, including 
military subordination to civilian governments and a vital role for the legislature, 
form an assumed basis for their works.  
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Scholars concerned with the obvious differences between democratic 
theory and reality in Latin America have struggled to reconcile theory with reality. 
The fundamental differences in the Latin American reality made political party 
theory from Europe and the United States a weak base for understanding Latin 
American politics. Von Mettenheim and Malloy (1998) assert that western 
democratic theory neglects important realities of Latin American politics, and that 
theoretical applications based on Western reality can’t be accurate for Latin 
America. Western theory bases its definition on competitive elections or 
emphasizes ideal standards of citizen participation. Yet, theorists fail to provide 
means or reflections on how to reach these standards.  
The political history of Latin America varied widely from that of Europe. In 
the 1970’s and 1980’s, Latin American countries began a rapid transition from 
military dictatorships and systems of bureaucratic authoritarianism to democracy. 
With the reintroduction of democracy in these countries, many countries focused 
on constructing a viable and effective representative democracy, less prone to 
coups and dictatorships.  In constructing these new democracies, leaders used 
constitutions as one way to address fundamental grievances about lack of 
representation of different sectors of society in the political system. Latin 
America’s political culture rarely valued political parties as important components 
of a political system. Yet in Ecuador, leaders used the constitution to make 
political parties critical players in government. These architects tried to mandate 
changes in political culture, using constitutions. 
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 One of Latin America’s most historically dominant institutions in politics 
has been the military, which has greatly affected the development and 
construction of government. (Lieuwen, 1961, Johnson, 1964). Samuel Huntington 
made an important theoretical contribution to the understanding of the Latin 
American power structure.  (Huntington,1968:196), He established the idea of a 
praetorian system. In this system, social forces confront each other nakedly; 
neither political institutions, nor corps of professional leaders are recognized or 
accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. While 
Huntington developed this in the context of military intervention in politics, this 
applies to societies that have weak institutional systems. Other scholars have 
focused on the changing role of the military in politics since the reintroduction of 
democracy in Latin America. (Millett and Cold-Biss, 1996, Loveman and Daives, 
1997). 
Several theorists began to look at the construction of parties in Latin 
America. Many classified party systems based on the number of political parties, 
ranging from two-party systems to multiparty systems. Two important theorists 
took other avenues in identifying and classifying party systems which was not 
strictly based on numbers of political parties. They argued that the significance of 
the party system was the role the parties played in government. Scholars have 
warned against the assumption that political party systems are going to play an 
important role in the western sense in the Latin American context. (McDonald 
and Ruhl, 1989). Yet, theory dictates that a democratic system has several 
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important key institutions that serve specific roles. Mainwaring and Scully claim 
that a strong, institutionalized party system is a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for consolidating democracy and governing effectively. (Hartlyn, 1996)  
Political parties are defined as any political group that presents candidates 
in elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public 
office. A party system is seen as a set of patterned interactions in competitions 
among parties. (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). 
Ronald MacDonald (1989) attempted to measure the significance of 
parties by the functions they perform in electoral processes and government, 
including political recruitment, political communication, social control and 
government organizing and policymaking. He emphasized the importance of 
personalism and the military in Latin American history, including the reality that 
private sector groups generally have worked directly with governments instead of 
working through political parties. In classifying different types of Latin American 
party systems, he looked at the role of parties in society. He found that the 
significance of party systems is closely related to the subordination of the military 
to civilian authority. He highlighted the characteristics of Latin American parties, 
including elitism, fractionalism, personalism, organizational weaknesses, and 
heterogeneous mass support. (1989:7-8) In addition, he asserted that it is 
through elections that political legitimacy comes. By winning elections and having 
the freedom to participate in them, parties and democracy gain their legitimacy. 
(1989:6) 
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 Mainwaring and Scully (1995) provided a landmark book on party systems 
in Latin America, concerned with the study of the institutionalization of party 
systems. They assert that the institutionalization of an effective party system 
forms a fundamental base for a successful democratic system. They emphasize 
the importance of parties, due to the domination of electoral politics and that 
candidates almost always run through party labels. According to the authors, 
“parties shape the nature of political competition and provide symbols that orient 
the electorate and political elites.” (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:4). Further, to 
institutionalize a system, four conditions must occur: regularity of party 
competition (low electoral volatility), stability of parties roots in society, legitimacy 
accorded to parties by elections, and the existence of solid party organizations 
independent of individual leaders. (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:2) Party 
functions include: channeling and expressing interests of the electorate, giving 
the electorate a “shortcut” to what the candidate will stand for, because of 
ideological base, helping groups elaborate their interests while allowing 
governments to govern, and establishing legitimacy.  
 Mainwaring and Scully address the historical reality of personalism and 
populism in Latin America. They assert that the lack of solid parties creates great 
space for populists, who aren’t constrained by parties and don’t attempt to create 
institutions. (1995:22). When party systems aren’t strong, public opinion 
becomes an important tool of electability, which leads to campaigning on a 
campaign of popular, though not realistic ideas. Weak party systems have a 
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tendency to punish the parties of the incumbents, due to projected promises that 
later aren’t fulfilled. (1995:25-26).In addition, once a president comes to power, a 
weak party system hinders effective governing due to the inability of solid parties 
to construct coalitions. 
 Elections form the base of legitimacy in the democratic system. 
(MacDonald, 1989, Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Party systems form an 
important component of establishing legitimate government. In terms of executive 
and legislative elections, parties play a vital role. In an institutionalized party 
system, the party chooses the candidates for the executive and the legislature. 
The party has a base in society, and a general ideological viewpoint. The 
electorate can infer certain assumptions about the candidates due to their 
political party affiliation. Once a candidate becomes the president, he or she is 
able to work with their party and other parties in the legislature to enact effective 
legislation. In times of trouble, the party becomes a system of support for the 
executive. 
 Few Latin American countries function like this. Yet, the theoretical 
importance of parties continues to form a fundamental base of the establishment 
of an effective and self-sustaining democratic system in Latin America.  This 
thesis addresses the connection of party affiliations and electability among one of 
Latin America’s least stable and least institutionalized party systems, that of 
Ecuador.  
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Mainwaring (2001) makes four important points as to the consequences of 
a weakly institutionalized party system. Firstly, because of the lack of the 
electorate’s connection with the party system, people vote for personalities, 
which make individuals instead of institutions the main political power players. 
Secondly, weak party systems impede accountability. Thirdly, the weak party 
system impacts the representation of popular interests. Finally, the candidate 
lacks a system of political support to sustain him and support governmental 
policies once in office. 
While McDonald and Ruhl organize different party systems in Latin 
America based on citizens attitudes towards parties (dominant, primary, 
secondary, or marginal), Mainwaring and Scully choose levels of 
institutionalization as the way to categorize different party systems 
(institutionalized party systems, hegemonic party systems in transition, and 
inchoate party systems). These are the following groupings, according to both 
McDonald and Ruhl (1989) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995). This forms an 
important historical context for important changes in political party structures 
across the continent. 
Mainwaring and Scully, 1995 
Institutionalized-Venezuela, Costa Rica, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia and 
Argentina 
 Hegemonic-Mexico, Paraguay 
 Inchoate-Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador 
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McDonald and Ruhl, 1989 
 Dominant-Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico 
 Primary-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Cuba, Nicaragua 
Secondary-Peru, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Bolivia 
 Marginal-Paraguay, Panama, Haiti 
In addition, Catherine Conaghan defines Ecuador as an “extreme multi-
party system” (1995:434) which emphasizes the prevalence of a multitude of 
different political parties.3 The weakness in this extreme multi party system is that 
few, if any, parties have the capacity to become ideologically based, because of 
the frequent reorganization, appearances, and disappearances of parties. In 
addition, this has created clashes between the legislative and executive 
branches, due to the difficulty of coalition building in Ecuador.  Finally, this 
configuration impedes the possibility that party systems can serve as a shortcut 
for the electorate to know what a party label means. 
In many different Latin American countries, political parties have become 
increasingly notorious for their perceived corruption and lack of capacity to 
address important societal, economic and political problems. In a recent survey, 
59% of political leaders interviewed stated that political parties are failing to fulfill 
their necessary role, including the critical one of representation (UNDP, 2004). In 
addition, when asked if governments provide what they promise, only 2.3% of 
                                                 
3 Conaghan defines an extreme multiparty system as, “A party system that revolves around competition among at least 
five or more parties.” Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:434.  
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Latin Americans said yes. When asked why politicians don’t complete promises, 
64.3% said because politicians lie to win elections. (UNDP, p. 49 of report)  
Populism, Neopopulism, and Personalism  
Latin America has always had distinct patterns in leadership style, ranging 
from military dictators, to caudillos, to parliamentarians, to socialists. (Conniff, 
1999:2) .Scholars have argued that in Latin America, power is seen in more 
personal terms, not in impersonal institutionalized forms. (Angell, 1968:362, 
Vanden and Provost, 2003).  
Since the 1930’s, Ecuador has formed an interesting (if somewhat 
understated) case study of the phenomenon that is referred to as populism. To 
define populism in a single sentence is a difficult task, as debate rages over 
whether populism is a historical phenomenon, an ideology, or a political 
movement. Michael Conniff’s general definition (Conniff 2000:4-6) highlights 
many characteristics of populists, including a new style of campaigning that held 
voter loyalty, a focus on nationalism and cultural pride, promises of a better life, 
and the ability to court followers from all different economic classes. These 
populists also exhibited charisma, which Conniff defines as “special personal 
qualities and talents that, in the eyes of their followers, empowered them to 
defend the interests of the masses and uphold national dignity.” (Conniff 1999:4) 
 A main problem in developing an adequate definition of populism is the 
influence of each country’s particular political development on their populist 
experience. In larger Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, 
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populism’s main support came from the working class created by the process of 
industrialization. In other cases, populism flourished in unindustrialized countries, 
and the leader made no attempts to create a party system, as is the Ecuadorian 
case. 
The history of populism in Latin America has greatly impacted the 
construction of political party systems. In countries where populists focused on 
building political parties, these parties played a large role in the political 
development of the country. One particular assessment of the power of Latin 
American populist has been that they were particularly successful at doing four 
things: gaining high office, holding onto power, maintaining their following, and 
renewing their careers. (Conniff, 1999:1)  
New theoretical work on the prevalence of candidates with populist 
campaigning styles but different economic priorities has formed a branch of 
leaders, dubbed neopopulists. Demmers, Fernbandez Jilberto, Hogenboom. 
(2001), address the transformation of Latin American populism. Both classical 
and neoliberal populism is associated with significant economic changes. While 
the staying power of classical populists directly related to the state’s capacity to 
meet people’s demands, neoliberalism has changed the capacity of the state to 
meet people’s material needs. Populism depended on a strong state and on 
income to satisfy all elite groups who would fight for power. In addition, 
government remained accepted if they continued to spend large sums of money 
on social services and program. As neoliberalism removed the state capacity to 
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financially meet the demands of large sectors of society (spending became 
restricted and regulated), many thought populism would cease to exist. With 
strictly controlled finances, populists couldn’t have the financial support to 
succeed in office.   
With the sole exception of 20th century Mexico and the staying power of 
the PRI, Latin American politics has generally centered on personalities as 
opposed to institutions. Because of the democratic trend, politicians still need 
widespread mass support to win elections, a situation bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes didn’t encounter.  Due to the return to democracy, large masses of 
politically uncommitted people are being incorporated into the system.  
Neopopulists appeal to the informal sector and the urban poor, and have 
integrated many strategies of populism (including organization around charisma, 
dedication to the masses and personalism). Yet while traditional populists 
advocated an active state, neopopulists have shifted economic policy. Rightest 
neopopulists have endorsed strict economic austerity once in office, regardless 
of campaign promises. Both neoliberal reforms and neopopulists support the 
concept of hierarchical decision making, as a central leader makes decisions for 
a whole group of people.  
Delegative Democracy 
Guillermo O’Donnell has addressed the shortcomings of democratic 
theory in regards to the third wave of democratization. (O’Donnell, 1994, 1996, 
1998.) He claims that general democratic theory has too many unexamined 
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assumptions due to the third wave of institutionalization occurring in a reality 
where the division between economically developed countries and the 
developing world continues to widen. Scholars searched for more adequate 
theories of democracy that addressed the unique situation of democratization in 
Latin America which includes the important distinction of an overwhelming debt 
crisis. In other waves of democratization, countries didn’t face such extreme 
financial pressures from the outside world. As many Latin American countries 
scrambled to create a democratic system while meeting international financial 
obligations, Latin America’s new elected presidents needed vast power to push 
through radical, fast paced changes in the economic and political structures of 
the country. O’Donnell’s theory of delegative democracy (O’Donnell, 1994) 
attempted to address the important historical context of strong authoritarian 
institutions and how those interact with rapid democratization. O’Donnell’s 
delegative democracy established a distinct category of democracy, different 
from representative democracy. The electorate voted for the president. The 
president saw this positive support during the election as trust to rule the country 
as he sees fit. He felt no strong restrictions by campaign promises and didn’t 
have a strong political party system constraining him. Nor did he/she have a 
strong party organization to sustain him/her or his/her government. This 
construction becomes most obvious with countries such as Argentina and Brazil 
that have strong traditions of authoritarian presidents ruling without either vertical 
or horizontal constraints.  
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Vertical accountability addresses the capacity of citizens to “punish or 
reward incumbents by voting for or against them, or the candidates they endorse, 
in the next elections.” (O’Donnell, 1999:29) O’Donnell points to the weakness of 
vertical accountability in the fact that elections are only present every few years. 
Horizontal accountability is the ability of government incumbents who are part of 
the state apparatus to provide checks on each other. (O’Donnell, 1999) 
Outsiders and Case Studies 
Further, the last decade in Latin America has seen a new group of 
leaders, often referred to as “outsiders.” The term was coined in the context of 
Alberto Fujimori’s election in Peru in the early 1990’s. Fujimori, a virtually 
unknown Peruvian of Japanese descent, brought a strong message to Peru’s 
people. He used his lack of experience in the political system as a key positive 
factor in his election. Due to widespread disapproval of existing political parties, 
Fujimori was able to win the elections. He campaigned with a strong oppositional 
message to the current political and economic situation, and highlighted his lack 
of association with established politicians. He emphasized people’s 
dissatisfaction with and alienation from the system and had a populist platform. 
Once elected into office, Fujimori slowly consolidated power in both the 
governmental and economic sphere. He enacted strong neoliberal reforms (often 
by decree), defeated a major terrorist guerrilla threat, and retained enough 
popularity to be reelected.  Fujimori even managed to close down congress and 
restructure the government, and win the concurrent election.  Fujimori’s rejection 
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of traditional political parties and his campaign as an outsider, unaligned political 
player brought him from the status of an unknown to the head of the nation. 
In the last five years, certain democratic systems have changed radically. 
Some of these changes have come from historically stable party systems. In 
Mexico, the PRI lost their first presidential election in over 70 years in 20002. In 
1998, former coup leader Hugo Chávez’s election prompted a new constitution 
and a new judicial system in Venezuela. His campaign as an active opponent to 
the corrupt, established politicians and parties appealed to wide sectors of 
Venezuelan society, and the armed coup he led against a democratically elected 
government in 1992 didn’t impact him negatively at the polls. Chávez founded 
and created his personal political party, to provide him with a banner under which 
to run and to place allies in other branches of government. This has 
unquestionably altered the political structure of Venezuela, and highlighted the 
disillusionment of the electorate with traditional political parties and their 
presidential candidates. 
Finally, the 2002 elections brought another former coup leader to the 
presidency in Latin America. In Ecuador, Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez’s surprising 
popularity in the 2002 campaign led him to victory in the second round of the 
2002 elections.  A formerly unknown military man, Gutiérrez grabbed the 
spotlight with his role in the 2000 ouster of then President Jamil Mahuad and his 
participation in a short lived junta. 
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In all of these case studies, one important political institution is 
conspicuously absent: traditional political parties. Their candidates are 
performing poorly in countries that have historically had institutionalized, 
hegemonic, and inchoate party systems. The electoral choices in Latin American 
indicate a clear trend away from a traditional political party system, and exhibit 
the electorate’s desire for a new kind of leader, if not a party or movement. At this 
time of examination and reflection on the process of democracy in the context of 
economic crisis, political parties appear to be weakening in multiple countries. 
Yet scholars have traditionally insisted that political parties play a vital role in any 
functioning democratic system.  
In addition, political parties continue to play an important role in 
congressional elections, negatively impacting governability. Due to the strong 
emphasis on personalism, outsider candidates often have to build difficult 
coalitions in the legislature to pass legislation. Traditional parties are represented 
in congress, outsiders continue to win presidential elections, and presidents 
receive little support in congress or in the larger political system. 
Stable democracies usually have an effective party system which plays a 
vital role in government. In governments where outsider candidates have won, 
these same countries often eventually suffer from inevitable problems with the 
democratic system. Both Venezuela and Peru have faced economic and political 
unrest. After Fujimori won corrupt and fraudulent elections in 2002, the public 
protest toward him and his measures forced him out of office and into exile in 
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Japan. Startling revelations about the widespread corruption in his government 
and the undemocratic practices of his administration came out. Chávez, after 
rewriting the constitution with widespread support, was challenged by a coup in 
April 2002. Though Chávez reclaimed his presidency, millions of Venezuelans 
have voiced their support for a presidential recall, a clause included in his new 
constitution. Both countries have suffered from constitutional crises.   
As many authors have underscored, many Latin American countries have 
never had an effective party system that fulfills its role within the political system. 
Yet, authors seem to agree that those roles are still very important and other 
groups attempt to fill them, including personalist presidents, former coup leaders 
and new political movements. If Latin American voters continue to steer away 
from party representatives, one wonders how this will change the face of Latin 
American democracy.  
 It is important to note that in 1989 and 1995, Ecuador’s party system was 
weak by any of the various measures set forth by different scholars. (MacDonald, 
1989:10, Mainwaring and Scully, 1995:30) Generally, Ecuador was grouped with 
other Andean republics such as Peru and Bolivia, which both have similar 
histories of highly ineffective party systems. Though it is not the intent of this 
work to discuss or contest these groupings, they suggest that Ecuador has a long 
history of weak and uninstitutionalized parties. This study uses information such 
as this to build the important background for the reflections on the political 
situation in 2002. 
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The failure of administrations backed by traditional political parties in the 
1980’s has caused an irreparable alienation of political parties from the electorate 
in presidential elections. Over the last decade, the electorate has become 
mobilized in opposition to unending economic crises. The lack of effective 
political parties, leaders, or other coherent political institutions capable of 
addressing this problem has created a space for personalist leadership and new, 
highly politicized social movements. Ironically, while electing personalist leaders, 
many of the same citizens quickly call for their ouster after the candidates haven’t 
met the expectations they set for themselves. This study suggests the elections 
in 2002 provide concrete evidence that the populace is alienated from political 
parties at a historically high level. The 2002 elections placed an outsider 
candidate with no legislative support and no party system support in office. 
Subsequent events further suggest that the new president’s support will decline 
and that he and his government may soon suffer a marked decline in their 
legitimacy.  
Ecuadorian Literature 
Ecuador has received little attention in both qualitative and quantitative 
studies of political culture and values. Few quantitative studies on public opinion 
in Ecuador exist. The most informational view of contemporary public opinion in 
Ecuador came out in a joint study by the University of Pittusburg and Cedatos 
Ecuador in 2002 (Seligson, 2002). This study addressed perceptions of 
democracy in Ecuador, including support for democracy, antidemocratic values, 
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local government and democracy, civil rights, corruption and democracy, and 
participation in civil society. All of these public opinion studies address feelings 
after democratic transition.  
 The joint study by the University of Pittsburg and Cedatos Ecuador 
identifies two main categories of qualitative studies about political culture in 
Ecuador. The first category focuses on the contradictions between political 
development (in embracing systems such as the democratic one) and the 
continual informalization of political styles and discourses. This shows that while 
the political system has fundamentally changed, rhetoric and campaign style 
continue to focus more on personality as opposed to institutions. As a prime 
example of this phenomenon, the study of José María Velasco Ibarra dominates 
the study of populism. The second tract focuses on ethnic diversity and 
democracy, due to the presence of strongly organized indigenous groups. 
Thematic studies tend to address issues of identity, consensus, equality and 
inequality, governability, democracy, citizenship and populism.  
Nearly all works on Ecuadorian politics highlight the endemic instability of 
Ecuador’s political system, both before and during the democratic era. This 
question has interested a number of scholars.  (Blanksten, 1964, Martz, 1972, 
Fitch, 1977 Lucero, 2002, Gerlach, 2003, Walsh, 2001.)  Research after the 
democratic era has mainly addressed the transition and consolidation of 
Ecuador’s system of democracy. In 1979, Ecuador became the first dictatorship 
in Latin America to transition to a democratic system of government, with the 
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support of the military and prominent civilian leaders. Corkhill and Cubitt (1988) 
Blanksten (1964) and Fitch (1977) addressed the military’s role in Ecuador since 
its initial intervention in civilian politics in 1925.  
George Blanksten (1964) develops the concept that historically, Ecuador’s 
conquerors imposed a power system based on the divine right of rule and 
hierarchical, unquestionable authority. Neither the Inca empire nor the Spanish 
empire valued or encouraged democracy. His assessment of caudillos integrates 
the idea of caudillos representing the history of monarchy in Ecuador, yet 
disguised in “republican dress.” This means that many of the monarchical values 
became a part of Latin American politics and Latin American presidencies. This 
analysis of Ecuador’s political characteristics, far before the reintroduction of 
democracy in Ecuador, highlights the importance of a singular figure (a president, 
dictator or caudillo) having enormous power and influence.   
Of the academics who have chosen to focus on Ecuador, they have 
almost exclusively covered the 20th century. John Martz (1972, 1987), David 
Schmidt (1988), and Anita Issacs (1993) addressed the decade of the 1980’s, 
including the transition from military rule to representative democracy.  Catherine 
Conaghan (1988, 1995) published insightful works about both Ecuador’s 
industrialists and the political party system. As all of these scholars present 
explanations of modern trends in Ecuador’s political reality, the historical impact 
of political parties and their successes and failures in the executive sphere 
contributes to a more complete understanding of the Ecuadorian political picture.  
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A small group of Ecuadorian social scientists have made important, 
nuanced contributions to the study of their country. Distinguished Ecuadorian 
scholars such as Osvaldo Hurtado (1980) and Augustín Cueva (1982) have 
addressed questions of power and domination in the Ecuadorian political system. 
Hurtado’s work (1980) provided a helpful analytical analysis of the historical 
construction of power in Ecuador, and first hand knowledge of the push to return 
to democracy. Cueva focused more on regional politics and the role Ecuadorian 
populists played in the 1930’s-1980’s. 
Simón Pachano, in his book Democracia sin Sociedad (1996) focuses on 
contemporary democratic Ecuador.  In his discussion based on governmental 
documents, he correctly identifies the constitutional tradition of centralism. He 
further states that Ecuadorian governmental structures have not been receptive 
to acknowledging regional differences and the reality of political parties and 
problems of representations. Similarly, Rafael Quintero (1997) and Amparo 
Méndenez-Carrión (1986) have written extensively on José María Velasco Ibarra 
and his role in bringing populism to Ecuador. 
Ximena Sosa-Buchholz, a historian, and Carlos de la Torre, a sociologist, 
both natives of Ecuador teaching at American universities, have addressed 
populism in Ecuador. (Sosa Buchholz, 1999, de la Torre, 1997, 2000). De la 
Torre has focuses much of his studies on Abdalá Bucaram and the impact of his 
discourse on Ecuadorian politics. His work emphasizes the impact of discourse 
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and the popularity of populist messages. Sosa Bucholz, a historian, focuses on 
the historical reality of populism.  
In addition, the development of populist political parties impacted the 
national political scene. (Guerrero Burgos, 1994). Pyne (1977) wrote a 
fascinating article about Ecuador, highlighting the realistic difficulties of Ecuador’s 
populist president ruling in a system with no party support, and the impact of his 
resistance towards the development of a political party. While populists have 
always enjoyed wide levels of support in the coastal provinces, they receive 
minimal support in the highlands, and their presidencies have often been 
extremely difficult.4  
Huratdo identified personalism as the dominant characteristic of 
Ecuadorian politics in 1980, and it continues to be so through the present day. 
Conaghan documented the oppositional relationship between the executive and 
the legislature (Conaghan, 1995.). This is before the electoral success of outsider 
candidates. Political instability continues, as no Ecuadorian president has 
managed to finish his constitutionally elected term since the presidential elections 
in 1992. 
In addition, Jorge León Trujillo (2003) examines the contribution of a 
regionalized political system and how that has affected contemporary Ecuadorian 
political, economic and social crises.  He focuses on regionalism, an important 
                                                 
4 Abdalá Bucaram, elected in 1996, exhibits many populist characteristics salient in Guayaquil. The 1996 first round 
presidential election resulted in the victory of two candidates from Guayaquil, making the second round a guaranteed 
victory for one of them. To see more information about Abdalá Bucaram and his tumultuous presidency, which lasted six 
months before congress declared him mentally unfit for office, please see Baez et al, de la Torre and Hoy. 
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source of division in Ecuador. While the government attempted to establish 
hegemonic control and develop the state as a legitimate governing body, the 
coast (particularly the port city of Guayaquil) continues to view the state as an 
instrument to promote and expand trade with other nations.  
In terms of contemporary democracy, researchers focusing on party 
systems agree that Ecuador is one of the most consistently unstable party 
systems (Coppege, 2003, Scully and Mainwaring, 1995, MacDonald, 1989) and 
has an “unconsolidated and uninstitutionalized democracy.” (Power, 2003).  They 
point to the chronic ineffectiveness of the party system in Ecuador as a main 
cause of instability. (Conaghan, 1995). 
Ecuador does not command much attention in literature on contemporary 
Latin American political parties. Catherine Conaghan’s article on Ecuadorian 
political parties entitled “Politicians Against Parties: Discord and Disconnection in 
Ecuador’s Party System,” published in Mainwaring and Scully’s Building 
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America,” (1995) provided the 
most complete analysis of Ecuador’s democratic experience with parties to date. 
Her historical construction, focus on conflict between the legislative and 
executive branches, and understanding of the intricacies of the Ecuadorian case 
make this article of prime importance for those interested in Ecuadorian political 
parties. Conaghan concludes there are three main characteristics of Ecuadorian 
party systems: an extreme multi-party system, no popular /lasting attachment to 
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particular political parties, and the marginalization of parties in policy making 
process-especially in economic decision making. 
The most complete guide to Ecuadorian political parties, written by 
Freidenberg and Alcántra (2001), offers an in depth view of all dominant 
Ecuadorian political parties. The author’s analysis of internal party structures, 
their successes in congress and their ideological positions develops a complete 
picture of historically and currently significant Ecuadorian political parties. The 
authors include a chapter on Pachakuitk, an indigenous political movement that 
supported Gutiérrez in the 2002 elections. The authors address the role of 
personalistic leaders in each individual party, the internal structure of the party, 
and the ideological development of each party.  In addition, voting records and 
opinion questions clarify political party beliefs.  
Freidenberg and Alcántra’s study emphasizes the development of political 
parties. It also addresses the changes that occurred in the system due to legal 
changes. From 1979-1994, only political party candidates could compete in 
elections. After 1994, referendum approved by the electorate allowed the 
candidacy of citizens who were non-affiliated with political parties. While political 
parties still hold an enormous weight in the Ecuadorian political system, 
Freidenberg and Alcántra highlight importance changes due to these laws. 
Andres Mejía Acosta (2002) addresses the difficult attempts at coalition 
building in the Ecuadorian congress. After a historical orientation, he analyzes 
the reality facing Ecuadorian executives, who come into power with minimal 
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support in the legislature. The president must immediately build coalitions among 
multiple parties in order for Congress to enact legislation. As many of these 
presidents have come into power with a strong message of opposition to political 
institutions, this creates an immediate need for presidents to work with those 
same institutions that they claim harm the country. 
Continual constitutional reforms attempted to address problems by 
creating ties between presidential  candidates and parties, yet changes have 
failed to prevent the election of presidents with little or no political party support. 
This, in turn, hinders executive-legislative relationships. After the new constitution 
came into effect in 1998, the citizens of Ecuador have overwhelmingly supported 
the unconstitutional dismissal of two fairly elected presidents who ultimately 
experienced high levels of unpopularity. The elections, presidencies and 
dismissals of these presidents will be explored in Chapter Four. 
The presidential and congressional elections in October and November of 
2002 produced peculiar results. Ex-Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, military leader of the 
coup d’etat that ousted President Jamil Mahuad from office in January 2000, won 
the presidential elections. He campaigned on frustration with corrupt Ecuadorian 
politicians and bankers, vowing to address the flight of corrupt bankers to other 
countries and found his main support in the indigenous population of Ecuador. 
His election, based on his opposition to the establishment, traditional political 
parties, and unpopular neoliberal reforms, proved successful. Yet, the same 
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electorate strongly supported traditional political parties in the legislative 
elections.  
Neither parties, personalities, nor institutions have managed to 
consolidate power in the Ecuadorian political scene. As the electorate has 
watched traditional political party politicians make promises they don’t keep while 
the country’s economic situation continues to worsen, the candidates and their 
parties have lost legitimacy and support. The UNDP report serves as important 
evidence that Ecuador is a part of a larger alienation from politicians and 
traditional political parties in Latin America as a whole. In Ecuador, outsider 
politicians have become attractive to the Ecuadorian electorate, and over the last 
decade, have increasingly garnished more of the vote.  In 2002, the Ecuadorian 
population voted two outsiders without political experience into the second round 
of the presidential elections. This occasion provides the opportunity to test the 
hypothesis that party affiliation can damage presidential electoral opportunities in 
Ecuador.   
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CHAPTER TWO RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Case Study Design 
The UNDP argues that economic and social rights are important 
components of a successful and self-sustaining democracy. This study 
acknowledges and encourages a concept of democracy that includes crucial 
attention towards social, societal and economic problems. The paper focuses 
exclusively on a critical part of a democratic system, elections and the electoral 
process in Ecuador. It addresses how political institutions, political organizations 
and candidates interact in the electoral process. Specifically, it looks at the 
performance of traditional political party candidates and outsider candidates in 
Ecuadorian presidential elections from 1979-2002.5 
Free, clean and fair elections are one of the fundamental components of 
any democracy. (UNDP, 55). Elections form the legal way for citizens to choose 
their leaders. Elections also give citizens a tool to remove and replace leaders 
when the leaders aren’t adequately representing those they serve. In this system, 
the people are the source and justification for the authority of the state to govern. 
(UNDP, 56) The importance of studying elections comes from elections serving 
as the legitimate way for citizens to choose their leaders. When leaders win 
                                                 
5 For more information on the larger picture of democracy, including the discussion of economic and social components of 
democracy, please see the UNDP report on Democracy in Latin America, published in April 2004. 
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elections freely and fairly, this gives them legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. 
This study looks at the performance of different candidates, and analyzes 
general trust in parties or politicians, as measured by parties’ respective 
performances in elections. 
In establishing a research design, this study uses a quasi experimental 
method based on the 2002 Ecuadorian presidential elections. There is no control 
over the application of the independent variable, nor is it possible to form control 
and experimental groups. This work looks at Ecuadorian political history, the 
construction of a democratic system, and the gradual decline of political parties’ 
capacity to win presidential elections after the constitutional development of a 
party system.  
This work examines the manifestation of disillusionment with the political 
system, and how that disillusionment is expressed in terms of candidate choice. 
The hypothesis is that alignment with traditional political parties in the 2002 
election damages a presidential candidate in Ecuador. There are a few main 
reasons for this phenomenon. Firstly, Ecuador has a history of weak and highly 
ineffective political parties through the present day. Secondly, increased voter 
alienation due to continual political and economic difficulties (particularly the 
1997 and 2000 crises) has further distanced the populace from political parties. 
Finally, Ecuadorian political culture has revolved around personalist and populist 
presidents. The electorate has supported these individuals, instead of providing 
more widespread support to specific parties or political institutions. Candidates 
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unaligned with traditional politics, dubbed outsiders, have found favorable 
situations for messages of opposition to the political system. These are the 
independent variables studied in the paper. The dependent variable is the 
performance of traditional and outsider candidates in presidential elections. In 
addition, appeals to alienated citizens based on a personal campaign have 
increased and proven successful in Ecuadorian elections. Parties continue to be 
increasingly less relevant in presidential campaigns. 
Establishing definitions is an important part of any research design. 
Traditional political parties consist of the political parties that have been present 
in Ecuador for at least 15 years, were developed by a group of people (as 
opposed to a single dominant leader), have evident ideologies, have made an 
effort to develop roots in society, have an internal organization which is not 
based solely on a single personality, and have held the office of the presidency 
once during the democratic era from 1979 through the present day. These 
parties also are competitive in the legislative elections, and have had strong 
voting blocks in the legislature. They include the Izquierda Democrática (ID), 
Partido Socialcristiano (PSC), and the Democrácia Popular (DP). In contrast, a 
personalist parties were created by a specific individual, usually for the exclusive 
purpose of supporting his own election. These parties have not developed an 
ideological base and have not attempted to develop long lasting roots in society. 
The founder of the party (or current party boss) makes all major decisions 
relating to party candidates. Most have a strong rhetoric of opposition to 
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traditional parties. These parties include the Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriana 
(PRE), Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (CFP), Partido Sociedad Patriótica 
(PSP),  and the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN). 
This research design has several advantages as the study addresses 
issues of “outsiders” in Latin America’s highest elected office. Outsiders are 
defined as candidates who have little or no political experience, base their 
campaign around opposition to established institutions, political parties and 
political elite, and highlight the absence of their relationship to the existing 
political system. A case study design permits a realistic way to test the 
hypothesis and address the research questions relating to Ecuadorian 
democracy. The case study design proves useful due to the characteristics of 
this study. This design allows for an in depth qualitative study of a specific 
political anomaly. The inductive nature of this study allows for the intersection of 
a wider trend towards outsider politicians in Latin America while taking into 
consideration the unique nature of Ecuador’s political history. 
 Robert Yin notes that a case study, “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident, and when there are multiple 
sources of evidence being used.” (Reynolds et al. 2001:143) The concern with 
establishing a link between the independent and dependent variables in the 2002 
elections contributes to the wider literature on outsiders in Latin American politics 
and the evolving face of Latin American democracy.  
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The study begins by briefly addressing important background trends of 
Ecuador’s presidential history. It establishes the constant dominance of 
personalities over institutions (which could be civil, military or governmental). In 
addition, it highlights how the legacy of charisma has impacted Ecuador’s 
contemporary democracy with its foundations in a political party system. The 
thesis traces the absence of any solid development of effective political 
institutions or political parties. This resulted in the creation of a political system 
based on individual leaders, who became the prominent component of 
government. Political parties failed to provide adequate representation and 
advocacy of the electorate’s needs and desires as individual leaders made 
parties subordinate. The leader worked to maintain loyalty based on his personal 
connection to the electorate, as opposed to developing a political party. The 
leader, not political parties, began to be viewed as the ideal representative of the 
public will.    
With Ecuador’s redemocratization in 1979, the architects of modern 
Ecuadorian democracy used the constitution to address Ecuador’s lack of 
effective political institutions. The 1979 constitution attempted to create a 
functional political party system for many reasons, one of which was to control 
and eliminate populism. The weakness of political parties and the tradition of 
populism were already a present, active component of Ecuadorian political 
culture, and those trends became integrated in the democratic system.  
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The historical analysis of elections since 1979, emphasizing campaigns, 
politicians, and how presidencies affected political parties forms an important 
construction of contemporary political reality in Ecuador. While the Ecuadorian 
population initially elected presidential candidates from the traditional parties, the 
inability of traditional parties to address economic problems undermined their 
legitimacy and led the electorate towards more personalist politicians.  
The alienation from traditional political party candidates has not occurred 
overnight. The constitution of 1979 established a modern democratic system 
based on political parties. Initially, the populace elected presidents from 
traditional political parties, but lost their trust in parties after repeated failures to 
effectively address economic problems. The political and economic situation in 
Ecuador has changed drastically since 1979. After initial enthusiasm with the 
redemocratization of Ecuador, political parties have become less effective and 
less popular in presidential elections, voter alienation has increased, and 
candidates with populist and outsider messages have become more common. 
This becomes evident due to Ecuador’s two distinct phases of political party 
competition. The first phase was from 1979-1992, where traditional political 
parties competed in and won presidential elections. In 1992, the first outsider 
president came into office after publicly breaking from his political party and 
running as an independent minded politician, emphasizing the negative 
connotations of political party affiliation. Outsider candidates began regularly 
passing into the second round of the elections. Finally, outsiders began winning 
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elections, as the electorate preferred these unaligned candidates to those linked 
to traditional political parties.  
As strikes and protests have become a more common form of expression 
of opposition against incumbent presidents, discontent with the current system 
continues to be on the rise.  In addition, Ecuador’s citizen approved a new 
constitution in 1998 that allowed for unaligned political candidates to compete in 
presidential elections. The lack of political party affiliation has become a central 
theme in election rhetoric, as candidates have worked to distance themselves 
from the traditional political system.  
Observation and document analysis play important roles in the research 
design. Both methods of research have important advantages and 
disadvantages, but when used together, they form a more complete picture of 
Ecuadorian democracy. 
Field Experience 
The author’s presence during important times of economic and political 
crisis (particularly the 1999 economic crisis, which ended in dollarization and the 
termination of Mahuad’s presidency in 2000) has allowed this study to integrate 
an important on-site understanding of Ecuadorian politics. In addition, the author 
was present in Guayaquil, Ecuador, from May through November of 2002, during 
the 2002 presidential campaign season. The author’s arrival in Ecuador in May 
coincided with various announcements about potential presidential candidates, 
and she observed both the first round elections (October 20, 2002) and the 
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second round runoff elections (November 25, 2002). This has given her 
important insight and valuable direct experience in Ecuador, by talking with 
Ecuadorians about their political system, reading national newspapers daily, 
watching political television shows, and listening to political radio shows. This has 
provided a unique understanding of the importance (or lack of importance) of 
political parties, and gauging popular opinion of the political system and 
democracy’s strengths and weaknesses in Ecuador. Particularly, the author 
observed a lack of any strong affection for a political party and a low capacity to 
identify between potential programs and ideologies of presidential candidates. 
The utter failure of political parties to indicate ideological viewpoints, or attract a 
dedicated following was readily observable in the media, in general conversation, 
and in campaign strategies. This, in turn, was juxtaposed with a genuine 
frustration bred by constant economic problems. The results of the election 
showed a strong endorsement of neophyte, outsider politicians. This Ecuadorian 
election placed non-traditional candidates with no political experience in office. 
These candidates held new and unique ideologies, ideas and rhetoric. When 
offered a choice between a traditional political party candidate and an outsider 
candidate, voters rejected the political party candidates. A main reason for this 
was voter perception that political parties had opportunities in office and had 
failed to solve economic problems.  
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Document Analysis 
Document analysis is the most prevalent form of data collection. In an age 
of internet access, researchers can obtain documents from many places across 
the world. It is non-reactive, and unobtrusive. Document analysis also has 
several drawbacks. Language and translation can present problems. In addition, 
selective survival can create a problem. Documents can be incomplete or contain 
inaccurate data. Yet document analysis is an important, cost efficient strategy to 
gain information about Ecuador’s electoral history. 
Primary, untranslated documents form an important part of this research. 
These documents include current and previous constitutions, election 
observation reports, election results, newspaper articles, magazine articles, 
interviews, and primary documents from prominent Ecuadorian political 
scientists. 
Historical development 
The study begins with a focus on the lack of development of effective 
political parties and political institutions. Understanding the democratic 
experience with the party system forms a crucial background for the events of the 
last decade. Since 1979, the Ecuadorian population has slowly but intentionally 
shifted their support for presidential candidates associated with preexisting 
political parties to candidates without party affiliation who might best be 
described as personalist candidates. Exploring and highlighting this transition 
forms an important part of the historical background. This study relies on 
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documented campaign strategies, platforms, and analysis from scholars and 
experts in Ecuadorian politics, in additions to election results to analyze the 
change in support for particularly parties.  
An important shift in presidential elections took place after 1992, with the 
victory of Sixto Durán Ballén in that year. His campaign formed the first incidence 
of a candidate breaking from his previous political party to form his own party, 
and running under a personalist banner in the presidential campaign. He formed 
a new political party, and included important dominant players from his previous 
party. This is a stark example of the lack of commitment to political parties by 
elite members. His election also serves as an example of the weak voter loyalty 
to a particular political party. Voters have tended to become attached to a 
specific presidential candidate, as opposed to a party.  
Since the election of Abdalá Bucaram in 1996, outsider candidates have 
performed extremely well in presidential elections. In addition, none of the 
presidents elected after 1996 have managed to successfully complete their term 
in the presidential office. Abdalá Bucaram, who campaigned on a populist 
platform, survived barely seven months in office until being impeached on 
grounds of mental incapacity. Bucaram fled to Panama and has been directing 
his political party from Panama since 1997. He has promised a return to 
Ecuador’s politics. One of the leading players in arriving to a peaceful dismissal 
of office was Jamil Mahuad, who would win special elections called in 1998. 
Mahuad served in office for sixteen months of his four year term, until social and 
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political protest led to a bloodless coup against him, lead by sectors of the 
military and indigenous organizations. One of the main leaders of this coup was 
Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, who would go on to win normally scheduled elections in 
November, 2002.  
As outsiders performed well in the 1996 and 1998 elections, the 
governmental also suffered from unprecedented constitutional crises during both 
Bucaram’s and Mahaud’s presidencies. As Bucaram campaigned as a populist 
outsider, his dismal performance in office highlighted the difficult reality of being 
an effective outsider president. Two years later, the country chose former mayor 
of Quito and career politician Jamil Mahuad as president, yet his victory came by 
a slim margin over billionaire outsider Alvaro Noboa. Though the vote was almost 
evenly split between Harvard educated Mahuad and political neophyte Noboa, 
faith in outsider candidates was shaken after Bucaram’s disastrous presidency. 
Fearing Noboa’s close connection to Bucaram and looking for a more predictable 
candidate, the populace once again turned to a career politician to confront 
increasingly bleak economic and political situations.  Mahuad’s presidency ended 
no better than Bucaram’s, as national protests and strikes forced his removal. 
This set the stage for the 2002 election. Both populist, outsider candidates and 
career public administrators had both been delegitimized with by their 
performance in office.
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The 2002 Elections 
Before beginning analysis on the 2002 elections, this work examines 
sections of the new Ecuadorian constitution (ratified in 1998) that address 
presidential elections and political parties. It looks at the law of political parties 
and the constitutional rules for the formation of a political party, and also looks to 
the role of political parties that is prescribed by the Ecuadorian constitution. The 
analysis highlights certain articles of the Constitution that try to assist in 
controlling the multitude of minor parties, including requirements for support in 
order to maintain registered, and laws related to campaign spending. It also 
addresses the new electoral laws that allow independent candidates to run for 
president without any alignment or affiliation with political parties.   
The role of the Tribuno Supremo Electoral (TSE) is also prescribed in the 
constitution, including how the TSE is organized. The Tribuno is an independent 
and autonomous institution that organizes, supervises, directs and guarantees 
the electoral process, and is responsible for official results of elections. The 
presidential election functions on a two round system.  
This study of the 2002 presidential elections looks at the six contesting 
candidates. There were a total of eleven candidates, but five received less than 
4% of the vote each in the first round. It introduces the six dominant candidates 
in the presidential election and looks at their party affiliation, ideology, campaign 
strategy, and the rhetoric of each candidate. One sees that certain candidates 
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focus on qualifications, while others focus on personalities in order to garnish 
support. In a crowded field, three candidates identified themselves as outsiders 
(Gutiérrez, Noboa and Roldós) and two candidates came from established 
political parties (Neira and Borja). Jacobo Bucaram campaigned as an outsider, 
but came from a historically populist party. The majority of this information on this 
election comes from primary resources, including newspaper articles, magazine 
articles, candidate websites, and published interviews. These documents 
address both general themes in the election, and clarify political party 
involvement in the elections and campaigns.  
  When discussing the results of the first round, newspapers and 
magazines are relied on as important references. Additionally, the reports, 
opinions and conclusions of various international observation groups, including 
the European Union, the Organization of American States, and the International 
Republican Institute form an important part of this analysis. 
After a careful analysis of the 2002 round one results, including a brief 
statement on the legislative results of 2002, the study moves into the second 
round. Due to the fact that two non-traditional, outsider candidates placed in the 
second round,  this work analyzes differences and similarities in support, 
ideological content, plans of governments, and campaign strategy. In addition, 
the reactions of other politicians to the presence of Gutiérrez and Noboa in the 
second round are included. An important discussion of which second round 
candidate political parties supported, or why they chose to not endorse any 
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candidate, is included. This analysis highlights main issues in the 45 days 
between round one and round two, and addresses speculation of how each 
candidate’s victory in the election could potentially impact the country. 
 Finally, the study concludes with important comments about the role of 
opposition in the Ecuadorian political system. In every presidential election since 
the election of Jaime Roldós in 1978, the electorate has soundly rejected both 
the incumbent party and the party’s ideological position. The last three elections 
have placed into power extremely distinct presidents, two of whom have non-
traditional political backgrounds. Forming strong opposition to a current president 
gives a party or politician a distinct advantage in the next elections.   
The 2002 election results in both the first and second round affirmed the 
population’s alienation from nearly all political party candidates. Though many 
polls predicted that traditional politicians would perform well in the elections, the 
voters soundly rejected those candidates at the polls. Noboa and Gutiérrez were 
strikingly different candidates, coming from different backgrounds, different 
regions, with different ideologies and vastly different sources of support. Yet, they 
had two very important points in common. Firstly, neither man had any political 
experience whatsoever. Secondly, they both campaigned offering the concept of 
a new way of politics that differed greatly from traditional politicians. Both spent 
the majority of their campaign focusing on the needs of the poor and excluded. 
Noboa used his wealth and business success as an indicator of what his 
business contacts could do for the country. Gutiérrez became a representative 
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for the multitude of indigenous citizens and impoverished Ecuadorians who were 
fed up with economic decline, corruption, and a distant political system. No 
candidate with political party ties managed to connect to these groups.  
The 2002 election again brought an unexpected result. For the first time in 
modern democratic history, the electorate completely rejected traditional political 
party candidates by supporting outsiders in the first round. No political party 
candidate managed to even finish among the top three. The liability of affiliating 
with a political party showed through in the election results, as outsider candidate 
performed markedly better in the first round than insider candidates. This thesis 
will look at why. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND ECUADOR’S FIRST 
THREE ELECTIONS  
Historical Construction 
This brief historical orientation suggests the Ecuadorian state held very 
little power in the 19th century and the early 20th century. In addition, there was 
an almost complete absence of institutional power in Ecuador, as nearly any 
state consolidation occurred because of a specific caudillo and his programs. 
Political parties held almost no influence in government, and never developed an 
institutional base that was independent of from strong, dominant leaders. The 
two political parties that formed in the mid-1800’s, The Liberal Party and The 
Conservative Party, represented little more than different regional elite interests. 
Neither party attempted to create roots in society, develop coherent ideology, or 
create long lasting grassroots support. Instead, the caudillos formed the base for 
the political system, without integrating political parties as an important 
component. 
In 19th century Latin America, the continent had several presidents who 
held strong despotic power but extremely weak institutional power. Caudillos, 
defined as, “strongmen on regional or national levels who seize power through 
extra legal means,” became Ecuador’s dominant presidents.  (Morner 1993:7) 
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Ecuador had yet to fully develop effective governmental institutions. Ecuador’s 
first president, Venezuelan Juan José Flores, was primarily concerned with 
maintaining internal cohesion (Morner 1993:7). The dominant characteristic of 
the state from 1820-1855 was the use of force to maintain unity (Ayala Mora 
1983:9).   
The different priorities of regional elites formed the base of Ecuador’s first 
contentious political parties. The highland elite (mainly landowners and 
hacendados) formed the political base of the Conservative Party. In contrast, the 
coastal elite (agro exporters and commercial bankers) created the Liberal party in 
Guayaquil. As elite regional priorities differed greatly, regionalism became an 
additional source of division. This shaped a political culture where politics 
consisted of splintered factions of elites, and politics remained largely outside of 
the average citizen’s realm. 
 Much of the division among the elites came from ideologies of Gran 
Colombia. Conservatives tended to support Bolivarian ideas of the formation of 
independent states, which encouraged top-down, hierarchical, strong, 
authoritarian rule with an emphasis on order and control. Bolívar favored the 
supremacy of the president in comparison with other branches of government. 
The Liberals found their base in the opposition of Santander, who believed in a 
more democratic form of government. His system highlighted the separation of 
powers and emphasized the system of checks and balances.  
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 The experience of party development in independent Ecuador showed a 
longstanding tradition of weak and ineffective political parties. This shaped the 
development of modern political parties. The Conservative Party, based in Quito, 
was the first to gain control of the central government. It placed its priorities on 
establishing order and cementing the role of the Catholic Church in Ecuador’s 
new political system. As Gabriel García Moreno served as president for over a 
decade, those alienated by his strict Catholicism and conservative ideology 
quickly joined the opposition Liberal party. When in power, the Liberal party 
attempted to undo many of the reforms enacted by the Conservatives. 
 Neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party served as an 
adequate base to the development of a contentious party system in which 
political parties functioned independently of specific leaders. Both parties 
became steeply dependent on their leaders, and became defined more on 
personalistic qualities of their respective caudillos instead of different ideological 
bases. Both parties only included elite members of their regional stronghold, and 
neither made an attempt to bring politics outside of the elite sphere. In addition, 
their doctrines differed on the sole issue of the role the Church played in society. 
Both Conservatives and Liberals claimed to be devoutly Catholic, so the small 
variance in their vision of the relationship between the Church and the State 
formed the main noticeable ideological difference. 
 The Church enjoyed a prominent and powerful place in society, including 
complete responsibility for all levels of education and the responsibility for 
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registering births, marriages and deaths. The Constitution of 1830 declared the 
newly independent country as a Roman Catholic state, and obligated the state to 
protect the Church “to the exclusion of all others.” Ecuador did not become a 
secular state until the beginning of the 1900’s.  
Gabriel García Moreno, Conservative president from 1860-1875, is widely 
seen as the man responsible for beginning the consolidation of the Ecuadorian 
state. His presidency fostered decades of Conservative rule from Quito’s elite. 
The disorder of the state provided the authoritarian García Moreno an 
opportunity to use military might in his attempt to establish order in Ecuador’s 
fragmented territories. His regime emphasized strong presidential authority, a 
subordinate national congress, the control of individual liberties, public morality, 
centralized government, institutionalization of political power, and, most 
importantly, the dominance of the Catholic Church (Hurtado 1980:101). His 
personal beliefs, including his devout Catholicism, became the base of the 
country’s government. In a barely consolidated country with little rule of law, he 
used his personal authority and force to implement his programs. 
His regime’s push to establish the Catholic Church as an intimate part of 
the state resulted in the, “Most theocratic regime in all of the Americas.” (Martz 
1972:69) Other authors have addressed the theocratic characteristics of his 
regime (Handelsman 2000:9). Congress became completely subordinated to the 
whims of the president (Martz 1972:64). The establishment of Catholicism as the 
only recognized religion emphasized this privileged position of the church. In 
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addition, the Church gained control of additional tracts of land. The coastal elites, 
living in an area where the church had little influence in regards to issues of 
landholding and control of bureaucratic decisions, objected to the church’s 
privileges and its active role in the state. García Moreno became an appropriate 
representative for the established highland bureaucracy, heavily influenced by 
the Spanish colonial experience. He used strong force in his attempt to integrate 
the state and the church.  
The Conservative regime and its leaders began to lose their grip on 
power, and the political orientation shifted to a new ideology. The liberal 
revolution, beginning with coastal leader Eloy Alfaro’s first presidency from 1895-
1901, would dominate the country for over twenty years. Martz described Alfaro’s 
“magnetic appeal to the masses” as a new phenomenon in national Ecuadorian 
politics. While the patriarchal system of rule in Ecuador facilitated the 
construction of a highly paternalistic political system, this adoration of him by 
common people served as an important component of the political system. Yet, 
Martz also states that Alfaro had an extremely difficult time governing. This 
juxtaposition of a politician with a populist message who has strong popular 
support but does not govern effectively is a trend that becomes evident in 
Ecuador’s future. 
The legacy of the Liberal revolution, which lasted from 1895-1925, 
included constitutional revisions that primarily addressed the role of the Church in 
the state and society. While in no means anti-Catholic, Ecuador became a 
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secular state in 1906, guaranteed non religious public education, established 
separation of Church and State (therefore subordinating the Church to the State) 
and recognized freedom of thought. The Liberal constitutions also included 
clauses addressing the responsibility of the State to care for indigenous citizens 
of Ecuador. 
Alfaro and the Liberals ruled in an era of economic boom, which allowed 
the state to take an active role in the development of the nation. The high levels 
of revenue from cacao exports allowed the government to provide funding for 
many different factions of society (Schodt 1988:36). Schodt argued that Ecuador 
became an active state for the first time during the Liberal Revolution, which not 
only provided public works, but also formed an expected level of investment and 
expenditure by different elite groups and regions (Schodt 1988:36).  Yet, this 
ability to satisfy competing demands depended on a constant high price of a 
single export, whose price was determined by the international market. 
Inevitably, the price dropped, and Ecuadorian leaders had to design a new 
strategy that continued to satisfy fiscal demands that exceeded income.  
George Maier claims that the linkages between economic performance 
and political performance, while important in every country and region of the 
world, are particularly transparent in Latin America (Maier 1971:490).  World War 
I caused much economic decline for exporting countries, and Ecuador’s economy 
suffered harshly. The diminished revenue in the coast transferred into diminished 
income for the central government, because of less duties and taxes on exports. 
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The government, running a budget deficit, had three main choices. Firstly, the 
government could cut back on expenditures, including abandoning many of the 
already initiated public works projects. Secondly, the government could begin to 
print money and continue with the programs. Finally, the government could 
borrow money from Guayaquil’s banks, to supplement the decreased income. 
The government chose to print additional money and also borrow money from 
Guayaquil’s banks, the central government’s only source of credit. These 
measures resulted in spiraling inflation, which negatively affected both coastal 
and highland interests.  
The military as an institution had not yet intervened in civilian politics at 
this point in Ecuadorian history. Flores and other presidents had long military 
careers. Yet, the lack of cohesion of the Ecuadorian military in state development 
and the general disorder in government were two important reasons why the 
military hadn’t forcefully taken power from civilian governments. For the first time 
in Ecuadorian history, the military as an entity became involved in Ecuadorian 
politics during the 1920’s. The ideological justification of this intervention came 
from frustration with the economic stagnation of Ecuador, in addition to 
disillusionment with liberal governments which promised structural changes but 
produced little of it. Augustín Cueva states that young officers, frustrated by the 
unfulfilled promises of upward mobility of the liberal revolution, rebelled against 
an entrenched power system, which restricted professional advancement of the 
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new middle class (Cueva 1982:15). The enemy became the entrenched political 
system, and members of both the Conservative and Liberal political parties.  
The military junta and its reformist agenda suffered attacks from 
Guayaquil. Guayaquil’s elite believed that the reforms desired by the military 
aimed to diminish the economic power of Guayaquil by diverting much of 
Guayaquil’s wealth to the central government and the highland region. The 
military government further alienated itself from Guayaquil by ignoring the city’s 
powerful elites and aligning with the old, aristocratic highland oligarchy (Cueva 
1982:16). These antagonisms between the military establishment in Quito and 
the business sector of Guayaquil lead to a period of continual governmental 
instability. 
The 1930’s represented a period of both economic and political crisis in 
the Ecuadorian state. This situation of widespread discontent with the political 
elite and their political parties, the occurrence of fraudulent elections in the 
1930’s, and mediocre experience with military intervention in politics created a 
space for a different type of political candidate.  
José María Velasco Ibarra and his Impact on the Political System 
Both the Conservative and Liberal governments had become less 
legitimate in the eyes of the people. Conservatives hadn’t held power in decades 
and failed to find a leader that brought new life to the party. The Liberals faced 
accusations that much of the economic decline of the country was due to their 
governmental policies and that the liberals only aimed to serve Guayaquil’s 
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business community. This deadlock resulted in a situation where neither group 
had the power to implement their governmental programs. This “tie” between 
elite groups resulted in a space for a charismatic leader, unlike Ecuador had 
seen before. A Congressman from Quito, José María Velasco Ibarra came onto 
the national stage with his vocal opposition to a fraudulently elected liberal 
president in the early 1930’s. In this, he obtained the support of Conservative 
highland factions, who preferred his rhetoric as opposed to revolution. Using 
rhetoric of change, Velasco Ibarra managed to unite much of the country behind 
him. Velasco Ibarra was the politician who would give the country a new type of 
politician with a new rhetoric of opposition to the status quo.  
Literature on populism almost always includes Ecuadorian José María 
Velasco Ibarra as a member of the classical populists in Latin America, due to his 
campaign style, his rhetoric of change, and his attempt to include Ecuadorians 
who had traditionally been ignored by politicians. Both Carlos de la Torre (2000) 
and Ximena Sosa Buchholz state that Velsaco Ibarra founded Ecuadorian 
populism (Sosa Buchholz, 1999:138).  
Certain authors portray Velasco Ibarra as a politician who attempted to 
address the needs of Ecuador’s common citizens. They cite the source of his 
electoral success in increased urbanization in Guayaquil. In contrast, in El Mito 
de Populismo, Rafael Guerrero observes that Velasco Ibarra came to power in 
1933 with the strong backing of elite groups. Guerrero stated that in a climate of 
worldwide socialist revolution, the Ecuadorian elite preferred Velasco Ibarra to a 
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wider social revolution. While rhetorically, he attacked the political class and the 
elites, he didn’t have the power to make real changes.   
Velasco Ibarra won his first presidential election with a strong support from 
Quito’s establishment. The Conservative elites recognized that Velasco Ibarra 
was a politician who could help break the coastal resurgence of power. In 
addition, the party was conscious of the fact that none of the Conservative 
candidates were strong enough to win (Cueva 1982:24). Historian Alfredo Pareja 
acknowledges Guayaquil’s role in the victory of Velasco Ibarra. Pareja states that 
Guayaquil’s population supported Velasco Ibarra because of his rhetoric of 
opposition to the established elite and a fundamental change in governing, even 
though he came from a conservative political tradition (Pareja 1979:415). The 
disenchantment with the established political order allowed a politician to 
establish strong support in both the highlands and the coast, a rare occurrence in 
Ecuadorian history. 
Populist discourse, including that of Velasco Ibarra, constructs politics as 
the “moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy.” (de la 
Torre, 1997:14) In the era of Velasco Ibarra, the oligarchy included the political 
elite and their respective political parties. Velasco Ibarra took politics out of the 
hands of elites and into public plazas. He revolutionized campaign strategies by 
touring most of the country, claiming he represented, “political incorporation 
through honest elections.” (de la Torre, 1997:13) Velasco Ibarra did manage to 
expand the Ecuadorian electorate from 3.1% of the population in 1933 to 16.8% 
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in 1968, even though literacy requirements continued to exclude large sectors of 
society. (de la Torre, 1997:13) 
In a time of economic problems, his rhetoric and his ability to create 
himself as the hope and future of the country and the only person capable of 
fixing deeply rooted problems earned him much trust and support in the 
beginning of his career. Yet, these same anti establishment views, combined with 
his resistance in forming a political party that could provide him legislative 
support, made him extremely vulnerable once in office. He had no support 
system to assist him through difficult times when in office, no allies in Congress 
who could fight for and pass his plans and programs, and little support to survive 
as a dictator.  
Velasco Ibarra’s moralism, personalism and authoritarianism contrasted 
with important democratic concepts.  Though seeing himself as the embodiment 
of the will of the people, Velasco Ibarra lacked respect for democratic institutions 
on many occasions. He assumed temporary dictatorial powers, and abolished 
the constitutions of 1935, 1946 and 1970. (de la Torre, 1997:13)  
 Many of his failures in political office came from his lack of organization 
within his government and his determinedness to rule without assistance. His 
personal whims and unwillingness to listen to anyone who disagreed with him 
made his government unpredictable and unstable.  
Velasco Ibarra was elected president five times but only completed one 
full term. The contradiction of a consistently popular president who can’t 
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complete his constitutional terms provides a fascinating example of conflict and 
contradiction in the Ecuadorian governmental system. While Velasco Ibarra 
remained personally popular, his performance in office merited multiple military 
interventions and civilian pushes for him to be removed from office.   
Velasco Ibarra’s legacy contributed heavily to the developing political 
system and its characteristics in several ways. Firstly, this legacy of personalistic 
rule in Ecuador formed the cornerstone of the developing political system. 
Instead of developing a party that could continue to play a role in the political 
system when Velasco Ibarra wasn’t in office, Velasco Ibarra worked to maintain 
the masses’ loyalty as an individual. Carlos de la Torre highlights the fact that, 
“The weakness of political parties since Velasco Ibarra’s times and the continuing 
inability of liberal democratic institutions to provide a sense of participation and 
belonging to the political community have contrasted with symbolic political 
participation through populist, non-parliamentary politics.” (de la Torre, 1997:15) 
As political parties have failed to give citizens a sense of place and participation 
in the political system, individual politicians have created populist movements to 
include more citizens in the political system. Therefore, citizens become involved 
in politics through a personal candidate as opposed to a party.   
Secondly, Velasco Ibarra’s attitude toward political parties also played an 
important role in the lack of political party institutionalization. He actively 
discouraged the development of political parties to support him and his ideology. 
Instead of relying on party machinery, Velasco Ibarra often performed other 
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activities that political parties, the bureaucracy and interest groups usually 
undertake in other political systems. His position as president represented an 
important link between the government and public opinion, as Velasco Ibarra 
worked to maintain lines of communication open while connecting individuals and 
groups. He did not believe in using a political party to intermediate his 
relationship with his followers. He traveled extensively through the country to 
meet with different social and economic groups and explained governmental 
policies to them. This is a job that political parties and interest groups usually 
direct, but Velasco Ibarra did it himself. Instead of creating a bureaucracy to 
gauge the situation and public opinion in the country, he found out firsthand what 
the people wanted as he toured the country. Yet, this energy and time put into 
developing a direct representation meant less focus, consideration and reflection 
on policies and programs. (Pyne 1977:289)  
Velasco Ibarra fought bitterly against developing institutions and parties to 
support his candidacy during the campaign and his regime once in office. Yet, 
though parties generally were associated with elite interests and rarely effectively 
represented the people, his lack of political party machinery had distinct 
disadvantages. Velasco Ibarra himself acknowledged the weakness at position, 
when he stated, “I cannot count on a structured political party which would know 
how to defend me, how to carry out successful propaganda, and how to keep 
alive that civic emotion in spite of the difficulties that wear away the popularity of 
any government.” (Pyne 1977:293)  
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Thirdly, the lack of political doctrine allowed him to appeal to all different 
interest groups. His vagueness and failure to develop an ideological position 
gave him heterogeneous support. Yet, this made his presidencies extremely 
unpredictable because no one knew exactly what he would do once elected. A 
vague platform has become common among Ecuadorian politicians, as 
campaigns don’t adequately or realistically address presidential plans or 
programs that would be implemented once in office.  
Finally, Velasco Ibarra’s distain for the legislature and his outright refusal 
to develop a political party has greatly impacted Ecuadorian democracy in three 
ways. Firstly, Velasco Ibarra cemented the establishment of the president as the 
single most important component of the governmental system. Secondly, he 
encouraged reluctance by presidential candidates to affiliate or associate with an 
ideological party ally in Congress. Finally, he encouraged a lack of cooperation 
between outsider presidents and a congress dominated by political parties. In 
addition, an outsider president with little or no political party support made 
coalition building crucial to the functionality of the political system. In the 
Ecuadorian political system, coalition building and cooperation among parties 
has been historically difficult, and Ecuador had done this with little success. 
(Pyne, 1977) 
 In the late 1960’s, discovery of large petroleum reserves in Ecuador’s 
Amazon area impacted the political scene of Ecuador. Velasco Ibarra was 
elected for the last time in June of 1968, 35 years after his first presidency. The 
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situation in Ecuador consisted of “a hostile congress, overwhelming economic 
problems and increasing political chaos.” After elected, he decided to disband 
Congress, abolish the constitution and declare himself a dictator in 1970, with the 
backing of the Ecuadorian military. As Velasco Ibarra aged and approached the 
end of his political career, a new populist leader from Guayaquil and his political 
party became increasingly important in Ecuadorian politics. Assad Bucaram, who 
had served twice as the former mayor of the port city of Guayaquil and was a 
member of a prominent Lebanese immigrant family, came to dominate the 
political scene with strong support from Guayaquil. As the 1972 elections came, 
Bucaram declared himself a candidate with the support of the Concentración de 
Fuerzas Populares (CFP), a populist political movement formed as a splinter of 
the Velasquista movement in the late 1960’s. Bucaram seized control of the party 
in 1960, and used the party machinery to develop his personal prominence on a 
national scale. The ideology of the CFP, a center-right regional political party with 
nearly all its support in Guayaquil, was unabashedly populist in its rhetoric, 
appealing to the growing urban population of Guayaquil that began to fight for 
political inclusion. 
The military intervened and overthrew Velasco Ibarra before the 1972 
elections could occur. A primary factor in the military intervention came from the 
widespread belief that Bucaram would win the 1972 elections. Both the military 
and the civilian business sector feared a presidency of Bucaram, due to his 
unpredictability and his outrageous campaign promises. Particularly at a time 
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when Ecuador finally had a large influx of petrodollars, the military saw this as a 
golden opportunity to address deep economic problems. The military feared that 
if Bucaram were elected, he would misuse the money. In the military’s viewpoint, 
his clientelism apparent in his campaign would squander the new wealth. 
Ecuador finally had the necessary funds to make investments in the development 
of the country. Therefore, a reformist military junta prevented the 1972 elections 
and took over political control at a time of great opportunity for Ecuador. Army 
Chief of Staff General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara became leader of a “nationalist 
and revolutionary military regime.” The military regime looked towards Peru’s 
experience with a reformist military government in office, and hoped to reorient 
Ecuador’s government and economy.  
The military in Ecuador is one of the most respected institutions in the 
country, and has much more general public support than any political institution. 
When the military has become involved in civilian politics mainly to mediate 
between opposing political factions, but has generally hesitated to play an active 
role in the government. When it does, it intervenes when the military views 
civilian decisions as being detrimental to the country. The wealth provided by the 
oil boom allowed many to begin to dream of a new future for a prosperous and 
economically healthy Ecuador. 
Rodríguez Lara ruled for three years, but the continued reliance on 
imported luxury goods and the increasing debt burden on the government 
resulted in mediocre economic improvement. As inflation increased, and 
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Rodríguez Lara failed to make any noticeable changes in areas such as agrarian 
reform, he suffered from a bloody coup attempt in September of 1975 by the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The unsuccessful coup resulted in the loss 
of 23 lives, and exposed the lack of unity within the military. On January 11, 
1976, a second bloodless coup removed Rodríguez Lara, and a military junta 
took over power with the expressed desire to return to democratic rule. 
Transition to Democracy and Political Parties 
The military government and civilian elites came to an agreement to 
purposefully democratize the country. The process stemmed from economic 
modernization of the Ecuadorian economy, based on the discovery and 
exploitation of oil reserves during the 1970’s. (Hurtado, 1980, Corbitt, 1988, 
Gerlasch, 2003, Martz, 1987.) In their push for industrialization and 
advancement, democracy represented a complimentary, purposeful component 
to a modern Latin American state. Military and civilian leaders formed a 
partnership to establish a functional political system. (Hurtado, 1980).  In 1979, 
Ecuador became the first Latin American country to re-democratize. 
The process didn’t go as intended when the military initially decided to 
allow a return to civilian rule in 1976. The military planned for a two year 
transitional period which would allow the construction of a new constitution and a 
new political system, but the process took almost four years. As the first step in 
the return to democracy, an appointed civilian commission was to draft new 
governmental charters and electoral laws. Then, the entire nation would vote 
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between two proposed constitutions. The appointed commission, attempting to 
construct an effective governmental system, identified weak political parties as 
one of the key problems in Ecuador’s chaotic political past. Due to the historical 
instability that had accompanied personalist leaders (including Velsaco Ibarra) 
and the antagonisms between the legislature and the president, the commission 
attempted to use electoral laws to create a more smoothly functioning 
government. The commission took advantage of the consensus and widespread 
support for establishing a new, effective political system. Therefore, they included 
important clauses in the constitution that attempted to create a healthy link 
between politicians, political parties and the electorate.  
The awareness of the dysfunctional party system prompted a special 
legislative commission to evaluate party regulations in 1977. (McDonald, 
1989:315) Two of Ecuador’s most influential up and coming politicians served on 
the commission. Jaime Roldós and Osvaldo Hurtado addressed problems that 
parties had created in Ecuadorian governance. Hurtado described the problems 
as, “vacuous rhetoric, personal conflicts, and ad hoc grouping. “ (Levy and Mills, 
1983:21).  
The Supreme Council of Government, made up of the military leadership, 
knew that Assad Bucaram, the probable victor of the 1972 elections cancelled by 
the military, could be a strong contender in this first election. This reality 
continued to worry both the commission and military leaders. Bucaram’s 
combative style, unpredictability, and personal domination over his political party 
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served as prime examples of historical problems of personalist candidates within 
Ecuador’s political system. The delay in the process of democratization occurred 
in part because of the military’s attempts to manipulate the electoral process and 
control the outcome, preventing Bucaram’s presidency. In a creative maneuver, 
the commission chose to prohibit people whose parents weren’t native born 
Ecuadorians from becoming presidential candidates, a stipulation believed to be 
directed at Bucaram. Bucaram’s parents were born in Lebanon, and though 
Bucaram was born in Ecuador, he could not be a presidential candidate.  
Ecuador’s elites believed that the development of a functional, capable 
party system would cure Ecuador’s perpetual political problems, and the country 
would enter a new stage of stability and prosperity after its rocky political history. 
Ecuador needed a strong party system with modern, national parties, even 
though the country had almost no experience with effective political parties. 
(Freidenberg and Alcántara, 2001) The commission created laws guaranteeing 
the right to form political parties, and attempted to create a strong party system 
by imposing requirements for party names, membership, organizational structure, 
and program philosophies. In addition, to stem the prominence of outsider 
politicians, the commission agreed that a presidential candidate must run under a 
party affiliation in presidential elections. With this clause, the commission hoped 
the constitution would help create a more stable base of political parties in 
society.  
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The Ecuadorian case study becomes very unique in this context. Leaders 
attempted to create a functional party system by reform and laws, even though 
the country had no history of a party system that fulfilled theoretical roles 
assigned to political parties. Therefore, the legacy of ineffective political party 
systems existed long before the return to democracy. Yet, the long transition to 
democracy under military rule supposedly allowed the country time to develop a 
viable governmental strategy that included political parties as a crucial part of the 
equation.  
This transition is distinct from other Latin American cases, where 
bureaucratic authoritarian governments and military dictatorships yielded to 
democracy after the blatant failure of the import substitution industrialization 
economic model and authoritarian rule lost their legitimacy. The purposeful 
intention of Ecuador’s transition, combined with civilian and military support of 
democratic governance, didn’t create the need to study conflicts brought about 
by this transition. Therefore, scholars focused on more drastic transitions. 
1979-Widespread Support for León Roldós 
 The Constitution prevented Bucaram’s candidacy for president, but 
Bucaram was still a major player in the first elections. Bucaram handpicked his 
nephew-in-law, Jaime Roldós to run as his stand in under the CFP party banner. 
(Conaghan, 1995:442) Bucaram’s new strategy was to campaign as a 
congressional candidate, obtain the presidency of Congress, and control the 
country from the legislature. Roldós’ campaign slogan was, “Roldós to the 
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Presidency, Bucaram to power.”(Conaghan 1995:442) Apparently, the attempt to 
diminish Bucaram’s influence in the election failed.  
 After years of intentional work focusing on curbing the prevalence of 
personalism and dominance by a strong leader in the new political system, 
Bucaram managed to creatively insert himself as a potential leader of Ecuador. 
While new electoral laws hoped to subordinate individual leaders to parties, the 
CFP functioned in the opposite way. The party leader handpicked a relative to 
take his place in the elections, and indicated in every way possible that Bucaram 
would eventually be the one in control of the country. By postulating as a 
legislative candidate, Bucaram hoped to have a puppet president that would 
enable him to rule from the Congress. 
Yet, Roldós didn’t act as Bucaram had planned. An intelligent and 
prepared politician himself, Roldós distanced himself from the CFP and Bucaram 
with his choice of Vice Presidental candidate, Osvaldo Hurtado, from the 
Democracia Popular (DP). Both Roldós and Hurtado played important roles in 
the commission to reestablish democracy, both were young politicians, and their 
candidacy combined two popular politicians in Ecuador’s two dominant regions. 
This combination appealed to a wide group of citizens. Though Rodrigo Borja of 
the Izquiera Democrática (ID) led in many of the polls, the first round of voting put 
Roldós and and Partido Socialcristiano (PSC) candidate Sixto Durán Ballén in 
the second round. The military, fearful of Bucaram’s possible involvement in the 
government, delayed the second round by several months to allow Durán Ballén 
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time to build a coalition of right leaning parties and supporters. Much to the 
surprise of civilian elites and the military, Roldós and Hurtado won the second 
round with a sweeping 68.5% of the vote.  
After initial doubts as to whether the military would allow Roldós to take 
presidential power, Roldós was inaugurated on August 10th, 1979. With the 
economic situation improving and increased state revenue from petroleum sales, 
Ecuador hoped to modernize and stabilize the economy. Yet, the economic and 
social changes weren’t accompanied with changes in the highly fractured, 
personalistic, regionalist political system. After his inauguration, Roldós regularly 
passed over Bucaram’s candidates for ministerial posts. In response, the CFP 
ceased to support presidential legislation in Congress. In addition, Bucaram 
established a majority in Congress and took control of the unicameral legislature, 
the Congreso Nacional. As Bucaram failed to develop his own platform, he 
focused on blocking Roldós’ legislation. The president began to look outside his 
party for support in Congress.  
The commission to reestablish democracy attempted to use structural 
changes in the governmental system to control such problems as personalism, 
fragmentation, and personal animosity that prevented a functional government. 
Yet, constitutions can’t change or mandate political culture, and the pre existing 
political culture became woven into the constitutional system. Bucaram’s 
attempts to sabotage Roldós’ legislation as punishment for not submitting to 
clientelistic demands served as a poignant example of Ecuador’s historically 
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personalistic political system. Bucaram played an important role in the 
dysfunctional state of political parties in the democratic era. Personalism and 
fractionalization within political parties became a major component of the first 
presidential administration after so many careful reforms and laws to avoid these 
exact problems. In these critical first years of democracy, with the support from 
the entire country and the military, Ecuador lost a critical opportunity to put theory 
into practice, and enact a system that allowed for the development of a more 
cohesive party system. The reorganization of the political party system, so 
carefully addressed on paper by people like Roldós and Hurtado, was based 
around avoiding the exact problems that plagued the Roldós administration. 
Roldós broke off ties with the CFP and formed his own political party, 
Pueblo, Cambio y Democracia (PCD) as his former political party became an 
obstacle instead of an ally in Congress. This set an important precedent. In the 
first democratic election of the modern democratic era, a president rejected the 
party under which he was elected, split from his party banner and created a 
personalistic party that could better suit his needs and provide him with 
legislative support while in office.   
This reality highlighted an evolving trend in Ecuadorian politics, which is 
the lack of allegiance by prominent national leaders to political parties that 
support them in elections. Leaders have rarely been subordinate to their political 
party. If the party has tried to control an individual leader, the leader often 
responded by abandoning his political party and creating one of his own.  
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Ecuador’s first attempt at a modern political party system resulted in a 
party boss hand picking his successor, internal party conflicts becoming critical in 
an executive-legislative deadlock, and the a presidential decision to abandon the 
party he ran under during elections and form his own party while in office. The 
experiment of functional political parties began dreadfully. New political parties 
fell victim to “internal conflict and subsequent schisms,” just like the previous two 
traditional parties. (Conaghan 1995:439)  
In August, 1980, Roldós’ candidate managed to beat the CFP candidate 
for the presidency of Congress, and Roldós enjoyed increased support in 
Congress. However, Roldós did not have the opportunity to create a more 
effective political system with his newfound backing in Congress. In May, 1981, 
President Roldós, his wife, and the minister of defense died unexpectedly in a 
plane crash near the Peruvian border.  
Assad Bucaram suffered from a heart attack in the same year and passed 
away. The two dominant political players and their respective parties faded from 
the scene. As Vice President Osvaldo Hurtado from the DP became president in 
a time of increasing debt pressure and impending economic crisis, Ecuador had 
a second chance at establishing a less violate and personalistic political system. 
 Hurtado, Roldós’ constitutional successor, entered office in a difficult 
economic situation. As the petroleum boom suddenly ended, the country found 
itself struggling to meet debt payment obligations. In addition, the phenomenon 
of El Niño damaged Ecuador in 1982 and 1983, as Ecuador suffered severe 
 71
economic losses due to extreme weather conditions. Infrastructure damages 
resulted in a $640 million loss, with an additional $300 million in balance of 
payments deficit. Inflation reached its highest point in the history of the country, 
at 52.5% in a single year (Return to Democratic Rule). 
 Hurtado, though ideologically a center-leftist, implemented many 
unpopular austerity measures to gain the support of the International Monetary 
Fund and keep the country’s lines of credit open. Hurtado suffered from four 
major strikes during his short time in office; one of which was called off due to the 
fear of a coup d’etat in October of 1982 (Return to Democratic Rule). Though 
Hurtado suffered from lack of public support, he managed to help consolidate the 
democratic system and keep lines of credit open during a time of economic and 
political turmoil. Yet, the dismal economic conditions under a center-left president 
gave free market advocates an opportunity to attack the current administration. 
1984-León Febres Cordero and the Right 
Ecuador had another opportunity to begin anew in 1984, with an election 
between apparently distinct political parties with differing ideologies. The second 
round featured Guayaquil’s León Febres Cordero of the Partido Socialcristiano 
(PSC) and Rodrigo Borja, the leader of the Izquierda Democrática (ID) from 
Quito. In this election, there were two candidates from different regional 
strongholds, with different economic plans, different ideologies and support from 
different populations. The simple fact that the electorate put these two candidates 
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into the second round showed a willingness to trust political party candidates with 
the government.  
In evaluating the electoral history of Ecuador, this election is the only one 
that pitted the two traditional parties against each other. This shows that Ecuador 
attempted to develop a contentious party system with two dominant parties. In 
this election, the two candidates were markedly different, as were their political 
parties. Not only did the candidates and their parties espouse contrasting 
ideologies, but they also had support in distinct geographical areas, developed 
ideological bases, had different ideas of the role of the state in the economy, and 
had different platforms on how to govern. The left faced the right, the Serranos 
faced the Costeños and a Reganist, free market reformer (Febres Cordero) faced 
a social democrat (Borja).  
These two politicians also had different campaign styles, and emphasized 
different personal strengths in the campaign. Febres Cordero focused on his 
business connections as opposed to political ones, and ran a charismatic, 
aggressive, personalist campaign, with an image as a dominant leader. In 
contrast, Borja emphasized his political experience, diplomacy, concern with 
building consensus, and connection with his party and the political system as a 
whole.   
León Febres Cordero, who was a national deputy of the PSC, came into 
prominence due to media attention because of his attacks on Hurtado’s 
government. (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994:132) An unabashed believer in the 
 73
free market and representative of Guayaquil’s business sector, Febres Cordero 
quickly became a prominent and aggressive politician who would dominate the 
PSC for decades. This put this conservative party in a good position for the 1984 
elections, especially after the economic meltdown following the 1982 debt crisis 
in Latin America. Many citizens were looking for a more efficient government. 
(Conaghan and Malloy, 1994:132) 
Febres Cordero won a narrow victory by 81,000 votes and acted rapidly to 
implement neoliberal reforms in his attempt to save Ecuador from a deepening 
economic crisis. His presidency included a strict neoliberal economic program 
and received the strong support of not only Guayaquil’s business elites, but also 
of the United States and the larger international financial community. Politically, 
his controversial and authoritarian leadership style created many enemies, 
including congressmen from Borja’s party, the ID, which was the largest party 
represented in Congress. The presidential administration had many severe 
problems. They began with the loss of the majority in congress in 1986 and the 
establishment of the ID as the leaders of the legislature. In addition, the 
legislature requested Febres Cordero’s resignation, which he refused to give. 
Other events included a deepening economic crisis and a failed referendum 
initiated by Febres Cordero to restructure the political party system by allowing 
independent presidential candidates to run. (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994:170) In 
one of the more outrageous occurrences, members of the Air Force kidnapped 
and held President Febres Cordero hostage for two days before releasing him. 
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Febres Cordero himself described his presidency as governing, “With a pistol to 
his throat.” (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994:172)  Once again, overwhelming 
personal opposition and animosity between the two branches of government 
crippled the capacity of the government to govern.  
 In 1988, the Ecuadorian electorate had the first opportunity in the 
democratic era to reform the constitution to allow candidates who have no 
political party affiliation to run for president. This idea was rejected at the polls, as 
a referendum to this effect failed to pass. This suggests that at this point, the 
electorate still supported the concept of a presidential candidate from a political 
party that would run on the same platform as congressional candidates.  
1988-Rodrigo Borja and the Left 
As the 1988 elections came, other politicians quickly became leaders in 
the presidential campaign. As became common in Ecuador, candidates who held 
different ideological positions from the incumbent president became frontrunners 
in the campaign. The president’s most outspoken opponent, Rodrigo Borja, was 
a strong candidate for the 1988 elections. Borja’s two previous experiences in the 
presidential campaign (in 1979 and in 1984) made him an experienced and well 
known candidate. 
The second round brought a new face to national prominence, Abdalá 
Bucaram from Guayaquil. Nephew of deceased CFP party boss Assad Bucaram 
and brother in law of deceased president Jaime Roldós, Abdalá established a 
populist political party in honor of ex-president Roldós, the Partido Roldósista 
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Ecuatoriana (PRE) in 1983. Bucaram was elected as mayor of Guayaquil in 
1984, an important political post in Ecuador. After being ousted as mayor due to 
corruption charges, Bucaram fled to Panama and was incarcerated briefly for 
drug trafficking. Bucaram came back to Ecuador in order to run in the 1988 
elections, and managed to win 17.6% of the first round vote for second place. 
This put him in the runoff against Borja for the second round.  
Finally, the incumbent party ran a candidate in the elections. Sixto Durán 
Ballén, one of the founders of the PSC, ran hoping to continue the PSC’s tenure 
in office. Durán Ballén performed poorly and placed third in the first round. With 
this, the Ecuadorian electorate had thoroughly rejected the PSC’s experiment 
with free market reforms and their lack of success of improving Ecuador’s 
continually dismal economic situation. 
Bucaram’s political party, the PRE, served an important function in 
Ecuador’s national political scene. Since the 1930’s, Ecuadorian politics always 
had a dominant, outsider leader, who received strong support from the non-elite 
population. Velasco Ibarra was Ecuador’s prominent populist for almost 40 years, 
from the 1930’s through the 1970’s. As Velasco Ibarra aged, Assad Bucaram 
established the CFP and used a populist message to create a personal following. 
When Bucaram died in 1981, Abdalá quickly began filling the roll of an opposition 
politician, distinguishing himself from the political elites and establishing himself 
as the embodiment of the national will. Abdalá managed to create a political party 
machinery that gave him support and worked for his candidacy. Abdalá 
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represented the excluded in Ecuadorian politics. His Lebanese roots, campaign 
full of dancing, sports, and spectacles, and his condemnation of traditional 
politics won him adoration by many citizens who had always felt excluded from 
the political scene. 
Borja’s image, personal history, and experience couldn’t have been more 
different. An established politician and Congressional representative, Borja had a 
long history of intimate involvement with the government. An academic who saw 
public service as his personal duty to his country, his image was that of a 
serious, well-trained politician, completely the opposite of Bucaram. Borja 
campaigned on a social democratic approach to government, emphasizing the 
importance of social services. He advocated more state involvement in the 
economy. After four years of structural adjustment under Febres Cordero’ he 
promised no new fiscal shocks. In addition, Borja hoped to insert Ecuador back 
into the international arena, after Ecuador defaulted on its foreign debt in 1987 
(Hey, 1995). After Febres Cordero’s economic policy, closely aligned with the 
United States, Borja attempted to build relationships with Ecuador’s neighbors.  
Borja won the presidential competition by receiving 252,160 votes more than 
Bucaram (Revista Vistazo).  
The Ecuadorian electorate had the opportunity to choose from a politician 
with strong political party support, or an outsider politician with a populist 
message. The ID was the most strongly represented political party in Congress, 
with a clear ideology, a long history in the legislature, and had strong connections 
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to institutionalized politics. Bucaram represented little ideological development, 
ran on a campaign of opposition to the established system, and his brief political 
experience as the mayor of Guayaquil resulted in his removal and exile.  
 Borja entered the presidency in a time of grave economic problems and a 
general feeling of animosity for not only the free market reforms that Febres 
Cordero had implemented, but also what former President Osvaldo Hurtado 
called Febres Cordero’s administration, a “civil dictatorship.” (Revista Vistazo) 
Borja brought his experience in politics and campaigned with an optimistic 
message that addressed opening channels for political participation, stabilization 
of the economy in a way that allowed the democratization of credit and a focus 
on job creation, and finding a “peace with dignity” in respect to a border dispute 
with Peru. Borja entered his presidency with 30 seats in Congress (42.2%), and 
with members of the ID in prominent provincial posts in 17 of Ecuador’s 21 
provinces. This put Borja with the most legislative support any candidate had 
since the return to democracy in 1979. 
 Borja used his legislative approve and implement mini-devaluations of the 
sucre in an attempt to control inflation. Borja believed in socialist principles with 
an active state in the economy. Yet due to adjustment packages and 
internationally imposed economic policies in conjunction with continued debt 
relief, Borja had few options but to continue free market reforms and open the 
economy to privatization. Though Ecuador had defaulted on its external debt, 
Borja made symbolic payments to show the international market of Ecuador’s 
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intentions to be involved in the world economy. Though rhetorically, Borja 
advocated adequate social services for the impoverished population in Ecuador, 
he did not make significant progress in reducing levels of poverty. Borja failed to 
take advantage of his ID majority in Congress from 1988-1990 to pass and 
implement programs that significantly improved the living conditions of the poor. 
In 1990, Borja lost his majority in Congress, and become yet another Ecuadorian 
president who had the difficult task of trying to rule with little congressional 
support. 
 By 1992, inflation had begun to rise and petroleum prices continued to be 
increased by the government, resulting in high levels of unpopularity for Borja’s 
government. In addition, a new, powerful social movement that would greatly 
impact Ecuadorian politics and election emerged on the national scene during 
Borja’s presidency. The Confederación de Nacionales Indígenas de Ecuador 
(CONAIE), claiming to represent the 25-40% of the Ecuadorian population with 
indigenous roots, staged its first national protest and strike during Borja’s 
presidency in 1990, and presented 18 demands to the government relating to 
necessities for the indigenous population. Initially, Borja negotiated with CONAIE 
and its leadership. The dialogue continued but included several ruptures, new 
threats for uprisings and strikes, and general rejection of the government and its 
policies by the indigenous citizens. Only minor progress was made in the 
development of a mutual relationship.   
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 Ecuador’s indigenous population has been excluded from politics for 
hundreds of years. The indigenous have suffered from lack of the most basic 
necessities, such as food, housing and adequate medical care. As many speak 
native indigenous tongues, language is another main obstacle to integrating the 
indigenous sector into society. CONAIE formed to address the specific needs of 
these citizens, who for hundreds of years, have been viewed as less than 
citizens. Initially, this social movement purposefully stayed out of traditional 
politics, and has used such methods as strikes, protests and governmental 
negotiations to achieve their demands. After supporting the development of a 
political movement, Pachakutik, to compete in elections, groups such as the 
CONAIE began to advocate for inclusion in the political system and make 
demands to a government that was not adequately representing them or meeting 
their needs. 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE SHIFT OCCURS (1992-2002) 
 
1992-Sixto Durán Ballén-From Insider to Outsider  
The sheer quantity of presidential candidates (ranging from six to 12 
candidates in any election) has created a unique reality for those campaigning for 
the presidency. This plethora of candidates produced varying results in a two 
round election system. Candidates can often pass on to the second round with 
15-20% of the national vote in the first round. Therefore, instead of building a 
broad national consensus in the first round, candidates can pinpoint a specific 
population or region that will actively support them. If they do this successfully, 
this can often result in a second round appearance, which is generally when 
candidates then make their campaign strategies more nationally based and 
inclusive. Yet, a first place finish in the polls after the first round does not 
necessarily indicate widespread support of a certain candidate or ideology. The 
electoral system also can result in two candidates with similar ideologies, 
backgrounds, or regional strongholds. In the second round, mandatory voting 
means the electorate must pick between one of the two candidates, regardless of 
whether they feel either candidate adequately represents them.  
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In 1992, Rodrigo Borja’s presidential term came to close amidst rising 
economic speculation and inflation. The multiple strikes and protests by CONAIE 
and other social groups created a sense of general unrest.  Continual problems 
with servicing the external debt and bleak macroeconomic factors combined with 
a strong congressional opposition against Borja and his center-left ideology. 
Candidates with a conservative, free market based ideology dominated the 
presidential electoral season. Borja and the center-left had no nationally viable 
candidate. 
 Of the 12 candidates who ran for the presidency in 1992, the Partido 
Socialcristiano (PSC) and its members dominated the election season in a 
surprising way. Febres Cordero affiliated with the PSC to run for Congress in 
1978, but he continued to identify himself as a businessman as opposed to a 
party militant. As President of Ecuador from 1984-1988, he established himself 
as the undisputed head of the party. Sixto Durán Ballén, one of the PSC’s 
founders and PSC candidate for president in 1979 and 1988 decided to contest 
the nomination of Jaime Nebot Saadi during the PSC convention. Nebot had 
strong backing from Febres Cordero and business elite of the party. Yet, like 
Durán Ballén, some of the party militants and career politicians objected to 
Febres Cordero’s domination of the party and his authoritarian style. Durán 
Ballén wanted to redirect the PSC to its roots as a political organization instead 
of continuing with its current close alignment with powerful business sectors. 
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Nebot won the nomination, but Durán Ballén’s voiced suspicions about 
voting irregularities at the presidential convention. When the party did not 
address his complaints, he cut off all ties with the PSC, a move that was widely 
popular with the public. After much urging to join the presidential race without 
PSC affiliation, he became a candidate and his public support skyrocketed. As 
the public was growing increasingly less tolerant of internal bickering among 
political parties, Durán Ballén’s attempt to stand up to party leaders won him 
many admirers.   
An experienced politician and political party member, Durán Ballén saw 
the stunning electoral success of Peruvian outsider President Alberto Fujimori, 
who had recently shocked the international community with his rapid rise to 
prominence and sweeping victory in the presidential elections. Fujimori had no 
political experience and won on his identity as a candidate with no connection to 
the traditional political class. Durán Ballén, like Fujimori, could campaign on a 
platform as an independent candidate, uninfluenced by traditional political 
parties, and untainted by the declining public support for parties that had 
increasingly become viewed as corrupt, ineffective, and unable to address the 
needs of the populace (Conaghan, 1995).  
 Due to constitutional regulations, Durán Ballén needed to run as a 
member of a political party. He created the Partido Unión Republicana (PUR) to 
serve as his party for the 1992 elections. This creation of a party for a personalist 
candidate showed the inverse relationship of parties and politicians in Ecuador. 
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Politicians continued to see parties as vehicles for personal ambitions, not as 
ideologically solid organizations, independent of individual leaders.  
The lack of ideology of the PUR made Durán Ballén’s choice of a vice 
president an important sign of his governmental plans and intentions. Durán 
Ballén chose Alberto Dahik as his vice presidential candidate. Dahik, a hard core 
right wing, neoliberal economist, had served as economic minister under Febres 
Cordero. The PUR director, Mauricio Gandara, opposed Dahik, who was a 
political insider, as Durán Ballén’s vice presidential candidate. Gandara feared 
Dahik would decrease Durán Ballén’s capacity to market himself as an 
independent political candidate from the ideological center, due to Dahik’s close 
party affiliations and extreme free market views. As conflict ensured, the PUR 
expelled Gandara.6  
Durán Ballén, along with Jaime Nebot of the PSC and Abdalá Bucaram of 
the PRE, became the dominant candidates. The first round, won by Nebot, 
concurred with a strong victory for the PSC in the legislative elections (the PSC 
won 27.3% of the seats in Congress). Nebot’s close alignment with ex-president 
Febres Cordero and his active role in the party made him an insider candidate, 
affiliated with the established political system. He ran with the support of the 
established business elite from Guayaquil, claiming that the country needed to be 
run more efficiently.  
                                                 
6 For more information about this event,  please see Catherine Conaghan’s article written in 1995. 
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Although Durán Ballén founded the PSC, was the party’s presidential 
candidate on two different occasions, and continued to have strong contacts 
within the party, He managed to shed his image as an insider politician and 
highlight his newfound independence. Durán Ballén used this fact to establish 
himself as an outsider candidate, which appealed to the population alienated by 
political parties. The PUR only won seven seats in the legislature, which was 
15.6% of the seats.  In the second round, these two candidates with common 
regional, party and ideological roots had few distinctions from each other. Their 
main difference was their current affiliation with traditional politicians and political 
parties. While both developed their careers inside the conservative, business 
oriented PSC, Durán Ballén’s condemnation of the traditional order and his 
willingness to abandon his own political party showed that no political 
organization (most of which were gaining a reputation as corrupt and inefficient) 
could control him. He could come into office as an outsider candidate, untainted 
by past failures of political parties and their administrations. 
 Durán Ballén went on to win the second round and became president in 
Ecuador in 1992. As the new president began his term with only seven allies in 
congress, that soon decreased to a single PUR member in Congress after the 
1994 legislative elections. In addition, Durán Ballén’s administration became 
involved in a major corruption scandal. Among the many governmental officials 
accused of unethical behavior was Vice President Alberto Dahik. Dahik accused 
the legislators and the judiciaries of forcing the president to pay bribes in order to 
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provide legislative support to implement programs. The Congress and the 
Supreme Court responded by beginning impeachment proceedings. Dahik went 
public with his accusations, stating, "The relationship that has developed 
between Congress and the executive branch over the last 15 years has led to a 
permanent form of blackmail from individuals, groups of people, and political 
parties in Congress. In this administration, three different political groups—the 
Movimiento Popular Democratico (MPD), the Partido Rodolsista Ecuatoriano 
(PRE), and the Partido Socialcristiano (PSC)—have permanently engaged in 
blackmail to obtain favors from the government, reaching unbearable levels." 
(Noti-Sur, 1995) 
In September, the Supreme Court filed multiple criminal corruption 
charges against Dahik, including embezzlement and bribery. In addition, 
Congress threatened to file political charges of bribery, abuse of office, and 
actions that damage the national honor. On September 11, 1995, Dahik fled to 
Costa Rica with his family to avoid prosecution, and was granted political asylum 
in Costa Rica in April of 1996. 
As this crisis unfolded, congress members, judges, and administration 
members all suffered from a loss of legitimacy. As the political mudslinging 
continued with the exile of Dahik and the dismissal of Supreme Court justices, 
the deep corruption at all levels of government became apparent. In addition, 
political notables used the scandal as an opportunity to gain prominence and set 
up their campaigns for the 1996 elections. Durán Ballén’s administration 
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responded with an anti-corruption campaign, but much of the public had lost faith 
in him as a leader. The president who had campaigned as an outsider had 
become embroiled in scandal surrounding his administration’s relationship with 
political parties. Finally, congressmen from multiple parties suffered from a loss 
of legitimacy, as the accusations and actions portrayed them as self-interested 
thieves who demanded payment in order to enact any programs. 
1996-Abdalá Bucaram, the Populist 
The political situation in 1996 was shaped by two main events. The first 
was the corruption scandal involving Vice President Dahik, Supreme Court 
justices, and many members of the legislature. Every branch of government 
suffered from accusations of bribery, and each branch continued to blame the 
others for the unethical practices. In addition, Durán Ballén continued on the path 
of free market reforms, including privatizations of major industries, austerity 
measures and economic liberalization. Inflation, unemployment and 
underemployment continued to be endemic problems, as neoliberalism had yet 
to improve the quality of life of most Ecuadorians.  
Nine candidates competed in the first round of the elections. While the 
election was dominated by familiar faces, there was one historically excluded 
population that became involved in government. The indigenous population had 
continued to unify and play an increasingly important role in the politics of the 
nation. They decided that in their quest to advocate for the specific needs of the 
indigenous population, they would support a candidate in the presidential 
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elections as an organization. Freddy Elhers, a non-politician and host of a 
popular news show in Ecuador, campaigned under the independent banner of 
Nuevo Pais, and ran explicitly supported by the Confederación Nacional de 
Indigenas de Ecuador (CONAIE), indigenous groups and progressive social 
movements. Elhers campaigned as an outsider, with no connection to organized 
politics, attempting to represent a segment of Ecuador’s population that has 
historically been ignored.  
As is tradition in Ecuador, many of the 1996 presidential candidates had 
already competed in previous elections and lost. Both ex-presidents Rodrigo 
Borja and Sixto Durán Ballén ran for president twice before being elected, and 
each of them performed particularly poorly in one election (Borja in 1979, Durán 
Ballén in 1988).  
Three familiar faces entered the arena once again. Rodrigo Borja from the 
ID, ex-president of Ecuador, campaigned. In addition, Jaime Nebot made his 
second appearance in the presidential elections, with the strong support of 
Febres Cordero and the PSC. Finally, Abdalá Bucaram, candidate in 1988 and 
1992, ran for the third time under his PRE party banner. Bucaram’s populist, non 
traditional campaign included an exaltation of Ecuador’s poor, gifts of food and 
basic necessities, an entertaining campaign full of dancing, singing and 
excitement, and an unabashed attack on established political parties and the 
existing political order. Though Bucaram’s campaign did not differ significantly 
from 1988 or 1992, traditional political parties had been embroiled in corruption 
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scandals and had proven ineffective at dealing with the economic situation of the 
country. As the established politicians continued to fail to address the every day 
needs of the majority of Ecuador’s population, the voters looked for new options. 
As the voters trusted Durán Ballén and his message of change in 1992, 
Bucaram’s message of antagonism against the political class and his willingness 
to identify with ordinary Ecuadorians made his candidacy stronger than ever.  
Nebot, in contrast, campaigned with a strict neoliberal campaign, 
emphasizing the necessity of making Ecuador’s economy viable using the tools 
of the free market. His connection with the business elite in Guayaquil, who 
funded much of his campaign, steered the country in a clear path of continued 
privitazation, neoliberalism and the accompanying austerity measures and 
cutbacks. Nebot’s campaign was as pragmatic as Bucaram’s was vague; while 
Bucaram avoided specifying realistic governmental programs he would 
implement and how he would deal with economic constraints, Nebot clearly 
stated that additional free market reforms and austerity measures would further 
hinder the government’s capacity to provide social services and support. Nebot 
won the first round by a slim margin over Bucaram, and Freddy Elhers placed 
third.  
Bucaram’s lack of ideology and experience worked to his advantage in the 
second round Bucaram created a hope for the future. Bucaram referred to 
himself as “el loco” (the crazy one) and brought a campaign unlike any other to 
the Ecuadorian people. He jumped out of airplanes, danced with popular salsa 
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models, and sang at his campaign events, which resembled a show as opposed 
to serious political discussion. He consistently condemned the established 
traditional parties, and blamed the country’s problems on their incompetency and 
corruption. 
Jaime Nebot campaigned with a realistic (albeit unpopular) economic 
program. He acknowledged that free market reforms and austerity measures 
would be a part of the next administration, whether a candidate supported or 
rejected them. He advocated for the needs of the business elite of Guayaquil, 
and wanted to create an economy and government that could cater to their 
professional needs. In addition, his intimate connection with Febres Cordero 
alienated those who disliked Febres Cordero’s authoritarian style.  
While Nebot only talked of economic progress, Bucaram used his populist 
rhetoric to create himself as the savior of Ecuador’s poor. The protest vote 
against Nebot and austerity measures gave Bucaram a strong advantage. Yet, 
scholars termed this election, “A choice between cancer and AIDS” in 
emphasizing the weaknesses of each candidate (de la Torre, 2000:87). 
Bucaram’s campaign strategy was to give the people what they wanted, 
and to tell the electorate what they wanted to hear.  Bucaram’s charisma, 
combined with his boisterous style, lack of involvement with politics, ethnic 
minority status and common language discourse formed a strong challenge to 
the traditional Ecuadorian political class. In addition, Bucaram campaigned as the 
first of several “outsiders/opposition politicians” with virtually no connection to the 
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political system. This group would later include Alvaro Noboa, Lucio Gutiérrez 
and, to a certain extent, León Roldós. These candidates placed the strength of 
their campaign on their lack of connection with traditional political parties, their 
identity outside of the exclusive political class, and their rejection of traditional 
politics. Bucaram chose not to be part of the establishment, and based his 
campaign on his voluntary separation from the institution of politics. Before 
Bucaram, all second round presidential candidates had some connection with a 
political stronghold or party. Yet, the continual deteriorating situation of the 
Ecuadorian economy inclined the electorate to support something different. 
In 1992, Ecuadorians had chosen to support Sixto Durán Ballén, a long 
time political party member who had abandoned his political party in search of a 
new party. His strategy worked in the first round, as Durán Ballén constructed 
himself as an independent politician, above the corruption and squabbles of 
established political parties. Yet, his decision to include another political insider, 
Alberto Dahik, led the country to a deep crisis which shook the institutional base 
of the political system. As Durán Ballén weathered the storm, traditional politics 
and its history of corruption became associated with his name. Bucaram’s lack of 
experience on the national political level gave him the right to campaign as a true 
outsider; one with hardly any connection to politicians or the political system. 
Durán Ballén’s intimate ties to the political system did not disappear as he left his 
old party and created a new one. Yet, Bucaram’s control over his party and 
personal power gave him dominance. While in previous times, this was seen as a 
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detriment, it became attractive after all other potential groups and parties had lost 
legitimacy. To make him even more popular, he aligned with underrepresented 
and impoverished classes who were suffering even more harshly due to 
macroeconomic decisions made by a governmental system that had never 
included them. Bucaram’s attempts to integrate these populations gave him 
credibility among the masses, as they saw Bucaram as a person who would 
advocate for their perpetually ignored needs.  
 Bucaram’s slogan, “Primero los pobres! (First the poor ones!)” set the 
tone for his campaign. His promises of housing, health care, and food for the 
poor won their loyalty. Bankrolled by Alvaro Noboa, Ecuador’s richest man who 
was worth several hundred million dollars, Bucaram had access to nearly 
unlimited amounts of money, and used this to give away t-shirts, food, and 
clothing on his campaign tours. His patriarchal message, promising to take care 
of the poor and uneducated, showed his desire to portray himself as the savior of 
the country. In reality, after unsuccessful and painful neoliberal reforms, Bucaram 
became the lesser of two evils. 
Bucaram won the second round by a slim margin of 27,000 votes over 
Noboa. Yet, once in office, Bucaram quickly lost the support of the majority of 
Ecuador’s population. He began to appoint relatives and friends to important 
posts in government, regardless of their qualifications. His antics as president, 
including releasing his own CD titled “The Man Who Loves” and his national tour 
to promote the CD with scantily clad models, embarrassed the country. In 
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addition, Bucaram invited Lorena Bobbitt to the presidential palace, a famous 
Ecuadorian woman who gained notoriety by cutting off her abusive husband’s 
penis in the United States. Economically, Bucaram quickly turned to structural 
adjustment packages and harsh neoliberal economic policies, which surprised 
the entire country after his campaign based on advocating for the needs of the 
poor.  These economic goals included discussions with Domingo Cavallo 
(architect of the Argentine convertibility plan) to dollarize the economy in 1996. A 
last straw for Bucaram was his harsh increases in the price of electricity and 
gasoline, which jumped in price by 200%. In addition, Bucaram increased the 
price of public transportation by 60%. These goals greatly impacted the entire 
population, but had a particularly devastating effect on the poorest Ecuadorians. 
In addition, Congress began to investigate allegations of corruption within the 
Bucaram administration. 
By mid-January, opposition came from many different fronts, including the 
indigenous population, the urban poor, the middle class, and academics and 
intellectuals. In a telling statement of the utter loss of confidence by the entire 
country, even the business sector supported the ouster of Bucaram. Jamil 
Mahuad led Quito’s business associations to join in the strikes and protests 
against the government. On February 6th, over two million Ecuadorians 
participated in a 48 hour national strike, calling for the resignation of President 
Bucaram.  On February 7th, using a vague clause of the constitution, the 
Congress voted to impeach Bucaram on grounds of mental incapacity, and 
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elected President of Congress Fabian Alarcón as president.  The situation 
became ever more confusing as Bucaram rejected the legality of his 
impeachment, his Vice President claimed the presidency for herself, and 
Congress elected a separate president. 
As a vacuum of power loomed, the Armed Forces rejected the possibility 
of taking power. The military encouraged the squabbling civilian factions to find a 
quick solution to keep the country from falling into anarchy. The military 
volunteered to serve as a mediator between these fighting groups, and an 
agreement was made. Bucaram left the country for self-exile in Panama, Vice 
President Rosalia Arteaga agreed to step down, and Alarcón would become 
interm president of Ecuador until August of 1998 when special elections would be 
held to elect a new president. From exile in Panama, Bucaram quickly made it 
apparent that he was not finished in Ecuadorian politics, and continued to direct 
his political party from Panama.  
This utter failure of Bucaram in the presidential office left the electorate 
with many harsh lessons. The populace had chosen Bucaram to protest the 
inefficient and unresponsive government of traditional political parties. Yet, 
Bucaram’s presidency ended in a situation of chaos, with political, economic and 
constitutional crises negatively impacting the entire country. While political party 
candidates hadn’t been popular, all of them managed to finish their elected term 
in office. Bucaram’s tenure lasted a mere six months. While parties and their 
presidents had lost legitimacy due to their lack of successful government, 
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Bucaram’s government proved unstable and ineffective to a new extreme. 
Neither insider nor populist candidates managed to address Ecuador’s profound 
economic and political problems, or provide the electorate with a sense of 
representation in high levels of government. This left the electorate with little 
confidence in any type of politician. Both the new and the old had proved 
unsuccessful. Populist rhetoric had proven to be misleading, as Bucaram’s 
campaign promises did not in any way indicate what he would do once in office.  
Ecuador had yet to experience a successful presidency. The right, the left, 
independent and populist politicians had all failed to make positive changes in 
the quality of life of the majority of Ecuador’s population. As different groups 
continued to be delegitimized, Ecuador had few additional options. As different 
people with different bases of support tried to address serious problems of the 
country, they lost their legitimacy while serving as president and did not meet the 
expectations of the people that elected them. The population, frustrated by the 
continued failure of a wide spectrum of parties, politicians and ideologies to 
improve the situations in the country, prepared for another election in 1998. Wary 
of unabashed populism and disappointed at Bucaram’s performance, presidential 
candidates had to create themselves as something genuinely unique for the 
population. 
Fabian Alarcón ruled as interim president from February 1997 to August 
1998. In July 1997, he dismissed the Supreme Court as they began to 
investigate accusations that Alarcón had over 1,000 ghost employees on the 
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government’s payroll.  This removed the Supreme Court justice that was 
pursuing a corruption case against the interim president. Alarcón did not have the 
political support in Congress or the time to implement real changes. Though he 
attempted to get permission to complete Bucaram’s four year term in office, civil 
and political opposition prevented this. In addition, because Alarcón had not been 
elected to the presidency, he has less legitimacy in the eyes of the people than 
other leaders. Alarcón ended his lame duck term in August 1998. 
In a context of never ending corruption scandals among Ecuador’s highest 
government officials, the 1998 election season began. The electorate had trusted 
Bucaram to be an outsider president who would make important changes in the 
economic and political situation of the nation. That experiment ended in near 
disaster, so the populace approached this election with wariness. Outsiders now 
had a strike against them, and the general fear that Bucaram would somehow 
manage to return to the country to attempt to be in power again impacted 
electoral choices. Frustrated by the unbecoming behavior of Ecuador’s previous 
presidents and outraged at the corruption apparent in all levels of government, 
Ecuador’s population looked for candidates with experience in office who had a 
clean record.  
1998-Jamil Mahuad, the Career Politician 
These elections became the first elections that occurred under a new 
constitution, ratified in 1998. Much of the reason to change and update the 
constitution came from the confusing events of Bucaram’s ouster in 1997, when 
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Ecuador had three people who claimed to be the legitimate president. Though 
eventually a peaceful solution occurred, the prior document did not clearly 
mandate what was to happen in a situation such as this. This constitution hoped 
to clarify these issues, and again addressed political parties. In a new approach 
to politics, the constitution also permitted the candidacy of independent 
candidates running without a political party banner. 
Important roles of political parties are discussed, and the document 
attempts to assign functions to political parties and how they fit in the general 
system as a whole. Before addressing specifics of the 1998 elections, this study 
gives a general overview of the legal system in place for the 1998 elections. 
The Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador acknowledges the importance 
of the political party system. The Law of Political Parties states, “Parties are 
organized by political doctrines, and are made up of people who freely associate 
with each other to participate in the life of the State.” (OAS, 2002:28). 
Additionally, the law establishes an important role for political parties, stating that 
they, “constitute a fundamental element of the democratic system-they express 
and orient the public will, they promote active civic participation of citizens, they 
train their members to become involved in public life, and they select the best 
men for the term of the government.” (OAS, 2002:28). Even the Ecuadorian legal 
code recognizes the importance of parties, and claims that they should form a 
“fundamental element” of the democratic system. 
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In Article 114, the constitution guarantees the right to found political party 
systems and participate in elections in the conditions established by law. Article 
115 states that in order for a party to be recognized by law, it “should present 
doctrines that individualize them, present a program of political action that abides 
by a democratic system, should be organized nationally [as opposed to 
regionally], and have the number of members that the law requires.” In order to 
control for the multitude of minor parties and personalist parties, the law also 
states,” whatever party or political movement that does not obtain a minimum of 
5% of the valid vote in successive national elections will be eliminated from the 
electoral register.” In terms of campaign limits, Article 116 establishes that, “the 
law will fix the limits of campaign spending. Political parties, movements, 
organizations and independent candidates will have to present accounts before 
the Tribuno Supremo Electoral (TSE), about the amount, origin and destination of 
resources utilized during electoral campaigns.” Finally, “electoral publicity using 
the means of communication can only occur during the 45 days immediately 
before the date of the closure of the electoral campaign.”  
 Article 209 of the constitution establishes The Tribuno Supremo Electoral  
(TSE) is the head of electoral organization, and is made up of seven members 
who represent the political groups that received the most votes in the last 
elections. (OAS, 2002:28)  It is autonomous and administered independently, 
and its function is to organize, supervise, direct and guarantee the electoral 
process. The TSE is responsible for providing the official results of elections.  
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 Presidential elections occur ever four years. Article 98 establishes that 
candidates can either run under political party banners, or can run independently, 
without affiliation with political parties. In addition, while presidents and vice 
presidents can’t be consecutively reelected, the can be elected after one term 
has passed. Article 100 of the Constitution suggests that military members 
should resign from military posts before running for office. 
 A candidate can win in one electoral round under two conditions. Firstly, a 
single candidate can obtain a simple majority of the vote. Secondly, if a 
candidate wins 40% of the vote, and over 10% more than the immediately 
following candidate, a second round is unnecessary. In Ecuador, no election has 
ever finished this way. If neither of these situations occurs, a runoff between the 
top two candidates takes place. The second round produces the new president of 
the republic. 
 Mandatory voting means that candidates have to convince the majority of 
Ecuadorians that their candidacy will be able to address the country’s profound 
economic problems, along with political and social challenges. This requirement 
attempts to integrate all social and economic classes into the political system, 
and give everyone a say in the government. In a political system that has 
generally been highly exclusive, mandatory voting hopes to force candidates to 
address issues that are important to a large sector of the population. With 
between 60-80% of Ecuadorians living in poverty, improvement in the quality of 
life is a fundamental issue of every campaign. Mandatory voting reinforces the 
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importance of a bond between politicians and the general electorate. Candidates 
must be attractive to the general population.  
Though mandatory voting intends to involve the entire country in the 
electoral process, it has important unintended consequences. Specifically 
because of this, campaigns have often featured few realistic campaign promises 
and platforms. Considering that the vast majority of Ecuadorians live in poverty 
and have low levels of education, such campaign strategies that use clientelism 
and handouts to the people become popular. In addition, this makes Ecuador 
ripe ground for unrealistic but attractive campaign promises. Instead of 
acknowledging realistic budgetary restraints, presidents speak of programs and 
changes that would be extremely difficult to actually implement. For example, 
highlighting the reality of continued austerity measures would be a detriment to a 
candidate. Yet, they are inevitably going to be a part of their government. 
Instead, candidates talk about new housing for the poor, programs that assist in 
providing food, and increased numbers of jobs that will be created by a new 
presidency. In addition, this has assisted in creating a campaign season where 
candidates sometimes say whatever necessary to get elected, as opposed to 
addressing serious financial and economic realities. 
Bucaram’s platform forms a poignant example of a candidate specifically 
targeting voters alienated from traditional political party rule, advocating for 
important changes to improve the lives of Ecuador’s poor, and implementing 
unexpected, harsh austerity measures once in office.  These surprising 
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measures included such decisions as sharply increasing the prices of basic 
necessities such as public transportation and electricity. These mandate 
switches, very common in Ecuador, have damaged the legitimacy of the 
president. 
Latin American constitutions have a long history of creating an ideal 
picture of a how a government should function instead of taking into account 
realistic constraints and integrating the reality of a political culture that has been 
dominated by a history of authoritarianism as opposed to democracy. This 
constitution is another example of Ecuador’s attempts to use legal documents to 
regulate and change a political culture that never developed any strong 
attachment to political parties. After 20 years of a political system based on an 
important role of political parties, this constitution gave independents the right to 
run for presidency. In 1988, the populace rejected a similar referendum that 
would allow independent candidates to run, but after the dismal performance of 
various political parties in the president, the electorate was ready for new and 
untested governments. 
Sixteen months after Bucaram’s departure, the 1998 elections occurred. 
The chaos and near disintegration of the government was fresh on many voter’s 
minds. The trauma and instability caused by Bucaram’s six month presidency 
and his unconventional removal from office formed an important background for 
these elections. The unbecoming antics of Bucaram while in the presidency gave 
academically trained candidates with practical experience in politics an 
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advantage, as Ecuador looked for a candidate that could return a sense of honor 
and seriousness to government. 
Only six candidates campaigned in these elections, the fewest to date in 
Ecuador’s history. After Democracia Popular (DP) candidate Rodrigo Paz 
finished fourth in a field of nine in 1996, the DP ran a different candidate for the 
President, Jamil Mahuad Whitt. Mahuad campaigned with a promise to 
modernize Ecuador’s state apparatus and crack down on crime and corruption. 
Though the DP never had held the presidency, they had been an important group 
in Congress and were known for their moderate viewpoints and their ability to 
negotiate with other political parties. Identified with the highland middle and 
upper class, the DP had a centrist ideology, and hoped to build some consensus 
in order to allow for the proper functioning of government. In addition, Mahuad 
had an impressive résumé and a somewhat unusual reputation as a clean and 
honest politician in a country where the majority of politicians are viewed as 
corrupt by the public.  His training in Public Administration at Harvard University, 
combined with his respectable mayorship of the city of Quito, gave him the 
necessary experience and academic combination to propose serious programs 
to assist the country out of a continual economic downslide.  
Multi millionaire Alvaro Noboa was almost the exact opposite of Mahuad. 
Noboa blazed onto the political scene in 1998, under Bucaram’s party banner, 
the PRE. Noboa had bankrolled Bucaram’s successful presidential campaign in 
1996. With Bucaram in self-exile in Panama and ineligible to run for the 
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presidency, he agreed to back Noboa as a presidential candidate, and have his 
party sponsor Noboa’s candidacy. Noboa had no political experience whatsoever 
and many Ecuadorians saw his wealth as a product of his inheritance as 
opposed to hard work. Bucaram’s connection to Noboa also brought much 
speculation, as the population wondered if a Noboa presidency would also mean 
Bucaram’s return to Ecuador. Rodrigo Borja ran for presidency under his political 
party banner, the ID, for the fifth time. In addition Freddy Elhers campaigned 
again under the banner of Nuevo País.   
The characteristics of this election were markedly different from other 
ones. Firstly, only six candidates ran for presidency, as opposed to the usual field 
of anywhere between eight and twelve. Secondly, Noboa’s status as the only 
candidate from the coastal region of Ecuador gave him a huge comparative 
advantage. In a country where region often shaped the presidential election, 
1998 was the first year that the traditionally strong coastal party of the PSC didn’t 
field a candidate. Therefore, Noboa had no competition from another coastal 
candidate, which improved his odds at passing into the second round. Thirdly, 
Noboa’s personal wealth and ability to finance his campaign, combined with the 
clientelistic support structure of the PRE, gave him a combination of effective 
political party machinery with an unlimited pocketbook. As no campaign spending 
limits were in effect, the costs associated with running for president skyrocketed.  
Coming from an influential coastal family that made its wealth in Ecuador’s 
banana export trade, Noboa claimed to have the international connections and 
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the business knowledge to help the country out of its deep political and economic 
problems. His dominant, charismatic personality and lack of experience in the 
political sphere filled the void left by Bucaram, as the poor suddenly had a new 
populist leader to support. Noboa used his personal wealth to travel throughout 
the country, giving away food, flour, t-shirts and medicine.  
As Noboa gained support of mostly poor, alienated voters, the political 
elite of the country feared a return of Bucaram into a position of power. 
Therefore, in an extremely unusual occurrence, coastal business elites looked to 
support a candidate from the highlands. Rarely in Ecuadorian history have elites 
from the highland and coastal regions agreed to support a single candidate. The 
coastal elites threw their support behind Mahuad, due to the damage Bucaram’s 
presidency did to the view of the country’s stability. In addition, with no practical 
experience in politics and no real ideological platform, Noboa seemed unqualified 
to govern a country in the midst of severe economic, financial and political 
problems.  
Mahuad and Noboa passed into the second round with significantly more 
support than any of the other candidates. In the second round another surprise 
occurred, as Noboa abruptly severed ties with the PRE and its political 
machinery. While Noboa claimed that he had planned to do so all along, the PRE 
contradicted him by saying that Noboa could not have passed into the second 
round without the support of the PRE. Many people believed that a personal rift 
had occurred between Noboa and Bucaram. Bucaram insisted on complete 
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authority within his political party, and Noboa was attempting to take more 
control. When Bucaram wouldn’t cede any power within the party, Noboa 
responded by ending all connections with the PRE and creating his own political 
party, called the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN). 
Therefore, Bucaram became opposed to Noboa. Some analysts claim that this 
split cost him the election. 
The second round election featured a showdown between two completely 
distinct politicians. Mahuad represented experience and pragmatism. He had a 
platform to address some of the deep rooted problems in Ecuador, including 
inadequate state apparatus, corruption in high levels of government, and 
continual economic problems. Noboa, on the other hand, represented a rejection 
of the traditional political system and little developed ideology. Noboa’s optimistic 
campaign promised the voters an improved quality of life, but offered few 
practical ideas as to how that would occur.  
Both of these politicians represented a variation of a presidency Ecuador 
had seen before. Noboa followed in Bucaram’s footsteps, using populism and 
clientelism to win the loyalty of citizens. Ecuador has often had politicians use 
this approach, which has been widely successful. In contrast, Mahuad 
represented traditional politics, but came from a political party with a somewhat 
solid reputation. Mahuad had proven himself to be a capable administrator of 
Quito, and had the proper credentials to rule the country at the time of crisis. 
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After the near collapse of the government under Bucaram, the country wanted a 
president that had preparation for the difficult road ahead. 
Mahuad beat Noboa in a closely contested race, with only 200,000 votes 
separating the two candidates (OAS 1998). Noboa vigorously protested the 
results, claiming fraud gave Mahuad the victory. International election monitoring 
groups, including The Organization of American States, continued to verify that 
Mahuad fairly won the elections. As Noboa claimed the elections were stolen 
from him by a conspiracy of Ecuador’s elites to allow Mahuad’s presidency, 
Mahuad was inaugurated in August 1998.  
The second round of 1998 clearly shows the ideological swing back 
towards a career politician and away from a neophyte outsider after a chaotic 
and unsuccessful populist presidency with Bucaram. The population once again 
decided to place their trust in a political party and a president with intimate 
contacts with government. The population gave the DP 33 seats in Congress, 
another important victory for Mahuad, as he would have collaborators in 
Congress.  
Mahuad came to national prominence firstly by his mayorship of Quito, 
and then by taking a leadership role against a fairly elected president that had 
lost legitimacy in the eyes of the people.  By supporting Bucaram’s ouster, 
Mahuad gained important respect in the political sphere. 1998 was the first time 
in 10 years Ecuadorians had chosen a president from an established political 
party. Finally, Mahuad represented the true theory behind political parties, as the 
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party chose Mahuad to run under the party banner. Mahuad played an important 
role in his party, but did not dominate it absolutely, a rarity in Ecuadorian politics. 
Economic Collapse and January 21, 2000   
 Mahuad, who came into power with an impressive 33 members of his 
political party in Congress, hoped to modernize Ecuador’s political system. 
Almost immediately after entering office in August, 1998, Ecuador came to the 
verge of war with Peru over a boundary dispute that had existed since 1942. 
Ecuador had fought three wars with Peru over this territory, including a conflict in 
1995 which cost Ecuador a significant amount of revenue and saw dozens of 
soldiers killed. Mahuad and his counterpart, Peruvian Alberto Fujimori, came to a 
peace treaty that favored Peru, but included concessions to Ecuador.   
The immediacy of addressing a potential border confrontation diverted 
important attention away from the economic front. As the peace treaty finally 
came into effect, Ecuador was hit with another wave of serious problems, this 
time on the economic front. Due to a global overproduction of oil, the price of a 
barrel of petroleum (Ecuador’s main export) had dropped to $8-9 a barrel. With 
the Ecuadorian budget based on a price of between $17-22, Ecuador suffered 
from a huge decrease in state revenue. In addition, the El Niño phenomenon, 
warm water current that impacts global temperature and climate, hit Ecuador in 
1998. While El Niño generally harms Ecuador’s agricultural crops and 
infrastructure, this year the storm caused enormous damage to the country’s 
exports, roads, and residencies. Millions of dollars of export crops were 
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completely destroyed, which further hurt the country and its economy. All of 
these problems resulted in increases in the inflation rate, as the sucre, the 
national currency, began to weaken. 
1999 was one of Ecuador’s worst years in the economic history of the 
country. In the beginning of March, the currency began to rapidly lose value 
against the dollar. To avoid capital flight which would result in the bankruptcy of 
several banks and to avert hyperinflation, Mahuad declared a bank holiday in 
March, as banks closed for over a week. Widespread protests erupted as the 
administration’s economic team decided to freeze saving accounts to keep banks 
solvent. In addition, Mahuad attempted to raise the prices of gasoline within the 
country to help cut the budget deficit. After facing protests and marches that 
nearly brought the country to a standstill, Mahuad relented on his gasoline price 
increases and compromised over which accounts would be frozen and which 
accounts people would have access to.  
As Mahuad struggled to meet with all of the austerity measures required 
by international financial institutions in order to keep Ecuador’s lines of credit 
open, he faced another angry segment of the population that had felt betrayed 
and abandoned by the government. The indigenous social movement, CONAIE, 
sponsored several uprisings against Mahuad and his government in protest of 
cuts in subsidies for basic needs, increases in the cost of living, and inflation that 
impacted the entire population but particularly hurt the poor.   
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The banking and financial sector suffered severely from increased inflation 
and decreased economic stability. The government attempted to bail out several 
failing banks and spent billions of dollars in trying to keep the banking system 
solvent, but currency continued to slide and several large banks went bankrupt. 
Not just the result of macroeconomic factors, the banking crisis also revolved 
around unethical banking practices. Many of the high level staff of large banks 
left the country with millions of dollars of Ecuadorian’s money while the bank slid 
into bankruptcy. Particularly devastating was the bankruptcy of The Banco del 
Progreso, Guayaquil’s largest bank, which still closed after the government 
bailed the bank out and spent over $1 billion. In September, Ecuador became the 
first country in history to default on its Brady Bonds and the economic forecast 
went from bad to worse. 
After losing almost two thirds of its value in 1999, the sucre lost over 30% 
of its value in the first week of January 2000. The country was on the verge of 
approaching hyperinflation, and Mahuad’s approval rating continued to plummet 
as the population saw him as an incapable administrator to handle these severe 
problems. Mahuad’s focused on avoiding a bout of hyperinflation which would 
ruin the country. Hyperinflation hadn’t occurred in Ecuador to this point, but other 
countries such as Argentina and Bolivia had suffered harshly from its disastrous 
effect on the economy and the cost of living. 
As the currency continued to slide, more information became public about 
the sources of funding for Mahuad’s campaign. The 1998 elections brought 
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expenses to a new level in Ecuador. Due to the fact that the country had not 
established a legal campaign spending limit and Alvaro Noboa also had unlimited 
funds at his disposal, Mahuad needed to raise a significant amount of money to 
remain competitive in the elections. Mahuad and Noboa each spent an estimated 
$15-18 million dollars in the election season. A further blow to Mahuad’s 
legitimacy occurred when a reporter broke the news that Mahuad had received 
over $3 million for his campaign from Fernando Aspiazu, president of the now 
bankrupt Banco del Progreso. Mahuad’s government spent over $1 billion in its 
attempt to bail out this bank, but all of the depositors lost their money. After the 
bank failed, Aspiazu left the country with millions of dollars and did not face any 
consequences for his action. Mahuad had staked his reputation on honesty and 
transparency, and had been a strong opponent to corruption. This startling fact 
became an additional betrayal of the people by Mahuad and his political class. 
Due to the accusations of corruption against Mahuad and outrage at the 
drastic devaluation of the currency, CONAIE and other sectors called for a 
national strike beginning on January 10, 2000. Mahuad shocked the country with 
his decree on January 9. He decided to follow a drastic, untested path, as he 
used his executive power to abandon the national currency and adopt the 
American dollar as Ecuador’s legal currency. This took the country by complete 
surprise, as he had not elaborated on a plan such as this in public. Ecuador 
became the first country in Latin America to fully dollarize the economy, and it did 
so in a time of economic meltdown. Mahuad pegged the value of the sucre at 
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25,000 sucres per dollar. Mahuad’s presidency had begun 16 months ago with 
an exchange rate of 5,500 sucres per dollar. Under his watch, the national 
currency had lost almost 80% of its value. 
In addition, dollarization meant the loss of any control over fiscal policy 
and adopting a foreign currency. This angered many Ecuadorians, but the 
tremendous impact of the high exchange rate made life savings disappear and 
decreased the purchasing power of salaries instantly. Particularly hard hit were 
the poor, who had not been able to purchase dollars in times of crisis and found 
their meager salaries suddenly not sufficient for even the most basic of all 
expenses. CONAIE was outraged at this undemocratic decision and the lack of 
consultation with the public to implement a national program such as this. They 
declared their intention to march to Quito with the goal of forcing Mahuad out of 
office.  
The trajectory of Ecuadorian politics would change forever on January 21, 
2000, when a sector of the military, combined with CONAIE, ousted a fairly 
elected, constitutionally legitimate president from the presidential post.  
CONAIE, represented by leader Antonio Vargas, formed an unusual 
alliance with a sector of the Ecuadorian military. Though from a distance, the 
collaboration of the military and an indigenous social movement seems odd, the 
Ecuadorian military has a much different tradition and reputation from other 
militaries in the continent. Widely seen as one of the most respected institutions 
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in the country, the military had historically played an important role as a mediator 
between civilian groups in times of political crisis.  
Due to goals of national integration of all of Ecuador’s different regions, 
members of the military have often been stationed in areas with strong 
concentrations of indigenous people in Ecuador’s highlands and Amazon region. 
A large component of the active military comes from families with indigenous 
roots, as the military is often formed of those coming from lower classes that 
have few other professional options. In addition, the military and indigenous 
warriors fought together against the Peruvians during border disputes. The 
military’s outrage with the incapacity of civilian governments and their call to 
defend the integrity and honor of their homeland has led to resistance against 
democratically elected presidents who are seen as abusing the power of the post 
they occupy. 
After occupying the congressional building with a people’s congress 
claiming to represent the true will of the country, thousands of indigenous citizens 
protested outside the presidential palace and in other places across the country. 
The military informed President Mahuad that they would no longer guarantee his 
safety, and advised him to leave the presidential palace. As Mahuad’s location 
was unknown, a new junta appeared in the presidential palace, claiming to be the 
new junta of national salvation that would truly represent the will and desire of the 
people. Appearing on the balcony were Antonio Vargas of CONAIE, Carlos 
Solorzano, a former supreme court justice, and Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, who 
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represented a sector of the military that supported Mahuad’s ouster and 
advocated for a government that listened to the needs and desires of the 
population. Gutiérrez found himself in the national spotlight, as he spoke of a 
peaceful revolution that would create a government that addressed the desperate 
needs of Ecuador’s indigenous citizens and its impoverished population. 
Gutiérrez claimed that he was not doing this out of self interest and had no desire 
to take over power, but felt obligated to take action against a government that 
had abused its power and implemented painful austerity measure that 
impoverished more of the population. In addition, he rallied against dollarization, 
lamenting at the loss of national sovereignty and claiming the exchange rate was 
unreasonably high for most Ecuadorians. This peaceful overthrow (referred to as 
a bloodless coup) gained much respect from the population. 
As the night wore on, Gutiérrez was forced to allow General Carlos 
Mendoza to take his place in the junta. The military, intent on not appearing as 
fragmented, needed someone with a higher rank to represent the institution. After 
communications from many nations and international organizations, including 
threats by the United States for an embargo against Ecuador, Mendoza withdrew 
the military’s support of the junta, declaring that Mahuad’s Vice President 
Gustavo Noboa (no relation to Alvaro Noboa) should occupy the presidency. As 
the international community condemned the undemocratic removal of Mahuad 
and several groups began to protest the unconstitutional dismissal of power, 
Noboa came to Quito to begin his interim presidency in a time of political uproar 
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and instability. Noboa, with the support of the legislature and the military, became 
president until Mahuad’s term ended in 2002.  
The People’s Congress and the junta only held power for a few hours. Yet, 
this uprising of mainly indigenous citizens against the established traditional 
politicians and their success in peacefully overthrowing the government marked a 
new moment in Ecuador’s democratic history. CONAIE taught the country that 
they were unwilling to sit on the sidelines any longer as president after president 
ignored their needs and implemented unpopular and impoverishing austerity 
measures. This episode brought up a wider question of grass roots democracy 
and how it works in Latin America. When a freely, fairly elected president has lost 
legitimacy and the population rises up against him and overthrows him, is this the 
ultimate expression of democracy, or an condemnable undemocratic action? 
In Ecuador’s case, the military and CONAIE became the protagonists for 
overthrowing a widely unpopular president. Though many disagreed with the 
tactics used, few were sad to see Mahuad leave his office. CONAIE had entered 
institutional politics in the constitutional and legal way with its political party 
Pachakutik. They had logged their protests within the system peacefully. When 
this failed to make adequate changes, CONAIE resorted to disrupting the 
country’s roads and staging general strikes and marches when the system did 
not give them the adequate channels to voice their grievances and concerns 
about the direction of the government and the decisions it was making.   
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Gutiérrez became a household name after this episode. His obvious 
attention to the concerns of common Ecuadorians came through in his image of a 
frustrated citizen defending his country against corrupt politicians who were 
willing to hurt the country for personal profit.  
The Disappearance of a Party 
Mahuad came into the presidency with a strong academic and political 
background and a promised to update the political system. He left behind a 
country with a currency valued at 1/5 of the value when he entered, a drastic 
decision to abandon the national currency by decree, a banking system in ruins, 
26 bankrupt banking entities, millions of dollars of frozen deposits, and Latin 
America’s first successful indigenous uprising that resulted in a regime change. 
The DP watched their party go from national prominence to becoming 
responsible for Ecuador’s economic meltdown. It began with Mahuad’s ouster 
and continued in July of 2000 as 12 legislators split off and formed their own 
Movement of International Integration (MIN). In August of 2001, long time DP 
supporter, ex president, and 2002 presidential candidate Osvaldo Hurtado 
abandoned the party, along with another group of legislators. 
 The DP forms a stark example of how an unsuccessful administration can 
completely destroy a political party that spent decades establishing roots in 
society. In addition, this also highlights the importance of the presidential 
candidates that these parties choose. Winning a presidency and having that 
candidate lose legitimacy can easily be death for a political party. Members of the 
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party will quickly abandon the unpopular name or stigma around an unsuccessful 
candidate. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 2002 AND THE TRIUMPH OF OUTSIDERS 
 
The International Republican Institute (IRI), one of the three international 
organizations monitoring the 2002 elections, highlighted its importance.7 In its 
initial report, the IRI emphasized the volatile political and economic environment 
in Latin America. While Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru experienced profound 
political problems, Argentina and Uruguay suffered from financial crises. Brazil 
recently received the largest IMF loan package in history to avert a financial 
meltdown. Though the Ecuadorian situation had not commanded media 
attention, the IRI asserted that the 2002 elections were important to Ecuador and 
the entire Andean region. Due to the fact that Ecuador has had six presidents 
since 1996 and neither of the last two democratically elected presidents has 
survived their terms, this election was a significant test of the strength of 
Ecuador’s democracy. In the late 1990’s, the financial crisis that devastated the 
country led to a political crisis that ended the term of presidential Mahuad. 
Though the country has stabilized somewhat after dollarization, Ecuador still 
                                                 
7 The International Republican Institute, the Organization of American States, and the European Union all participated in 
elections observations. The IRI released three pre-election reports. Report #1 covered a period from July 17-24, 2002, 
Report #2 covered a period from August 18-24, 2002. Report #3 covered a period from September 12-22, 2002. 
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faced serious economic and political problems, such as rising costs of living, low 
salaries, and unemployment and underemployment (IRI Report 1:2-3). 
The 2002 elections arrived during a time of economic adjustments that 
were necessary due, in part, to its new currency, the United States dollar. Interim 
President Gustavo Noboa rejected the idea of running for president in the 2002 
elections. The country hoped a new president could help continue the fragile 
stability obtained under Noboa’s watch, and proceed to strengthen democratic 
institutions and responsibly address the economic reality of the country. Noboa 
took power in a situation of crisis and was able to continue the process of 
dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy. After several months of using both the 
sucre and the dollar, the country stopped using Ecuadorian currency in March of 
2001.  
Noboa managed to finish his term without any major scandals. He was 
credited with preventing the country from falling into anarchy in January 2000 
and for stabilizing the country economically by continuing the process of 
dollarization.  
In 2002, for the first time in Ecuadorian history, the Tribuno Supremo 
Electoral (TSE) established spending limits for presidential campaigns. After the 
1998 elections, where both Alvaro Noboa and Jamil Mahuad spent an estimated 
$12-15 million each on the campaign, the TSE decided to create and implement 
spending limits. It set the fine for exceeding spending limits at twice the amount 
of the excess. The limits, low by many country’s standards, were set at 
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$1,139,882 for the first round and $227,976 for the second round.  Though the 
TSE had little legal backing to enforce this rule and candidates with personal 
fortunes could easily overspend, this was a first attempt at controlling spending of 
candidates. After the scandal in 2000, where banker Fernando Aspiazu donated 
over three million dollars to President Jamil Mahuad’s campaign, the TSE 
attempted to create more accountability and establish a realistic base for 
campaign spending (OAS final report, 2002:21-22). 
Like many other times in Ecuador’s history, this campaign was 
overshadowed by the events that ended the previously elected president’s rule. 
Ecuador’s indigenous groups demonstrated their willingness and capacity to 
overthrow a democratically elected government that did not listen to the desires 
of the electorate and integrate the unique needs of the indigenous population into 
government. In addition, Mahuad’s deep connections with the institutions of 
government further alienated the population from the traditional parties. Outrage 
about white collar crime, corruption at high levels of government, and the exodus 
of bankers who had stolen the money of depositors before their banks went 
bankrupt and had then escaped to the United States and other countries became 
a key issue in this election. The population demanded accountability for these 
men. They wanted these criminals extradited and brought to Ecuador to stand 
trial.   
The Organization of American States stated that the election season was 
characterized by strong voter apathy (especially in large urban centers) and a 
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loss of credibility by political parties. As the left, right, outsider politicians, 
populists, and well trained public administrators had all struggled through their 
terms in office (or in the case of Bucaram and Mahuad, had been removed from 
office after a short time), the population hesitated to place their trust in any 
politician. By August 4th, less than 80 days before the election began, 89% of the 
population was undecided about the candidate they would support (Indecisión 
electoral, August 5, 2002). The OAS highlighted one of the main reasons for this 
apathy as the lack of leadership and personalities that captured the attention of 
the voters.  
In addition, political parties faced additional disapproval due to their failure 
to cooperate in the legislature and build coalitions necessary to create and 
implement programs that addressed the socioeconomic demands of the people. 
Particularly in a time when traditional politics had been delegitimized and 
overthrown by a coalition of the excluded, this election seemed to have space 
available for a new series of leaders, movements and parties that attempted to 
capture the electorate with their discourse condemning corruption and 
established political parties and politicians (OAS 2002:49).  
All three international observation organizations highlighted the complexity 
of these particular elections. The first round of the presidential voting coincided 
with Congressional elections for the entire unicameral congress (100 seats), 67 
provincial council members, 677 municipal council members, and, for the first 
time in history, five representatives to the newly formed Andean Parliament (IRI 
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Report 1:3).  Therefore, though much attention remained on the presidential 
race, the Ecuadorian electorate also was responsible for electing a completely 
new legislature and important municipal and regional posts. 
Potential Candidates and Speculation 
Presidential candidates had until August 20th to register with the TSE. The 
tradition of running tickets with a presidential candidate from the coast and vice 
presidential candidate from the highlands (or vice versa) continued, highlighting 
the continued importance of regionalism. Alvaro Noboa began campaigning 
actively for the 2002 elections soon after his narrow defeat in 1998. Noboa used 
his personal wealth to give away shoes, boots, clothes, food, and other items, in 
an attempt to gain voter loyalty. Without the Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriana 
(PRE) party banner, Noboa worked to establish the Partido Renovador 
Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN) and created a disciplined following that 
would support him in the presidential elections and his party’s candidates for 
legislature.  According to the International Republican Institute, Noboa enjoyed 
wide support before the official beginning of the campaign, with public opinion 
polls placing him easily in first place.  
In addition, León Febres Cordero, former president from 1984-1988 and 
mayor of Guayaquil from 1992-2000, found tremendous support (particularly in 
the coastal region) for a presidential campaign. His admirable job as mayor of 
Ecuador’s largest city gave him credibility as a no-nonsense, assertive, effective 
leader who completed public projects that benefited the entire region. Many 
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analysts saw Febres Cordero as a shoo-in second round candidate in the 
presidential elections, and some even claimed that he had a strong chance at 
winning (IRI Report 1, 2002:10). On July 23rd, after traveling to Miami for medical 
appointments, Febres Cordero announced that he would not be a candidate for 
president, due to medical restrictions. Febres Cordero endorsed the Partido 
Socialcristiano (PSC) candidate, Xavier Neira, who he claimed possessed, 
“integrity, capacity, decisiveness and the loyalty necessary to achieve positive 
results for the people, changing for the better the quality of life of all Ecuadorians 
and especially the poorest.” (Febres Cordero, 2002)  
Preliminary analysts asserted that this election could end with many 
surprises, as the population seemed particularly alienated from traditional 
political parties. In fact, many seemed apathetic about elections in general. Two 
former presidents were also potential candidates--Rodrigo Borja from the 
Izquierda Democrática (ID) and Osvaldo Hurtado, formerly a member of the now 
defunct Democrácia Popular (DP), party of ex-president Jamil Mahuad. Ex-
Colonel and coup leader Lucio Gutiérrez also became a potential presidential 
candidate, running under the political organization he created, the, la Sociedad 
Patriótica 21 de enero (PSP). (IRI Report 1, 2002:7-8) 
 As of August 6th, 2002, not a single presidential team (president and vice 
president) had inscribed in the TSE. By August 20th, 11 candidates had met legal 
requirements for the presidential campaign. The candidates consisted of a wide 
variety of political insiders and outsiders. Two ex-presidents ran, Rodrigo Borja 
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and Osvaldo Hurtado. Abdalá Bucaram’s brother, Jacobo Bucaram, ran under 
the PRE banner. León Roldós, nephew of deceased ex-president Jaime Roldós 
ran as an independent candidate. In addition, other candidates expected to run 
turned in their petitions. Noboa ran, and so did two of the three junta members 
from January 21st, 2000, Ex-Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez and Antonio Vargas. In 
addition, several other candidates from minor parties joined the campaign. 
In this round, two common characteristics of the election made results so 
unpredictable: Firstly, the presence of 11 candidates fractionalized the vote, so a 
low number of votes could pass someone into the second round. In this election, 
no clear frontrunners emerged. Secondly, with mandatory voting, candidates with 
charisma and personality could attract large groups of voters. While political party 
machines jumped into the campaigns to promote their candidates, the general 
disillusion with political parties and their empty promises created an uphill battle 
for party candidates.8 
Six candidates quickly jumped to the field of serious contenders. By 
looking briefly at each of these candidates, their biographies, party affiliations, 
ideological platforms, and connection with traditional politics, one can learn about 
the current political situation in Ecuador, and the electorate’s personal feelings 
towards democracy, institutions, and personalism.  
 
                                                 
8 Both of the characteristics have been common in Ecuadorian politics, as presidential contests have often had anywhere 
between six-twelve candidates. This election, in particular, saw an electorate more isolated than ever from traditional 
political parties, due to the economic crisis during the Mahuad years, and the accusations of corruption against his 
government. 
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Alvaro Noboa, the Businessman and Rich Benefactor 
Alvaro Noboa Pontón is a 52 year old from Guayaquil. Educated as a 
lawyer, he is Ecuador’s most prominent businessman. Worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars, Noboa inherited much of his wealth, and has continued to 
enrich himself through banana exportation. He also owns the country’s flour mills. 
His only political experience was as the president of the Junta Monetaria during 
Bucaram’s short lived presidency. Finally, he served as the PRE’s presidential 
candidate in 1998. 
Noboa’s support came from the banana growing provinces of the coast, 
and his campaign centered in Guayaquil. His candidacy and his political party 
attempted to create a new base of power in the coastal area. After the self-exile 
of Bucaram, Noboa had the opportunity to become a new personalistic, populist  
coastal leader. Noboa’s has not demonstrated any other political interests except 
to serve as the president of the republic.  
Noboa claimed the support and loyalty of Ecuador’s poorest. He had been 
targeting the poor in coastal provinces since his loss in the 1998 presidential 
elections. As he toured the country in his trademark vehicle, his yellow Jeep 
Wrangler, he often used rhetoric constructing himself as the only candidate who 
could help the country out of its economic decline.   
It is important to clarify that Noboa, as a much more visible and well 
funded alternative to Abdalá Bucaram, was attempting to replace Bucaram as the 
savior of the poor. His lack of political experience made him a leader with no 
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strikes against him. Though he hadn’t proven himself as a politician, he did not 
have any political scandals or failures in his past. Common wisdom stated that if 
Noboa could create and manage a profitable and thriving private business, he 
could bring some of those skills into running a government. Noboa himself 
claimed that his achievements in the international economy and his extensive 
business contacts could help Ecuador out of its precarious financial situation.   
The Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN) as a 
political party has little, if any ideological development. Noboa claims that he is 
the great representative of the people that will solve their problems. The PRIAN’s 
main role is to support Noboa’s image of benevolent patrón. An electoral vehicle, 
the party does not have deep roots in society, only raising support during the 
presidential campaign via populist gestures. Like its founder, PRIAN has not 
presented a coherent ideological position and is likely to act in an opportunist 
fashion in the 2002-06 Congress. 
The process of nominating Noboa as presidential candidate for the PRIAN 
showed the personalistic nature of the party. While Noboa was in New York on 
business, the first assembly of the PRIAN met in Guayaquil for the sole purpose 
of ratifying Noboa’s candidacy. No other potential names of candidates were 
mentioned (Ronquillo, 2002).  On August 1st Noboa hinted that he might not be a 
candidate for the 2002 elections, as he claimed that traditional politicians had 
started a campaign against him and had changed the dates of registration to 
personally damage him. (Alvaro Noboa, August 11, 2002) 
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Noboa claimed that the key to economic growth was using the funds from 
Ecuador’s largest export, oil, to implement social service programs for Ecuador’s 
poorest citizens. Noboa’s four years of “campaigning” in Guayaquil, and 
establishing himself as the rich benefactor of the poor, greatly contributed to the 
development of his image. He and his wife, an attractive doctor, used their 
personal wealth to give away medicines, t-shirts, and even flour from the state 
flour company he owned. He set up sites for people to come and apply for jobs 
that would be created if he were elected president. 
 Noboa’s close second place finish behind Mahuad in the 1998 elections, 
claims of election fraud, and Mahuad’s dismal performance in office gave Noboa 
credibility to attack Mahuad’s presidency and the established system. After 
Ecuador’s financial meltdown, Noboa identified himself as a businessman who 
has a proven track record with responsible administration of a private business. 
Noboa claimed that the Ecuadorian state needed someone who understood the 
important financial management and budgetary aspects of government.  
Noboa’s campaign attacked not only traditional political parties, but also 
other personalist candidates. His familiar, blatantly populist rhetoric, effective use 
of clientelism and self identification as champion of the people attracted many 
followers. His unlimited personal campaign funds, combined with the lack of 
necessity to form any alliances for monetary reasons, made him an almost 
completely independent from any party, organization, or ideology.   
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Noboa’s, and therefore, the PRIAN’s resistance towards coalitions 
became clear in interviews. When asked what kind of cooperative agreements he 
would form with other parties and leaders if he passed into the second round, he 
stated that he didn’t believe in alliances. He said, “The people vote for who they 
want to. The people who are with the PRE, who voted for me in both rounds in 
1998, the people who are with Colonel Gutiérrez are going to vote for me, 
because Gutiérrez wants change too, and the only difference is the way we are 
proposing the change, many people who voted for Jacinto Velazquez are going 
to vote for me, and a huge part of the PSC is going to vote for me.” (Almedia, 
Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002a). By stating this, Noboa doesn’t 
acknowledge any necessary coalition building or concessions to win these votes.   
This concentration of power and opposition to alliances shows Noboa’s 
belief in personal power. While alliance building is crucial in the Ecuadorian 
congress, Noboa dismissed the concept completely. The PRIAN was developed 
to be subordinate to his personal desires. His party could not exercise any 
control over him. Noboa’s party was not predicted to be a major winner in the 
legislative elections, and it had no desire to build alliances that would allow him 
to rule effectively. Therefore, the vagueness about how he would rule if elected 
continued. 
Many people speculated that Noboa would quickly begin to sell off state 
apparatus, which would please international lenders. Yet, some analysts also 
believed he would use his power and access to these industries as president to 
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enrich his own personal empire. In response to that question, Noboa stated, “I 
will differentiate what is mine and what is the State’s.” (Almedia, Palacio and 
Febres Cordero, 2002a). He claimed that the main difference between managing 
a private business and a government is that the state is regulated by laws that he 
is obligated to obey, and he can do whatever he wants with his personal 
holdings.  
 Noboa’s net worth established the perception that he would not be 
involved in corruption scandals (as have the last two presidents and the 1992 
vice president) simply because of his comfortable financial situation. The logic 
went that Noboa did not need to steal money from the state, because he was 
already worth hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Noboa’s opposition to Mahuad preceded Mahuad’s loss of legitimacy and 
eventual dismissal from power. He claimed in his campaign that he had warned 
the country of the trouble in trusting Mahuad and the established politicians, and 
the country did in fact enter Ecuador’s worst financial crisis in decades. Though it 
is impossible to know if another president had been in power the same crisis 
would have occurred, Noboa had the opportunity and credibility to assert that the 
situation would have been different with him in power. His break from the PRE 
and ex-president Abdalá Bucaram forced him to establish a candidacy and 
political party based on his own name.   
Noboa’s main proposals of his government addressed five areas: 
delinquency, agriculture, investment, corruption, and health. In the area of 
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agriculture, Noboa promised that he would increase agricultural production by 
between 30% and 40% in the first year. He would also extend credit to farmers in 
order for them to buy necessary tools. To stimulate investment, he would create 
special tax breaks for foreigners and Ecuadorians interested in creating new 
businesses. He planned to control corruption by developing transparency in 
public funds, where people would have access to know how money was spent. 
Finally, he wanted to establish a National Health Plan, which would consist of 
planning, promotion, prevention, healing and rehabilitation. 
 Noboa’s close loss in 1998 gave him the legitimacy to attack both Jamil 
Mahuad personally and the political system as a whole. His accusations of fraud 
in the 1998 elections faulted the traditional political parties for conspiring against 
him and giving the presidency to Mahuad. As Mahuad’s administration ended 
with a historically profound economic crisis, the political system that supported 
his candidacy (including several established political parties) suffered heavily. 
Therefore, Noboa became one of several candidates with a legitimate right to 
attack the political parties that supported Mahuad’s mandate. Strong opposition 
to the incumbent government gave Noboa solid footing for a campaign based on 
a new type of government with a new structure. His lack of experience in the 
political arena meant that Noboa has committed no major errors, had no political 
scandals, and no governmental failures to negatively impact his image. 
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Lucio Gutiérrez, the Military Coupster  
Lucio Gutiérrez Borbúa shot onto the national spotlight on January 21, 
2000, for his role in the peaceful uprising that resulted in the removal of then-
president Jamil Mahuad from office. Gutiérrez, 45, was educated as a civil 
engineer. He has spent nearly all of his professional life in the Armed Forces, 
and finished his career as a Colonel. He resigned from the Armed Forces after 
being imprisoned for six months due to his role in the overthrow of President 
Mahuad.  
 Doubts arose if Gutiérrez was legally eligible to postulate in 2000. Article 
five of the Constitution states that, “Those that have held power in a de facto 
government, described in numeral 4 of the 101 section of the constitution, can’t 
be candidates.” Gutiérrez’ successfully argued that he never held power, due to 
the fact that the junta never became constitutionally recognized. (Dudas sobre 
Gutiérrez, July 24, 2002) 
Gutiérrez decided to become involved in the political arena after he was 
released from prison and received amnesty for his participation in the January 
2000 events. A non-politician, Gutiérrez saw himself as an educator and 
advocate for change in a system plagued by corruption and increasing 
irrelevance to the population. Many of his supporters told him that if he wanted to 
make a real change, he needed to become involved in politics at a high level. His 
desire to provide a venue for the needs and demands of the population is what 
pushed him into the political arena. Gutiérrez soon gained the support of a power 
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ally, Pachakuitk, a political party linked to CONAIE that advocated for the needs 
of indigenous peoples in Congress. In addition, CONAIE and other leftists groups 
threw their backing behind Gutiérrez. The endorsement by CONAIE and other 
important leaders in the indigenous sector gave Gutiérrez a numerically large, 
politically active support group. Pachakutik’s endorsement gave him legitimacy in 
the eyes ofto the often marginalized indigenous population, who make up 
between 25-40% of Ecuador’s eligible voters. Indigenous citizens had been 
exercising their right to vote more now then ever before, and Gutiérrez was one 
of the only candidates that was attractive to this population.  
Gutiérrez’ campaign addressed not only the needs of the indigenous 
Ecuadorian peoples, but also other groups who had been alienated from the 
political system. Due to his role in Mahuad’s overthrow, Gutiérrez gained a 
respect among non indigenous citizens opposed to the general direction of 
government. In addition, The Armed Forces, one of the most respected 
institutions in the country, was seen as defending national honor, playing a 
critical role in negotiating civilian disputes during times of political upheaval, and 
as not being  involved in corruption. Gutiérrez’ willingness to step down as a 
member of the junta, combined with his appeals for a peaceful transition of 
government, gave him legitimacy in the eyes of many.  
Gutiérrez claimed if he becomes president, it would be a historic 
opportunity for the country to address deep cleavages in Ecuador’s society. He 
had significant support from the masses of marginalized and excluded 
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Ecuadorians. He asserted that these citizens were the same people who often 
bring the country to a standstill with strikes and uprisings, so he could use his 
presidency to help create a mutual relationship and work constructively with 
those who lead and plan marches, strikes and protests.  
His professional sacrifice for his participation in the uprising combined with 
his determination to keep the confrontation from becoming violent made him a 
distinct and appealing candidate. Gutiérrez did not use the stage on January 21st 
to make a personal push for power, but portrayed a genuine interest in ousting a 
president that had lost legitimacy among the vast majority of Ecuadorians. The 
dollarization of the country, combined with an enormous loss in the purchasing 
power of the sucre, negatively impacted the economic situation of nearly every 
economic class. As Mahuad made the radical decision to dollarize by decree 
after permitting the extreme devaluation of the currency, the electorate became 
more alienated than ever with the political system and political parties. Neither 
the president nor congress brought the idea of dollarization to the people to 
approve or reject; it was imposed on the country, which made many citizens 
furious. 
Guiterrez’ capitalized on his image as a frustrated Ecuadorian whose 
interest was in creating a democracy that serves the needs of the population. In 
addition, his lack of experience in politics, and his lack of connection with political 
parties and organizations gave him an image as a responsible, incorruptible 
leader, intent on assisting progress for the country. His military training gave 
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discipline, love of country, and a sense of honor in his candidacy. Gutiérrez 
created an image as a man running for president in order to serve the country as 
opposed to doing so for personal reasons; this gave him a platform based on 
putting the country first before individual needs.  
Gutiérrez’s created his own political party, the Sociedad Patriótica 21 de 
Enero (PSP). This party was brand new and has not had much ideological 
development, nor did anyone expect the party to play a significant role in 
congress. Gutiérrez himself downplays the role of his political party in his 
campaign. His rhetoric made him popular with many people. When talking about 
his political party and his plans of reform, he clearly establishes himself as an 
outsider who places priority on the country as a whole before any special 
interest. He claims that allegiance is to, “God, my conscience and the Ecuadorian 
people. It’s not even with the PSP [Gutiérrez’ own political party].” (Almedia, 
Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002b) 
 Guiterrez was asked about the concept of a leftist military leader. He 
answered that, “While I feel very comfortable being supported by movements of 
leftist ideology, I define myself as a nationalist that deeply loves Ecuador, as an 
individual that isn’t so much dogmatic as pragmatic, that wants to change 
everything to benefit Ecuadorians. The enemy of Ecuador isn’t the left or the 
right; it is poverty, illiteracy and the lack of competition.” When asked why he 
went from a military to a political career, he answered, “[The Armed Forces] 
taught me that I have to defend the country, the truth, and to fight against 
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corruption: that a military person is at the service of society, so I did this [entered 
the political arena].” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002b)  
 The former Colonel was also asked about his role in the uprising of 2000. 
Due to his role in overthrowing a democratically elected government, the 
interviewers asked what Gutiérrez would do if he were elected president and in a 
similar situation as Mahuad. He responded by saying, “If I commit the same 
errors [that prompted a coup d’etat against Jamil Mahuad], they shouldn’t stop 
with just overthrowing me, they should shoot me.” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres 
Cordero, 2002b) He claimed that his participation in the uprising wasn’t focused 
on obtaining personal power, but on preventing the country from sliding into 
chaos.  
 His campaign platform focused on strong measures combating corruption. 
Firstly, Gutiérrez insisted in requesting the extradition of white collar criminals 
who escaped with depositor’s funds from Ecuador’s bankrupt banks. Many 
corrupt bankers fled the country with millions of dollars, while the Ecuadorian 
government spent over a billion dollars to bail the banks out.  Gutiérrez then 
wanted to try them in Ecuador on corruption charges with long sentences.  He 
wanted to name independent judges (with no connection to political parties) and 
wanted to create a fourth branch of the government to control and justify 
government expenses and actions. In addition, he advocated drastically reducing 
the number of Congressmen, claiming that many of them aren’t efficient and 
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don’t do their job. Finally, he wanted to reduce the number of political parties to 
create a climate more conducive to governability. (Lucio Gutiérrez, July 30, 2002) 
 In financial terms, while condemning dollarization as a painful and 
damaging inheritance, Gutiérrez emphasized the importance of a strong 
currency. Seeing dollarization as an irreversible process, Gutiérrez hoped to 
strengthen it so that devaluations of currency don’t negatively impact the 
country’s business environment. Later, he hoped for reasonable, self-sustaining 
public finances. Eventually, he would like to remove the president’s power to 
allocate money. In addition, Gutiérrez saw competitiveness as an important goal 
for the financial health of the country. 
 He believed in the possibility of renegotiating Ecuador’s international debt, 
but not until Ecuador decided to address problems of corruption, banking 
scandals, control customs, and create an honest government that focuses on the 
social needs of the country. When that happens, Gutiérrez believed the IMF 
wouldl consider renegotiation. 
 Many credited Gutiérrez with avoiding bloodshed in the 2000 uprising that 
ended Mahuad’s term. In Gutiérrez’ own view, he stated the government was 
putting the military in a position where a possible confrontation with protestors 
would occur. Gutiérrez and his collaborators refused to fire upon the unarmed 
protestors, and were not willing to risk the loss of life to defend Mahuad. 
Gutiérrez embraced the image of a military leader in the 2002 campaigns. 
He did the majority of his campaigning in military fatigues, emphasizing his 
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successful military career and inevitably reminding the population of his role in 
the overthrow of Mahuad’s government.  
His willingness to take the campaign out of the traditional geographical 
sphere also impacted these elections. Historically, campaigns have centered in 
the largest, most populous cities (Quito and Guayaquil) and also in the two main 
regions of Ecuador, the coast and the highlands. Gutiérrez took the campaign out 
of those regions and visited the Amazon, a scarcely populated area of Ecuador, 
dominated by indigenous tribes.  
His new approach, in giving special attention to the specific concerns of 
Ecuador’s indigenous population, also represented a milestone in the country. 
Gutiérrez proved his loyalty to the causes advocated by CONAIE in January 
2000, and advocated not only for more general concerns (such as a rejection of 
neoliberalism, more equal division of wealth, and opposition to globalization) but 
also to specific indigenous needs, such as bilingual education and the state of 
agriculture in Ecuador. Indigenous needs went from the periphery to the center 
stage and Gutiérrez’ willingness to address them distinguished him from other 
candidates.  
His military background and image gave him credibility with non-
indigenous Ecuadorians, who respect the institution of the armed forces and 
Gutiérrez himself for avoiding bloodshed in the January 21, 2000 coup. In 
addition, he appealed to an extremely alienated electorate. Much of these 
supporters had lost faith in politics, but Gutiérrez gave them hope. The 
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indigenous and marginalized populations of Ecuador finally had someone to 
believe in. 
León Roldós, the Independent 
León Roldós, claiming to be “the citizen’s candidate,” never formed his 
own personal political party as a vehicle for his presidential run. In a radical 
move, he refused to align with any political party, running as the only true 
independent in this race. León Roldós Aguilero, a 60 year old lawyer from 
Guayaquil, had much experience in the public eye. He served as secretary of the 
Municipality of Guayaquil from 1969-1970, president of the Junta monetaria 
(1979-1981), Vice president of the Republic from 1981-1984, the Rector of the 
University of Guayaquil (1992-current) and a congressman (1998-2002). Roldós, 
brother of deceased ex-President León Roldós, brought a high level of 
experience and training into his campaign. As the rector of the University of 
Guayaquil, he had made vast improvements to Guayaquil’s largest university, 
and had the reputation of a serious educational leader in Guayaquil. 
Roldós was somewhat of a surprise candidate in the campaign, especially 
to other center-leftists who were preparing campaigns. (León Roldós, July 23, 
2002.) He claimed that if he ran, he would do so without party support, but by 
obtaining the number of necessary signatures to run as a legally recognized 
independent candidate and presenting them to the TSE. Roldós took advantage 
of the clause in the constitution that allowed independents to run. Because of 
Roldós’ refusal to align with a party, he didn’t have party machinery at his 
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disposal to obtain signatures, a fact many analysts saw as a potential problem. 
Roldós declared his intention to collect signatures without the support or alliance 
with any political party (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002d). Some 
didn’t see this as feasible without the help of party machinery, but Roldós 
managed to collect the required signatures for his candidacy.  
Roldós’ long political career as a socialist, and his alignment with the 
Partido Socialista Frente Amplio (PSFA), didn’t prevent him from running as an 
independent candidate. Before Roldós inscribed as a candidate, the socialists 
had decided to back Gutiérrez. By August 10th, the Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano 
(PSE), withdrew their support of Gutiérrez and backed Roldós. (Socialistas, Jule 
3, 2002). Additionally, the now irrelevant Democrácia Popular (DP) supported 
Roldós.  
Many wondered why Roldós decided to join the campaign, especially at 
such a late date. He claimed that his desire to have a candidate that was more 
than a representative of a political party, but a representative of the interests of 
the country propelled him to candidacy. Though many political parties came out 
in his support, Roldós continued to claim his independence from the parties, 
stating, “I don’t want to be a candidate who is dependent on political parties. I am 
going to inaugurate a new way to do politics: to dialogue with everyone.” 
(Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002d)  
The ideological similarity between Roldós and Gutiérrez, their mutual 
rejection of traditional political parties, and their support by the socialists, created 
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an interesting situation. While newspapers acknowledged that the entrance of 
Roldós damaged the candidacy of Gutiérrez, el Universo reported that Gutiérrez 
was willing to renounce his candidacy if he arrived to an agreement with Roldós. 
Roldós did not have the charisma or personal appeal that Noboa and 
Gutiérrez did. His reputation as a serious academic and lack of funds prevented 
him from gaining significant media attention in the already crowded field. 
Jacobo Bucaram, the Exiled Ex-President’s Brother 
 Jacobo Bucaram Ortiz, 55, came from Guayaquil. His academic training 
was in agronomy. He served in the Congress from 1988-92, 1992-94, and 1996-
2000 as a member of the PRE voting bloc. Among Jacobo’s most memorable 
antics was punching Jamil Mahuad during a session of Congress in the early 
1990’s. In addition, he was a dominant athlete in Ecuador, participated in the 
Olympics, founded the Universidad Agraria del Ecuador, and is the current mayor 
of Milagro, a small town close to Guayaquil.  
The Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriana (PRE) and Jacobo found their main 
source of support in the poorer classes in the coastal area, particularly in cities 
outside of Guayaquil. Abdalá Bucaram used over a decade of clientelism to 
establish a significant organization in coastal provinces. In previous elections, the 
PRE was the main party of opposition and non-alignment with traditional political 
parties, personified in the leadership of Abdalá Bucaram. The party was the first 
widespread populist party in the democratic era that managed to use the anti-
establishment message to win an election in 1996. 
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In 2002, the PRE found many other candidates competing for the same 
base of support. While the PRE had been the voice of excluded Ecuadorians for 
the past decade, now those alienated from the political system and tired of 
traditional politics that never seemed to solve any problems found several 
politicians who included their needs in their campaign rhetoric. These included 
Alvaro Noboa, Lucio Gutiérrez, and León Roldós. Politics was now flooded by 
personalist, outsider candidates. After the disastrous presidency of Abdalá 
Bucaram, the PRE has lost some credibility with the popular classes. 
Finally, the PRE has never managed to spread its influence out of the 
coastal area of Ecuador. In the coast, the PRE faced tough opposition with the 
PSC (which dominates the city of Guayaquil) and Alvaro Noboa’s newly 
established PRIAN. Though the PRE has had over a decade to work on creating 
deeper roots in a wider geographical area, it has failed to do so.    
Previous discussions of the Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriana have been 
included in this work. As stated before, the PRE was developed to support 
Abdalá Bucaram’s multiple attempts at winning the presidential post. The PRE’s 
relationship with other parties has been generally rocky, as the PRE support in 
congress has been inconsistent, unreliable, and opportunistic. The ideological 
orientation of the PRE claims to be center-left, with an emphasis on the needs of 
Ecuador’s poor. Yet, actions in office by PRE president Abdalá Bucaram 
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completely contradicted his campaign promises. Actual evidence has shown 
PRE policy decisions to be more neoliberal and rightest.9   
The party is not institutionalized in any sense of the word. While it has 
been the only party to compete in each of the last three elections with different 
candidates, Abdalá Bucaram continues to make all major decisions from 
Panama. Alvaro Noboa used the PRE party machinery in 1998 to pass on to the 
second round, but quickly abandoned the party in the second round. After much 
speculation about whether the PRE would even field a candidate, Bucaram’s 
brother, Jacobo, stepped in for the campaign.  
The bad blood between Noboa and the PRE carried over into 2002. The 
Universo claimed that even before the PRE had a candidate, their campaign 
strategy centered on criticizing and damaging Alvaro Noboa’s campaign. More 
focused on vengeance against Noboa for abandoning the party as opposed to 
finding a candidate shows the decreasing influence of the PRE. As Abdalá 
Bucaram continued to make all major party decisions from his exile in Panama, 
the party failed to find a candidate willing to stay in party ranks and be 
subordinated to Abdalá Bucaram. Jacobo Bucaram, Abdalá’s little brother, was 
the only real possibility. 
It wasn’t until days before the inscription deadline that the party chose 
Jacobo Bucaram as its candidate. The Congress, meeting in its “home” in the 
exiled leader’s Panama, chose Jacobo to pick up the PRE banner. Jacobo 
                                                 
9 See Freidenberg and Alcántara for more information 
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attempted to establish his own political career, stating, “I have an image and my 
own identity.” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002c). The interviewers 
began by asking about the PRE, wondering if it was a “party” or a “dynasty.” 
Jacobo Bucaram claimed that the party finds its birth in human reflection and is 
attractive to many different groups of people. He established the roots of the 
party in populist Assad Bucaram, idealizing the contribution of Assad Bucaram to 
Ecuador.  
The interviewers then asked about his late entry into the race. Jacobo 
asserted that he wanted to wait and try to create a front between different parties 
and social sectors from the center and center left groups. When asked about his 
personal ideology, Jacobo stated, “I have the thoughts of a center-leftist, and my 
character is social. I don’t value my country in money, but in projects and in 
works completed.” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002c) 
When asked about his ability to work with other groups, and who would be 
in his cabinet, Jacobo answers, “This country is atomized. I believe in 
collaborating with all of the political forces that are trying to work on Ecuador’s 
political and economic interests.” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 2002c)  
The interviewers, knowing that the PRE has a longstanding rivalry over control of 
the coastal vote, ask about working with the PSC. Jacobo claimed that he can 
work with everyone, even the PSC. 
Jacobo’s program highlighted four main areas: education, the economy, 
rural areas, and the social sphere. He aimed to prioritize investment in education. 
 142
Specifically, he wanted to increase state investment in the development and the 
transference of technology. In the economic realm, he hoped to develop an 
antimonopoly law, which should stimulate honest competition. He also 
highlighted the importance of recuperating confidence in the banking system by 
establishing stricter controls of banks and lowering interest rates. In rural 
Ecuador, he sought to establish housing programs, which should reduce the 
levels of migration and create incentives for farmers to stay in Ecuador. Finally, in 
the social area, Jacobo focused on improving nutrition. He also wanted to start a 
breakfast program at schools and establish public kitchens. He advocated 
increasing the health budget and providing free maternity care. 
When asked about his brother, the most well known Bucaram, Jacobo 
asserted Abdalá’s importance while claiming his independence from his brother. 
The PRE has advocated the return of Abdalá to Ecuador under immunity, which 
would be a part of any PRE presidency. Jacobo claimed that his brother’s 
impeachment was unconstitutional, and that the Congress didn’t do justice. 
When asked if he won, if he would maintain a distance from his brother or rule in 
his brother’s shadow, Jacobo became offended with the question. He then went 
on to list everything he has done without his brother, and everything his brother 
has done without him. He acknowledged that Abdalá is a very important leader in 
the country, but that he was independent of his brother.  
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Traditional Candidates 
In the 2002 elections, one could argue that only two of the 11 candidates 
came from even somewhat “traditional” political parties. The dominant parties 
that still hold electoral weight in recent democracy have been the Partido Social 
Cristiano (PSC), a business oriented, right wing party from coastal stronghold 
Guayaquil, and the Izquierda Democracia (ID), Quito’s leftist leaning, social 
democrat party. Democracia Popular (DP), which had played a strong role in 
Congress for years, virtually disappeared after DP Mahuad’s failed presidency. 
Both the PSC and the ID had presidents in office (León Febres Cordero 
(PSC) in 1984 and Rodrigo Borja (ID) in 1988). Yet, neither party has been able 
to place one of its candidates into the presidency since their respective 
candidates governed.  
Though Febres Cordero and Borja’s personalities and ideologies contrast 
heavily, the PSC and ID had important similarities. Febres Cordero’s forceful 
personality (Conaghan and Malloy, 1994) was the opposite of Borja’s more 
subdued, academic sensibility. Their political styles and source of support 
differed. Yet, both parties had dominant, unquestionable party bosses. Both 
Febres Cordero and Borja were currently the undisputed heads of their political 
parties. The simple fact that both Borja and Febres Cordero played a major role 
in the elections of 2002 (18 and 14 years after governing, respectively) shows the 
personalist tendencies even within political parties. While Febres Cordero 
attempted to create a successor in Jaime Nebot (PSC candidate and second 
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round loser in the presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 and current mayor of 
Guayaquil), Rodrigo Borja has not even made an effort to transfer his political 
party into other hands, nor has he allowed anyone but himself to be the parties’ 
representative in the presidential elections. Whether this is because of Borja’s 
monopoly of control within the party or due to Borja’s lack of capable successors, 
the ID has never been independent of Borja. 
 Evaluating the performance of these two political parties continues to 
center on the dominance of two individuals within their respective party 
organizations. Febres Cordero actively campaigned with the PSC replacement 
after refusing the PSC nomination. His presence in Xavier Neira’s campaign 
included his name or picture on virtually all campaign literature. Since Borja’s 
presidency, he has continued to compete in presidential elections, yet hasn’t 
successful passed into the second round. Though both the PSC and the ID have 
played important roles in the legislature and have often had legislative majorities, 
the both continue to rely on a dominant personality as an identity to the party. In 
these cases, both leaders have had prominence for over a decade. The 2002 
election season showed clearly that neither man intends to retire from the 
political scene in the near future. This highlighted the reality that even traditional 
political parties in Ecuador have dominant leaders who monopolize the party and 
personalist tendencies. 
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Rodrigo Borja, the Experienced Politician 
Dr. Rodrigo Borja, 67, has played an active role in politics since founding 
the Izquierda Democratica (ID) in 1970, after splintering off from the Liberal 
Party. A five time presidential candidate, Borja served as president of the 
republic from 1988-1992. His rule was one of relative political stability, but Borja 
only enjoyed a legislative majority for his first two years in office. The ID did not 
postulate its own candidate in 1996, but Borja was a candidate in 1998, placing 
third after Mahuad and Bucaram. 
Borja found base of his support among moderate citizens in the highlands, 
particularly the capital of Quito. His long presence in the city and his reputation 
as a serious academic and leader draws support from more moderate 
Ecuadorians.  His party, the ID, espouses a reformist, center-left ideology, and 
has performed much better in legislative elections than in presidential ones in the 
recent past. Borja has been known for attempting to build alliances between 
political parties, particularly ones in the highlands.   
The ID’s identity is closely connected with its leader. When interviewed 
about this, Borja claimed that “here people don’t vote for people they don’t know, 
so our tactic is to combine a well known person with someone young.” (Almedia, 
Palacio and Febres Cordero, October 7, 2003) Borja says his party insists that 
one must govern, “for the well-being of the country,” as opposed to personal 
aspirations for increased wealth or power (La ID se escundo, September 2, 
2002). 
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 Borja’s center-left tendencies attempted to create a functional political 
party with Social Christian characteristics, and lack of support for the neoliberal 
program made him an important figure among center-left parties. He protested 
the dollarization of the country and has opposed selling important state 
enterprises. His campaign was based around a mixed economy, where state 
capital and private business work together to modernize the business of public 
services. Borja rejected the neoliberal equation of total privatization, claiming it 
hasn’t worked in Latin America. In addition, he also had a strong message 
against corruption, claiming that his administration would carefully monitor state 
funds. In order to revitalize the economy, Borja advocated increasing petroleum 
production and emphasizing tourism as a source of income.  
Finally, Borja’s campaign emphasized a campaign to make internet 
service more obtainable to Ecuadorians, to implant clear, stable economic rules, 
and to focus on health care in Ecuador. 
Xavier Neira, the Insider Free Market Advocate 
 Xavier Neira Menéndez, 55, an economist by profession, served as a 
legislator from 1994-1996 and 1998-2002. A long term member of the PSC, 
Neira replaced ex-president León Febres Cordero as presidential candidate in 
July. Febres Cordero’s absence dealt a huge blow to the electoral chances of the 
PSC, as he was an obvious frontrunner in public opinion polls and had 
widespread name recognition. Neira, affiliated with the PSC since 1994 but a 
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close partner of Febres Cordero since 1977, has been a loyal member of the 
party and has the trust of party notables. (Un hombre, October 10, 2002) 
The PSC was founded by a group of upper class Roman Catholics in 
Quito in the 1950’s, but of late found it major support in Guayaquil. The PSC 
asserted that it commands over 18% of the national vote. (La vision, October 11, 
2002) Over the years, the PSC has become a party closely identified with 
regional advocacy, as the party has fought to maintain local control over local 
business and pushed for autonomy and decentralization. Though the party 
focuses on free market reform and has intimate connections with Guayaquil’s 
business sector, it had attracted millions of citizens from Guayaquil of all 
economic and social backgrounds. While the PSC’s support remained regionally 
concentrated, the widely successful and respected mayorship of Febres Cordero 
gave the PSC a reputation of a party that was effective in public administration. 
Jaime Nebot, current mayor of Guayaquil, continued in the tradition of 
consolidating PSC support in the city of Guayaquil. Due to the focus on local 
management and opposition to large government in Quito, the PSC tended to 
perform very well in coastal provinces but poorly in other regions. 
 Neira addressed the idea of alliances within a government. He claimed 
that the PRE is becoming extinct, the DP has ceased to exist, and that he could 
possibly talk to the ID. Neira argued that political parties were suffering and 
losing their importance in the political system. Yet, the weight of Febres Cordero 
in the PSC brought up some questions as to whether the PSC was moving 
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towards a more populist party as opposed to an ideological one. When 
interviewed, Neira rejected that idea, stating that, “The party is ideological and for 
that reason, it continues to be strong.” (Almedia, Palacio and Febres Cordero, 
2002c). Neira claimed that the doctrine of the PSC becomes evident in their 
support of the market economy to handle social problems, emphasizing the 
equality of opportunities, and free markets with effective state regulation. 
 Neira asserted that the majority of Ecuador’s political problems came from 
a lack of effective leadership in the presidential post. Due to the extremely strong 
role allocated to the president in Ecuador, a political party without power in the 
executive post was significantly restricted in its capacities. Neira claimed that no 
presidents have managed to effectively use the power of the presidency to make 
fundamental changes in the political and economic sphere. He went as far as 
declairing that the problem in Ecuador wasn’t moral, economic or social, but was 
the lack of political leadership. Neira claimed that a president must be elected for 
his campaign discourse and must stay true to what he promised. If changes 
couldn’t be achieved in Congress, Neira stated that a referendum must occur; the 
citizens must have the capacity to decide what changes the country needs. Neira 
established that security, reactivating the economy, increasing production and 
creating more jobs were the country’s most urgent needs.  
 His campaign centered on several main areas. In the social arena, he said 
that schools, housing, hospitals and ports were indispensable for growth, and 
that the poorest Ecuadorians should benefit from these works. He advocated for 
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the decentralization and transparency of the state. In the economic sphere, Neira 
insisted that economic growth would decrease poverty, which was the main 
cause and effect of corruption. He would work with international financial 
institutions, but was adamant that none of them could impose a general 
economic strategy on the country, such as forcing the sale of certain state owned 
businesses. Finally, Neira believed that dollarization would eventually result in 
the growth of exports, and would increase levels of saving and investments. 
Round One Analysis 
 In the first round of the elections, a main theme continued to be corruption. 
According to Transparencia Internacional, Ecuador is the second most corrupt 
country in Latin America, with an estimated $2 billion lost due to corruption each 
year (Naranjo, 2002). All candidates had a platform which emphasized the 
importance of transparency in the government and in control of spending. Due 
partially to the corruption scandals of past presidents, a reputation of honesty 
and a strong campaign against corruption became essential. 
 The basic necessities such as housing and employment formed an 
important cornerstone of the campaign. These campaign ideas, varying from 
general thoughts of reactivating the economy to actual inscription at party 
headquarters of the homeless and jobless have played an important role in 
presidential campaigns for over a decade (Ponce, 2002). The 2002 elections 
were no different, with candidates promising housing and jobs. 
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 The presence of eleven contenders created an interesting situation for the 
candidates. Due to the plethora of candidates, many candidates chose to focus 
their campaigns to a specific population. The PRE and the PSC stayed generally 
in the coast, as did Noboa. Noboa continued to play the role of the resident 
populist, giving away free medicine, t-shirts, flour and multiple other products to 
supporters.  
In an interesting new approach to politics, Gutiérrez catered to a 
previously ignored group. He specifically addressed the unique needs of 
Ecuador’s large and impoverished, politically motivated and frustrated indigenous 
community that participated in the 2000 uprising with him. Gutiérrez campaigned 
in his combat fatigues, making his identity as a military man a core part of his 
identity. By combining special attention to the needs of the indigenous population 
(an estimated 25-40% of the country) and relying on the high approval rating the 
military receives in Ecuador, he espoused a completely new campaign strategy.  
 On Sunday, October 20th, millions of Ecuadorians cast their vote for the 
next president, congressional elections, and elections for local offices. All of the 
candidates worked to in different ways to gain support from different citizens. 
Due to the obligatory vote, over five million Ecuadorians went to the polls to elect 
their president. The lack of trust in public opinion polls created true suspense as 
to who would pass onto the second round. (La desconfianza, September 9, 
2002). 
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 The outcome stunned several political parties and millions of citizens. 
While traditional political parties performed well at the legislative level, the three 
outsiders who staunchly refused to align with any traditional parties swept the 
executive elections. Former coup leader, ex-Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez of the PSP-
Pachikutik, shocked the nation with his victory in the first round after obtaining 
19.1% of the vote. Gutiérrez managed to win the first round election without 
winning either the province of Guayas or Pichincha, an extremely difficult feat. 
Guayas and Pichincha are the two most populous provinces in Ecuador, which 
contain Guayaquil and Quito and approximately half of the country’s population. 
In addition, Gutiérrez had an extremely limited campaign budget. Former front 
runner Alvaro Noboa of the PRIAN placed second with 17.3% of the votes cast, 
after spending nearly 10 times as much money on his campaign as winner 
Gutiérrez.  
 León Roldós, the candidate who refused to run under any party banner, 
finished a close third with 16.9% of the vote. In an extremely close race, Rodrigo 
Borja finished fourth and won his home province of Pichincha. Xavier Neira 
finished fifth and won Guayas. Jacobo Bucaram finished sixth. Only eight 
percentage points of the vote separated first place from sixth place. 
 For the first time since the redemocratization of the country in 1979, no 
established party would participate in the second round of elections. The gradual 
shift towards candidates independent of political parties and established 
organizations became complete in 2002. The elections analysis of the first round 
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done by the newspaper El Comercio of Quito was titled, “Ecuador preferred to 
leave political party rule behind.” In their analysis, they state that the three 
outsider candidates attempted and succeeded in creating confidence in their 
capacity to address important economic, political and social problems that 
political parties had failed to address and improve. Secondly, the results 
indicated the electorate’s desires for a new type of politics and a new type of 
politician, who has no obligations to the delegitimized political parties. The victory 
of Gutiérrez, who based his campaign on a strong denunciation of established 
politicians and a promise to attack corruption at its roots, was given legitimacy by 
his actions on January 21st, 2000, when Guitérrez risked his career to overthrow 
a corrupt and unpopular president. (El Ecuador dejo al lado, October 20, 2002). 
In addition, El Universo stated that the victories of Gutiérrez and Noboa signaled 
an increased polarization in the country and a thorough rejection of traditional 
political parties.  
The main losers in the election were the traditional political parties, who 
failed to maintain the support of voters who were once loyal to them. As the 
election results became clear, the political parties reacted with anger and shock. 
PSC leader León Febres Cordero had the harshest comments. He bluntly stated 
in a press conference after the election results that, “The country made a 
mistake.” (El Ecuador se polariza, October 20, 2002) In addition, he asserted 
that, “The Ecuadorian people elected two unprepared leaders.” He stated that 
neither had the qualifications to be presidential candidates, and were even less 
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prepared to be president. He further expressed his fear that due to lack of 
experience, neither candidate would have the knowledge to make appropriate 
decisions. (León Febres Cordero, October 21, 2002.)  
 Scholars went as far as to claim that the party system in the country was 
at risk. They warned that while governments of charismatic leaders aren’t always 
catastrophic, they tend be full of problems, especially in Latin America. Scott 
Mainwaring warned that, “These types of leaders arrive in power with an 
individualistic style and tend to govern individually and with authoritarianism.” In 
other Latin American countries with outsider leaders, outsider presidencies 
tended to further weaken political parties and political institutions.(Analisis, 
October 24, 2002) 
Noboa and Gutiérrez also emphasized the rejection of political parties in 
their comments after winning the elections. Gutiérrez stated, “If Noboa and I are 
the ones who won it is because the people said, “Enough!” to the same old 
politicians. The Ecuadorian people wanted a change after being led by an old 
political class that the people don’t want in power anymore.” Noboa stated that 
he was the “figure of change” and that the Ecuadorian people had “punished 
[traditional politicians] at the polls.”(El Ecuador se polariza, October 20, 2004) 
 The results of the elections obviously indicated a clear shift away from 
traditional political parties in the executive post. Yet, the election results on a 
whole indicate a somewhat different picture. Both the PRIAN and the PSP 
performed poorly in the legislative elections. In contrast, the PSC, ID and PRE 
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won the majority of the seats in Congress. Though traditional parties lost heavily 
in the elections, PSC insider León Febres Cordero won more votes in the 
legislative election than any other candidate postulating. He and his party will 
have an active leadership in the Congress. Yet, Neira placed 5th in the 
presidential elections.  
This fact points away from the thesis of complete alienation of political 
parties in Ecuador. In what could potentially be a very difficult reality, this created 
a situation where neither second round candidate would enjoy any significant 
level of support in Congress. Therefore, the tradition of opposition and 
antagonism between the executive and legislative branches seemed very likely 
to continue.   
 Secondly, in a country where charisma wins elections, the PSC and the ID 
both fielded candidates who failed to connect significantly with the general 
population. They did not manage to adequately address the people’s problems 
with political party rule. Borja’s lack of charisma has been a part of his reputation 
for decades, and Neira’s mediocre campaign both damaged each of their 
electoral opportunities. Borja, referred to as one of Ecuador’s political 
“dinosaurs,” is a representation of the old, political party politician. Neira, coming 
from a costal tradition of charisma and populism, didn’t connect with the voters in 
any significant way. Traditional political parties might not have had more options 
in terms of candidate choice, but neither one managed to inspire the electorate. It 
would seem that traditional political parties have no chance of winning elections 
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unless they find leaders who can espouse a message of change in a country that 
suffers from continual political, social and economic problems. 
 In addition, the indigenous support for Gutiérrez played a tremendous role 
in his victory. Due to the plethora of candidates, having the loyalty of a powerful, 
active organization who takes voting seriously was enough to propel Gutiérrez 
into the second round. Yet, his identification with the military and his actions on 
January 21st tapped into an important group of non-indigenous, frustrated 
citizens. His complete refusal to acknowledge the supremacy of any organization 
(such as a political party) over his obligation to the people rang well with 
alienated voters. 
 An extremely important new component of the elections was the lack of 
real governmental plans espoused by either candidate. Neither Gutiérrez nor 
Noboa detailed specific ideas of governmental plans in their campaigns. This did 
not become a detriment, as the electorate focused more on the possibility of 
something new as opposed to new concrete ideas.  The lack of experience 
actually gave both of these candidates credibility in the eyes of Ecuadorians.  
Noboa and Gutiérrez both founded their own political parties in order to 
compete in the presidential campaign (El Ecuador se polariza, October 20, 
2004). While Noboa’s personal wealth has allowed him to dedicate more funding 
into the development of a political party, his strategy has been obviously 
clientelistic. Neither candidate seriously attempted to build a credible party 
organization, and rejected forming any kind of alliance with another traditional 
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political party. Gutiérrez’ alliance with Pachakutik differed, due to the fact that 
Pachakutik also ran candidates with an outsider platform, and was seen as a 
party with strong opposition to the established order. 
Finally, the lack of political experience formed another important break 
from the past in Ecuador. Neither Gutiérrez nor Noboa have held any elected 
posts in government, or have served in any governmental administrations. Both 
are complete neophytes to the political game, with weak political parties and few 
friends within the political sphere. Yet, in a country alienated by political party rule 
and constant corruption scandals, their lack of connections to any political party 
or organization formed an important base for their campaign platforms. This did 
not address how to feasibly rule once in office, but their status as a businessman 
and as a career military officer were preferred over the other four candidates, all 
of whom had significant governmental experience.   
The Second Round and the Results 
 Because of the plethora of candidates in 2002, a fact of the first round was 
that Noboa and Gutiérrez received barely more than a third of the total vote 
combined. Immediately after the elections, many analysts questioned the 
usefulness of a two round electoral system, when this can mean that candidates 
with between 17-19% of the country’s support become the only two options in the 
second round. Almost two thirds of the country didn’t choose either one as their 
preferred candidate, so Noboa and Gutiérrez had to focus on obtaining the 
 157
support of those votes. Due to relatively high levels of voter turnout, these voters 
would decide who would be the next president. 
 As second round candidates waited for endorsements from first round 
losers, few came. El Comercio commented on this lack of enthusiasm by political 
parties and movements to form alliances with either candidate. The PSC told the 
country that they would not endorse any candidate. Roldós, who had the loyalty 
of many small parties, also declined to support a candidate. He said those who 
voted for him must decide for themselves who to support, but that he personally 
would not align with either one. The ID decided to respect the elections, but 
prohibited its members from working actively to support either candidate. The 
PRE stated it was too early to pick an alliance.  
 Gutiérrez and Noboa approached the second round very differently. 
Gutiérrez immediately began to talk to political parties and established political 
organizations, hoping to build bridges with traditional parties. He decided to 
campaign in business suits more often than fatigues, and worked with important 
sectors that were nervous about what a possible Gutiérrez presidency would do 
to the perception of stability in the country. As the international media and Latin 
America watched Venezuela become increasingly polarized over Hugo Chávez 
rule, Gutiérrez worked to differentiate himself from Latin America’s other military 
president. Venezuela had suffered from serious strikes, protests, attempted 
coups, and continual political upheaval. Gutiérrez set out to convince the country 
that his presidency would be different than that of Chávez. 
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Gutiérrez wanted a very active campaign, with open and direct 
communication with the media to spread his true campaign message. Instead of 
ignoring potential opposition from important political players in Ecuador, 
Gutiérrez addressed the importance of creating a sense of calm in the sectors 
where his candidacy generated resistance. These included the business 
community, free market supporters and right leaning political groups. 
 In a field of two unexperienced outsiders, Gutiérrez focused on 
establishing a plan of government and demonstrating a coherent and pragmatic 
program for his presidency. Now that Gutiérrez had sufficient media attention, he 
wanted to distance himself from his military identity and focus on becoming a 
“civilian leader ready to peacefully achieve important reforms.” (Candidatos, 
October 23, 2003).  Though most famous for his actions in overthrowing a 
government on January 21st, 2000, Gutiérrez worked to emphasize his desire to 
peacefully and democratically make important changes in Ecuador. In regards to 
other political parties, Gutiérrez actively pursued the support of other leaders to 
work with his government. 
 Noboa did the exact opposite. Gutiérrez immediately began looking for 
alliances and working on attracting voters who didn’t vote for him in the first 
round; Noboa stayed silent. As Gutiérrez established important communication 
with the press, Noboa refused to meet with any group. Gutiérrez began to 
caravan across the country looking for support and Noboa took a vacation from 
the campaign. Noboa didn’t look for any alliances among political parties.  
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 When Noboa decided to join the campaign trail again, he began a very 
personal attack against Gutiérrez and his presidency. Allegations came out by 
Noboa that Gutiérrez had been physically abusive to his wife. Gutiérrez quickly 
rejected that claim, but Noboa went on with an ad campaign that asked if 
Ecuadorians wanted an abuser to be president. He worked to develop female 
opposition to Gutiérrez, trying to win the vote of Ecuador’s women. Noboa 
seemed to be much more comfortable personally attacking Gutiérrez as opposed 
to talking about campaign issues. 
 Politicially, Gutiérrez attempted to keep the campaign based on platforms 
and ideas. He repeatedly challenged Noboa to a live debate. After days of not 
responding, Noboa finally agreed and a debate was schedule a couple of weeks 
before the campaign. Noboa later cancelled the debate and it never occurred.  
 On November 24th, Ecuadorians returned to the polls and elected their 
next president. Lucio Gutiérrez won by a comfortable margin, even after Noboa’s 
last minute smear campaign. The night of his election, Gutiérrez claimed that he 
would never again be seen in military fatigues when doing presidential duties, 
and that he felt a great sense of responsibility to help mend some of the deep 
cleavages that existed in Ecuador.  
The Ecuadorian population knew they were going to have a new type of 
leader in 2002. They chose between a rich businessman and a military coup 
leader. Gutiérrez’s success came from his real attempt to build bridges between 
other political groups during the second round. In addition, more citizens 
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identified with Gutiérrez, a hard working military man with a strong sense of 
country as opposed to an elite member of the business society. Gutiérrez 
managed to develop support and hope among Ecuador’s indigenous population, 
and made their needs an important part of his program. Gutiérrez worked to 
create an inclusive government that addressed the needs of not only the 
business community, but also the impoverished sectors and indigenous 
community.  
Lucio Gutiérrez did not represent a victory of populism. Alvaro Noboa ran 
a completely populist campaign, and ended up losing at the polls. Gutiérrez 
became a fresh face with a new ideology for a nation in recovery from an 
extreme crisis. Gutiérrez’ attempts to reach out to all sectors of society, including 
business elites, the urban poor, the military, and indigenous citizens hopes to 
create bonds that will help the country move forward. Yet, Gutiérrez has virtually 
no support in Congress and an alliance with CONAIE that could disappear at any 
minute. 
If Gutiérrez survives his term through 2006, he will be the first president to 
do so in the last decade. Based on Ecuador’s democratic history, the next 
president will probably be a conservative, more traditional politician from the 
coast. Those following Ecuador’s current situation should watch for politicians 
mounting strong attacks against Gutiérrez to become presidential candidates. 
Finally, political parties have become almost irrelevant in Ecuador’s 
presidential elections. In 2002, candidates who affiliated with a political party 
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finished far worse than those who rejected party rule. Though political parties 
tended to have more money, deeper roots in society, and can assist in 
campaigning and advertising, this did not provide any benefits for the candidates. 
Outsiders have become serious contenders in every election in the last decade, 
and won two of the three that occurred. Expect outsider candidates to continue to 
perform strongly. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Ecuador has currently had over two decades of experience with 
democratic government. Due to widespread consensus by the military, elite 
groups, and common citizens, Ecuador seemed to have the possibility of being a 
success story of the redemocratization of Latin America. The country’s brightest 
academics and public policy analysts carefully constructed a constitution and a 
democratic system that would change some of the traditional characteristics of 
Ecuadorian democracy and create a system that functioned more smoothly. In 
order to control such endemic problems as personalism, executive-legislative 
conflict, and weak and ineffective institutions, the constitution mandated a system 
that hoped to construct independent and significant political parties. This formed 
the base for more cooperation between the legislature and the government. Yet, 
the past twenty years of democratic experiences has shown the constitution and 
laws have failed to change a political culture based on these problematic 
characteristics. 
Political Parties 
Firstly, political parties and institutions have not become stable and 
effective in the country. While the country gave politicians from political parties 
support in the 1980’s, their mediocre presidencies pushed the electorate away 
from unconditional support of any particular party. Political parties have failed to 
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adequately perform their theoretical functions, which include channeling and 
expressing interests of the electorate, helping groups elaborate their interests 
while allowing governments to govern, assisting in establishing the legitimacy of 
the political system, providing an avenue for representation, creating roots in 
society, developing and implementing programs for the country, and in 
constraining presidents who attempt to overstep their boundaries. 
 The tradition of personalism has continued within political parties. After 20 
years, these parties continue to be dominated by a person as opposed to 
ideology. Both the Izquierda Democrática (ID) and the Partido Socialcristiano 
(PSC) have obvious party bosses that make most of the party decisions, and 
often decide for themselves who will be a presidential candidate. There is very 
little room for debate within the party, and there is no avenue to dissent from the 
leader’s opinions. When Durán Ballén contested his loss of the nomination at the 
1992 party convention, there was no democratic procedure in place to address 
that. Instead, he simply split off from a political party that he had lead for decades 
and formed his own.  
 After a political party has held office, it usually becomes less popular and 
often loses support, at least temporarily. Political parties have become 
particularly vulnerable after a presidential term. An unsuccessful presidency can 
often destroy both personalist and traditional parties. No party has been able to 
win the presidency twice in the democratic era. Though one would expect 
personalist parties to have less influence after a difficult administration, this is 
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also true for established political parties. Jamil Mahuad’s party, the Democrácia 
Popular (DP), had been active in Ecuadorian politics for decades. It worked to 
develop an ideological platform, had roots in society, and a fairly democratic 
structure. It won more seats in Congress in 1998 than any other party and gave 
Mahuad strong allies in the legislature. Yet, after Mahuad’s disastrous 
presidency, the party virtually disappeared. Some of the remaining DP 
congressmen split from the party and formed a different party. The DP went from 
prominence to near extinction in less than two years.  
Due to the unsuccessful presidencies of political party candidates, few 
Ecuadorians feel any kind of long term loyalty to any particular party. The political 
parties are at fault for failing to attract a loyal electorate. The people have given 
political parties ample opportunities to prove themselves as capable 
administrators once in office. Yet, instead of developing ties to specific parties, 
the electorate evaluates its support for a party or a person based on his tangible 
performance once in office.  
The constitutional requirement that mandated presidential candidates to 
run under party banners hoped to create important ties between presidential 
leaders and congressional representatives. In an interesting twist, this resulted in 
individual candidates running under one political party and then abandoning that 
party once in office, which occurred with León Roldós’ presidency. This was a 
hint of what was to come, as in the 1990’s politicians began creating individual 
political parties with the sole purpose of meeting the constitutional requirement of 
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party affiliation to run for office. The particularly telling case of Sixto Durán 
Ballén, who failed twice to win the presidency under the PSC banner, became 
successful in his presidential aspirations after abandoning his political party and 
constructed a completely new party for a specific campaign. 
 Political parties have failed to do their most fundamental task; represent 
the needs and desires of the population. While Ecuador is not the only country in 
Latin America where this has happened, this failure has resulted in other 
movements or individuals that have tried to fill the void of representation.  
Populist and outsider presidents have attempted to construct themselves as the 
most effective ally of the people in Congress. Some have even claimed that 
political parties have proven their lack of capacity to represent the people, and 
the people should be directly represented by the president. (This reinforces the 
concept of delegative democracy).  
These new personalist political parties, created by individual politicians to 
support their presidential aspirations, have not had success in the legislative 
elections. These parties, which include the Partido Unión Republicana (PUR) 
created by Sixto Durán Ballén, the Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriana (PRE) created 
by Abdalá Bucaram, the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional 
(PRIAN) created by Alvaro Noboa, and the Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) 
created by Lucio Gutiérrez, have not won many seats in the legislature. This 
means that personalist presidents often come into power with little or no party 
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support once in office. In addition, these parties also quickly lose any influence 
they managed to gain once their leader is no longer in power. 
Legislative-Executive Relationships 
These realities highlight another important reality of Ecuadorian 
democracy. There continues to be more conflict than consensus among the 
branches of government, and the legislative-executive relationship has been 
particularly oppositional. This has been a key cornerstone of Ecuador’s political 
culture for decades, and the implementation of a democratic system has not 
found an effective way to promote cooperation between the different branches of 
government. The Roldós administration began with particularly difficult problems 
with the legislature. In addition, Febres Cordero repeatedly ignored mandates 
from Congress, which became so frustrated with the president’s authoritarianism 
that they asked for his resignation. Durán Ballén’s administration suffered as his 
vice president fled the country into exile after he made public the bribes that were 
necessary in order to have legislation passed. Congress willingly impeached 
Bucaram to end his mandate. Finally, an ex-Supreme Court justice played a key 
role in the overthrow of Mahuad’s presidency. 
 The prospects for increased cooperation are weak, particularly with the 
evolving trend of electing outsider presidents and a legislature dominated by 
traditional political parties. In the 2002 elections, President Gutiérrez’ party has 
only 7% of the seats in Congress. While that will make implementing policies 
extremely difficult on its own, Gutiérrez’ congress is dominated by ideologically 
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opposed political parties, particularly the PSC. While Gutiérrez campaigned with 
support from leftist groups and a strong role for indigenous needs, the PSC 
continues to focus on business concerns and free market reforms.  
 Gutiérrez does not have the political support necessary to implement the 
changes he advocated in his campaign. Much of his time will be spent attempting 
to build coalitions in the legislature. Particularly troubling is the fact that both 
President Bucaram and President Mahuad has significantly more allies in 
Congress than Gutiérrez, yet neither one managed to survive their 
constitutionally mandated term in office.  
An Empowered Electorate 
 One of the historic changes that occurred in 1979 with the arrival of the 
contemporary democratic era was the extension of the vote to illiterate 
Ecuadorians. Historically, this clause was used to exclude the majority of the 
population from voting and resulted in elections of elite members of society by 
the same socioeconomic class. This also prevented non-Spanish speaking 
indigenous citizens from voting. In 1979, millions of poor Ecuadorians gained the 
right to vote for the first time in history.  
 The estimated 25-40% of the indigenous population had never before 
played any role whatsoever in governmental politics or policies. With the new 
voting rules, the indigenous population began to participate in national politics. 
While in the 1980’s, their needs and demands continued to be largely ignored by 
mainstream politics, in the 1990’s they became an important and influential 
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group. Their nontraditional actions of protest against government policies (such 
as strikes, protests and uprisings) made the government pay attention to their 
needs. Methods of protest often included blocking transportation lines. This 
prevented food and other necessities from arriving to cities in the highlands. 
Presidents have begun to dialogue with CONAIE and other groups on a regular 
basis.  
The previously excluded indigenous groups and other progressive social 
movements now play an active role in the political events of the country. In a new 
trend in Ecuadorian politics, the events of the past five years has shown that  the 
people will actively support an unconstitutional dismissal of a freely and fairly 
elected president that has performed poorly in office and lost legitimacy. An 
electoral victory no longer guarantees extended support throughout their elected 
term. Bucaram was in office for only six months until he was forced to leave 
office. The public widely approved of his quasiconstitutional removal. In addition, 
Mahuad’s presidency ended because of the actions of an angry and disillusioned 
electorate. Though both Bucaram and Mahuad were elected in fair and free 
elections, it took little time for the population to revoke their support and then fight 
for his ouster. The vast majority of the population supported both Bucaram’s and 
Mahuad’s dismissal. 
This trend has intensified in the last decade. In the 1980’s, candidates 
who were elected managed to survive their terms, even if they were unpopular. 
The population waited until the elections and then rejected that candidate, their 
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party, and their ideology by voting a completely different person into office. The 
presidential elections have consisted of victorious candidates with a leftist 
ideology followed by a candidate with a free market, conservative ideology. In the 
1990’s, the electorate refused to wait for a candidate to finish his term in order to 
reject his ideology. Instead, they actively supported his dismissal. As presidents 
struggle, the electorate looks toward the incumbent’s opponent in the next 
election.  
In this last point, the 2002 elections become particularly poignant. Both 
Noboa and Gutiérrez solidified an important trend in Ecuadorian democratic 
history; Strong opposition to the incumbent government creates a favorable 
image for the following elections. Noboa attacked Mahuad in the 1998 elections, 
and accused him of cheating. Gutiérrez played a critical role in Mahuad’s 
dismissal from power. This opposition to the incumbent president also propelled 
Febres Cordero, Durán Ballén, Bucaram and Mahuad to power. 
Outsiders 
The disappointment in the Ecuadorian political system and the lack of 
effective political parties has created a rich environment for outsiders and 
populists, who campaign on opposition to what was instead of what they plan to 
do. This has created a situation where the country has little idea what to expect 
from a president when he enters office.  They claim to serve as better 
representatives of the public than other political parties or politicians. Within the 
political system, these candidates have asserted that they don’t need the support 
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or help of an established party to represent the people. In fact, some have said 
that they can be the voice of the frustrated within the system. The increasing 
successes of candidates who reject parties as means of representation are 
performing well in elections.  
Yet, these candidates are often unclear about the logistics and plans of 
their government and have little legislative support. This vagueness, while 
popular during the election season, comes with a price. The country has extreme 
constraints placed on it by the international financial community. Any government 
has little room to maneuver and little access to funds to implement real programs 
that impact the levels of poverty and unemployment. Outsider candidates often 
don’t address this reality, and don’t include necessary budgetary cutbacks and 
austerity measures as part of their platforms. Yet, once in office, the president 
has no control in this respect.  After making promises to millions of poor to 
improve their quality of life, provide new services, and work advocating for their 
needs, these candidates often come into the presidency with little room to 
maneuver. They then must continue complying with austerity measures imposed 
by international financial institutions, and the budget does not allow for new 
social programs. These candidates quickly lose their legitimacy and support if 
they can’t fulfill at least some of their campaign promises. Bucaram’s presidency 
is a prime example of this reality. After winning the presidency, over two million 
Ecuadorians participated in a strike against him that assisted in his ouster a mere 
six months after he became president. 
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Social Movements 
 People have organized in other ways to voice their needs. They have 
mobilized and become organized. Some groups have decided that in order to be 
heard, they must work outside of the system to put pressure on the government 
to listen to them and their demands. These groups, including powerful social 
movements, (particularly CONAIE) and other organizations, such as labor unions 
and student groups have become important actors in the political reality of the 
country.  
In this aspect, social movements have become a source of representation 
for previously ignored populations. Some social movements reject the idea of 
forming a political party and working within the system for change. They assert 
that the system is inherently corrupt, so change must be forced from the outside. 
The strikes, mobilizations and protests employed by these groups to receive 
concessions from government have formed another attempt at representation. 
They have participated in unconventional actions that have resulted in regime 
changes in the government. Some assert that this is an ultimate example of 
democracy, while others argue that groups such as this disrupt the democratic 
process. Many members of these organizations argue that the democratic 
system gives them no real representation, so they are forced to voice their 
demands in different ways. 
Though most of Ecuador seems committed to the democratic process, the 
country elected Gutiérrez, a man who became famous because of his role in an 
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unconstitutional dismissal of the previous freely and fairly elected president. As 
evidenced by the UNDP report, much of the region of Latin America continues to 
feel ambivalent about democracy as a political system. Much more concerned 
with effective rule and solutions to economic problems, the populace in Ecuador 
would likely support any group that could establish some control over the 
country’s financial situation. Gutiérrez’s affiliation with the armed forces has 
posed the question of whether civilian administrators are really in the best 
interest of the country.  
Any president of Ecuador enters office in an extremely difficult situation. 
They must juggle international financial requirements with national social 
demands. The president walks a fine line between losing credibility with the 
international community or his own people. The organization of the political 
system, with Congress based on coalition building, does not give the president 
significant support to make decisions. The population has demonstrated that they 
only have so much tolerance for economic decline and governmental scandal. 
Therefore, a president entering office must be prepared to negotiate and work 
with multiple groups just to keep the country stable. 
 Finally, the structure of the political system could be a source of ineffective 
presidencies. While the electoral system has often given the presidencies to 
outsiders, once in government these outsiders face enormous opposition from a 
congress dominated by insiders. The population has repeatedly elected 
presidents without giving them any support in congress. In the past, this has 
 173
meant difficult coalition building. Presidents have asserted that this reality also 
assisted in the continual endemic corruption within the system, as presidents 
believe they must bribe political parties for their support once in office. This 
reality finds its roots in a constitution that continues to insist that political parties 
play a critical role in government. As political parties become increasingly 
illegitimate, the system might need some fundamental changes to allow 
presidents the capacity to govern. 
Final Thoughts 
Perhaps the most important problem in Ecuador stems from a genuine 
feeling that the population has no institutional avenues of representation within 
the governmental system. While political parties are supposed to be the 
intermediaries between government and the people, the parties in Ecuador have 
not managed to successfully do so. As the electorate has become more 
empowered to advocate for their rights, new forms of representation within and 
outside the political system has occurred. While Ecuador is not the only country 
in Latin America where this has happened, this failure has resulted in other 
movements or individuals that have tried to fill the void of representation.  
 Populist and outsider presidents have attempted to construct themselves 
as the most effective ally of the people in within the system. Some have even 
claimed that political parties have proven their lack of capacity to represent the 
people, and the people should be directly represented by the president. Other 
groups, outside the system, have attempted to become representatives of the 
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people and have included important, powerful social movements, (particularly 
CONAIE) and other organizations, such as labor unions and student groups.  
 Until the political system provides proper avenues for people to voice their 
opposition and frustration within the system, social movements and outsider 
presidents will continue to be popular.  
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